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2Abstract
State ownership in banking has received considerable coverage in the academic literature. However, 
there are very few recognised case studies of state ownership of banks in developed countries. The 
motivation for this thesis is thus to investigate the properties of state ownership in the context of a 
highly developed country
Theoretical and empirical work suggest that the success of government ownership in banks depends 
on the quality of government and financial institutions, independent regulation, the rationale for 
ownership, and recognition of good corporate governance standards. Apart from some minor issues, 
the case study of the Norwegian government's bank ownership supports this view. Institutions are 
well  developed, the rationale  for  ownership is  moderate,  and the government  applies corporate 
governance standards that are broadly agreed upon. The result  is  that  the government is rather 
successful  in  achieving  its  goals,  and  avoiding  most  of  the  pitfalls  normally  associated  with 
government ownership.
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5Part 1 Background
Questions pertaining to the reasons and outcomes of government ownership of enterprise have been 
discussed in depth both within academic and political circles. Furthermore, the debate has evolved 
following several  paradigmatic shifts  in thinking about ownership and state involvement  in the 
economy. From the mercantilistic economy of the earlier centuries towards the current paradigm of 
the Washington consensus,  theory and experience have supplied us with the tools  necessary to 
discuss the topic of government ownership in a broad context of prerequisites and implications. 
However, the discussion has often been generalised in its broad focus on government ownership, 
and there has been a lack of attention paid to government ownership in specific sectors of the 
economy. This preliminary part of the paper begins with a discussion of issues pertaining to state 
ownership in general. Thereafter, we will endavour into a more thorough investigation of the results 
and implications of academic work conserned with the specific case of state-owned banks. 
1.1 State ownership in general
1.1.1 The debate on government ownership and interference
In a supposedly balanced inquiry into the broad set of aspects related to government ownership and 
privatisation,  von Weisäcker et  al.  (2005) reflect  on the historical  prerequisites for privatisation 
throughout the 20th century. They refer to the fact that much of the 19th and the earlier part of the 
20th century were characterised by a large and increasing share of government  involvement in 
societal  functions.  This involvement  included goods and services within social  and commercial 
infrastructure.  Communist  ideologies  gaining  a  foothold  within  the  Soviet  states  and  socialist 
ideologies evolving in  Western Europe and Latin  America provided the political  circumstances 
under which nationalisation schemes were possible and supposedly in the interest of the people. 
Earlier colonies of the European nations adopted nationalisation policies as a response to the need 
for essential infrastructure in a period of transition from colonial rule.
However, the common belief that government ownership and interference in economic development 
were contributing to a more efficient economy met severe criticism in the later part of the 20th 
century. In particular, economic theory generated in the 1960's laid the academic foundation of a 
privatisation movement emanating in the 1980's. A diverse set of phenomena were pushing for an 
increase  in  privatisation  measures  and  a  reduction  in  restrictions  on  private  enterprise. 
Technological developments, globalisation and the growth of private operators led to a trend of 
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alternative mode of production, preferably in the hands of private owners and entrepreneurs. This 
would  presumably  improve  efficiency,  and  the  efficiency  measures  applied  supported  such  a 
paradigmatic shift. Renowned scholars such as Hayek, Friedman and Coase had contributed to an 
understanding  of  the  political  economy as  a  conflict  between  the  societal  goals  of  equity  and 
efficiency. Government involvement through ownership was perceived as a form of cronyism, and 
would thus probably lead to inefficient outcomes. This neo-classical perspective gained influence as 
the Keynesian perspective, its ideological adversary at the time, was increasingly associated with 
the simultaneous presence of two economic evils,  namely stagnation and inflation. They jointly 
constituted the feared stagflation that could be avoided, almost exclusively, by restricting the role of 
government and focusing on sound and conservative fiscal and monetary policies. An important 
factor in such policies was the belief that the view of classical economics pertaining to market 
failure  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  government  failure.  In  elementary  courses  in 
microeconomics,  most  students  become  familiar  with  possible  market  failures  caused  by 
externalities, public goods and natural monopolies. These phenomena are somewhat interrelated, 
but the important stance is that the economic disturbances they create can be overcome by actions 
taken  by  a  benevolent  government  through  regulation  or  outright  ownership  of  the  factors  of 
production.  As  with  most  other  theories,  we  start  off  with  a  simplification  where  the  basic 
assumptions need empirical evidence for the theory to be valid. 
Von  Weisäcker  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  the  historical  debate  on  government  ownership  and 
interference has been characterised by polar perspectives on the ability and willpower of the state in 
acting  on  behalf  of  its  subjects.  The  classical  economic  perspective  that  professors  teach  in 
elementary economics courses makes a decisive assumption about the benevolence of the state. The 
two polar perspectives disagree on the prevalence of such a characteristic of the state authorities. 
The statist view holds that, lacking a direct profit motive, the public sector will automatically act in 
the  interest  of  the  public  good.  The  state  is  perceived  as  benevolent.  The  libertarian  view, 
exemplified by Milton Friedman, assumes that competition and profit-seeking will lead to allocative 
efficiency as producers who successfully satisfy consumer demand will survive, while those that do 
not,  will  perish.  The  market  is  seen  as  efficient  while  the  state  is  inevitably  inefficient  and 
sometimes even malevolent.  These two perspectives are extreme in the sense that they are  not 
exhaustive, and do not consider more pragmatic alternatives. They agree, however, that the right 
ownership of assets is the key to good results. Von Weisäcker et al. (2005) consider the majority of 
the 'classic'  privatisation efforts  during the 1980's  in a libertarian perspective,  where change of 
7ownership  was  key.  Including  another  dimension  to  the  debate,  the  theory  and  application  of 
regulation provide a more pragmatic stance to the debate. Whether the state or the private sector is 
in control of assets, regulation can presumably avoid some of the undesirable traits related to one or 
the other of the two ownership types. 
The authors provide a significant amount of evidence in favour of such a pragmatic view, where 
privatisation accompanied by strong regulation produces good results. In recent years, some have 
argued for public ownership accompanied by strong, independent regulation which can ensure that 
public services operate in the interest of their users rather than their employees. Von Weisäcker et al. 
provide several examples of  more or less successful initiatives to make public service providers 
more  accountable   and  responsive  in  order  to  improve  performance  without  resorting  to 
privatisation. The increased focus on regulation can, to a certain extent, be seen as evidence of an 
increase in state influence in recent years.
1.1.2 The state as owner of last resort
In a classic paper entitled Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Gerschenkron (1962) 
argues  that  industrialisation  processes  in  a  number  of  historical  instances  differed  along  the 
dimension of economic backwardness or, in other words, the lag between the the leading industrial 
nation(s) and those that followed in the path of industrial transformation. The potential for industrial 
development is said to depend on the relative backwardness of a particular country. Even though 
there were many obstacles in the way of  successful  industrialisation attempts,  the potential  for 
adopting  technological  innovations  developed  in  the  early  industrialised  states  constituted  a 
considerable opportunity to narrow the gap. One of the most important obstacles was the financing 
of necessary infrastructure and production facilities. 
The main argument holds that the lag in initiation of industrialisation had certain effects on the 
institutional framework for financing industrial endeavours In England, the gradual industrialisation 
and the  related building up of  capital  in  a  pre-industrial  period facilitated private  financing of 
industrial development and made potential universal or industrial banks unnecessary. In backward 
countries, the wealth was less concentrated and there was considerable distrust in industrialisation 
processes. This context made private entrepreneurial initiatives more cumbersome, and left a gap to 
be filled by financial institutions with a long-term perspective such as the Crédit Mobilier in France 
and the universal banks in Germany. A third path for financing industrial transformation occurred in 
8Russia in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In this instance, the state took responsibility for 
industrialisation  based  on  military  necessities  under  unfavourable  economic  circumstances.  In 
contrast to industrialisation in Germany and France a couple of decades earlier, the financing of 
industrial transformation in Russia could not rely on banks. A distinctive feature of the Russian 
economy at the time was the extreme dispersion of wealth which made it almost impossible for a 
banking system to attract enough funds to finance large-scale industrialisation. The state managed 
to  acquire  the  necessary  financing  through  taxation,  effectively  directing  resources  from 
consumption to investment. The involvement of the Russian state in the process of industrialisation 
has been severely criticised by the lack of efficiency, and the presence of corruptive practices and 
incompetence  in  the  bureaucracy.  However,  the  state  made  a  significant  and  unavoidable 
contribution to industrial development in Russia.
What we can learn from Gerschenkron's (1962) elaborations on industrialisation in Europe is that 
the institutional  framework for  investment  in  industrial  enterprise  depends on the  allocation of 
wealth within a nation. The allocation of wealth depended on the relative backwardness of a nation 
and  its  former  economic  activities.  In  some cases  there  was  a  role  for  the  state  in  economic 
development through ownership or, in more general terms, through the effective reallocation of 
wealth and resources from consumption towards investment. More recent studies have also paid 
attention to the effect of the structure of wealth on the institutional framework for allocation of 
capital,  but  the  main  focus  has  been  directed  towards  prerequisites  for  'good'  government 
interference in the economy. 
1.1.3 Prerequisites for government involvement and ownership
Evans  (1995)  observes  that  during  the  twentieth  century  the  state  has  gained  an  increasingly 
pervasive influence as an institution and a  social  actor  from the poorestto  the  most  developed 
welfare states. The modern state has been bestowed upon a role in economic transformation and 
welfare.  Mainly  because  the  success  of  the  state  has  become  more  dependent  on  economic 
performance,  its  legitimacy rests  to a larger extent  on its  ability to intervene effectively in the 
economy. Evans (1995) argues that the global context of the international division of labour, more 
service  oriented  industries,  and  the  evolution  of  industries  that  are  less  dependent  on  natural 
endowments has extended the potential role of state-led industrial transformation. His argument can 
be  analysed  along  the  lines  of  comparative  advantage,  where  the  original  Ricardian  version 
emphasise natural endowments while Hecksher and Ohlin's refinement focuses on relative domestic 
scarcities of labour and capital. Considering more recent theoretical endeavours to pin-point the 
9determinants of comparative advantage (see Porter 1990 and Cline 1987), the emergence of such 
seems to rely on an increasingly complex system of competitive and corporate ties among local 
firms, as well government policies and a host of other social and political institutions.
Even though Evans studies economic transformation in the particular context of the IT sector in 
newly industrialising countries, his perspective and theoretical argument extends to a more general 
perspective on state intervention in the economy. State-led economic transformation can push for 
participation  in so-called "leading sectors" located in the innovative end of the product cycle, 
where  the  highest  value-added  is  created.  Landes  (1998),  an  economic  historian,  supports  the 
statement that comparative advantage can change, for the better or worse of a nation's economic 
well-being. Evans (1995) argues that we need to focus on the quality and not the amount of state 
intervention.There is considerable variation in the internal structure of states and in their relations 
with society as a whole. These factors contribute to the determination of states' capacities for action 
and the roles that states are capable of playing. In making a distinct separation between predatory 
states  and  developmental  states,  Evans  adds  an  interesting  point  of  view to  the  debate  on  the 
benevolence of the state. Predatory states are those that extract resources from the society in a way 
that hampers development and capital accumulation. Developmental states, on the other hand, are 
those  that  have not  only presided over  development,  but  also contributed actively to  industrial 
transformation and economic development. The problem with predatory states is that they lack the 
ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals instead of acting in the 
general interest of the people. Developmental states have an internal structure more similar to the 
Weberian ideal of bureaucracy. Recruitment based on merits and long-term career concerns creates 
a sense of commitment and coherence which, in Evans' opinion, provide the state with a certain 
autonomy. However, the developmental state is also highly embedded in society as it interacts with 
other actors,  among them private entrepreneurs.  It  is not  insulated from society such as Weber 
described the ideal bureaucracy. These characteristics of the developmental state is what Evans calls 
'embedded autonomy'. It refers to a state which is autonomous in its decision making, even though 
these decisions are considered to be valuable only as far as they are embedded in society. 
It thus becomes clear that we need to include characteristics of states pertaining to their internal 
organisation and external ties in order to make decent predictions related to the efficacy of state 
involvement in the economy. In light of more recent academic literature and official statements 
made by  the  World  Bank and the  IMF,  Evans  argues  that  the  neo-liberal  perspective  on  state 
involvement in the economy, namely that such involvement is unnecessary and harmful, no longer 
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has the same relevance and support as it had in the 1970's and 80's.
1.1.4 Ownership and the political agenda
Politics and economics is of course closely connected, and this is often the case with ownership 
policies as well. Politicians are in the business of pleasing their constituencies and producing the 
policies which are  in  the interest  of  associated lobby groups,  employers,  employees,  and other 
groups with political power in a society. In democratic states, the basic prediction of the public 
choice theory (see Mueller 2003) is that, at least in the long run, the politicians will base their 
political choices on the interest of the median voter. More elaborate theories within this line of 
thought point to the importance of interest groups and politician's structural dependence on capital 
owners in forming their policies (Przeworski 1990). Government ownership has to be considered in 
a context of political dependence, especially in democratic countries. This has led several authors to 
question  the  purpose  of  government  ownership,  and  direct  attention  towards  governments  and 
public servants who exploit  government ownership stakes to further their own political  agenda. 
Bennedsen (1998) theorises that political involvement in the operation of firms can provide lobby 
groups  with  incentives  to  try  to  influence  policy  choices,  giving  rise  to  inefficient  behaviour. 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1994)  argue  that  politicians  will  try  to  bribe  managers  of  state  owned 
enterprises into pursuing political objectives such as excess employment. An important element of 
such arguments is that voters cannot organise in order to conduct sufficient monitoring activity of 
the state policies. Politicians will thus not be held entirely responsible for money spent on bribing or 
subsidising businesses and/or interest groups, but will gain significant political support from such 
schemes.
Empirical studies comparing the performance of publicly owned versus privately owned firms seem 
to  indicate  that  the  publicownership  entails  lower  economic  performance  (Ehrlich  et  al.  1994, 
Megginson et al. 1994, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). Some even find evidence supporting the view 
that the reason for inefficiency in publicly owned firms is excess employment (Bartel and Harrison 
1999). There may be more than a handful of political objectives that politicians would like to pursue 
through the government ownership stake in different sectors of the economy, but we will not go into 
detail on all such potential political schemes here. It is, however, important to bear in mind all of the 
potential objectives of politicians when trying to identify  the motive and possible consequences of 
government ownership.
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1.2 State ownership and involvement in banking
Banks are in general highly regulated, and are often characterised by state ownership. They are 
more often than not considered to be a special type of firm, constituting an essential part of modern 
economies.  They  were  at  the  heart  of  the  recent  financial  crisis,  even  though  there  is  some 
disagreement as to whether they were the only institutions to blame for the economic downturn  we 
have seen the last two years. Whatever the initial causes of the crisis, it has shown how dependent 
the economy is on a healthy banking system, and what may be the result if something goes awfully 
wrong. Commentators have referred to the depression of the 1930's as a comparable crisis. Banks 
failures also played an important part in the economic downturn in the thirties, and the effects on 
the real economy were devastating. Possible links from bank failure to the real economy are loss of 
deposits (less relevant in the contemporary context of deposit insurance), reduction in the supply of 
loans and other banking services, and contagion from one or more failed banks to the rest of the 
financial  industry  (Ashcraft  2005).  As  banks  are  considered  to  be  cornerstones  of  modern 
economies,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  governments  to  secure  their  well-being.  This  explains  the 
emphasis  on  regulation  and  government  interference  in  this  industry,  but  does  not  provide 
politicians and government officials with a clear policy as to how they should intervene in this 
sector. 
1.2.1 The debate on state ownership in banking
Views on government ownership of banks has developed over time. In the post-World War II period 
policy-makers  seemed to  be  more  inclined  towards  direct  state  ownership than in  more  recent 
periods (Andrews 2005), which also included ownership in banks. From the 1970's and onwards, 
state ownership of banks has fallen into disfavour, which has led to numerous privatisation in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. Supporters of government ownership in banks often cite the 
developmental role of government with respect to the financial sector. Governments who prefer to 
be in control of strategic sectors of the economy often refer to banking as one such sector.
A less benign view of government ownership in banking argues that such involvement is based on 
political objectives such as the support of some supporters at the expense of the economy as a 
whole. This "political view" holds that state-owned banks are particularly desirable as instruments 
for pleasing political constituencies as it is easier to disguise politically motivated lending policies 
given the complexity of the banking industry and the resulting asymmetry of information between 
banks and outsiders. Such inefficient lending may turn out to be harmful to the financial condition 
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of state-owned banks, but losses due to politically motivated lending policies can often be deferred 
for some time. This provides political incumbents with a possibility to gain political support while 
potential losses occur during the reign of other political parties or regimes. 
Whether state-owned banking is based on a developmental view or a political view, the motive for 
government  control  is  to  finance  projects  that  would  not  be  funded  without  government 
intervention. The difference between the two perspectives on government ownership in banking is 
that the developmental view assumes a more or less benign government which acts in the interest of 
the  people  and  economic  growth,  while  the  political  view  holds  that  government  is  mainly 
interested in servicing the needs and demands of a smaller group of political supporters, or gaining 
the support of such constituencies. 
1.2.2 Legal system, financial development, and government interference
Most of the empirical work on the topic have revealed that government banks underperform relative 
to privately owned banks (Ianotta et al 2007, Berger et al 2005, Bonin et al 2005), even though 
some authors provide evidence that the gains related to privatisation of banks are less significant 
than  that  related  to  privatisation  in  other  sectors  (Verbrugge  et  al  1999).  Some  even  find  no 
significant  performance difference between publicly  and privately owned banks (Altunbas  et  al 
2001). However, there might still exist legitimate reasons for government ownership. In light of 
Gerschenkron's   view on development,  government  ownership could be  a  necessary evil  if  the 
private sector is unable to finance the establishment of banks. Admitting that private banking has to 
be accompanied by a  certain institutional,  regulatory,  and legal framework in order to function 
properly,  Verbrugge  et  al  (1999)  list  nine minimum conditions1 for  achieving a  viable  banking 
system through privatisation. They constitute a list of requirements that could be difficult to satisfy, 
especially in countries in transition (see for example Sherif et al 2003).
Several authors point out that state ownership of banks are more prevalent in countries with a less 
developed  financial,  regulatory  and  legal  system.  La  Porta  et  al  (2002)  find  that  government 
ownership is associated with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems and 
poor protection of property rights, while Andrews' (2005) empirical study provide evidence that 
state-owned banks occur more frequently in countries with weak institutions such as the rule of law, 
1These conditions include: deposit insurance, a sufficiently independent regulatory system, governance systems of truly 
independent shareholders, good financial reporting systems, methods for dealing with bad loans before and during 
privatisation, elimination of the propensity to lend to state owned enterprises (SOE's), assurances that if the government 
retains minority ownership it will act as a passive owner, reduction of the influence of insider control, and acceptance of 
sales to foreign owners in order to attract sufficient capital
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and insufficient government infrastructure. These studies are somewhat interrelated to studies on the 
effect of legal systems and framework on financial development. Beck et al (2003, 2005) find that 
adaptability of the legal system, a trait associated with legal systems based on common law, is 
negatively correlated with obstacles which firms report  they face in accessing external  finance. 
Djankov et al (2007) study data on creditor protection through credit registries and legal creditor 
rights and conclude that these factors are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross
domestic product. La Porta et al (1998) find evidence supportive of the hypothesis that financing by 
diversified shareholders  is  more difficult  in  countries  which lacks  a  sufficient  legal  framework 
designed  to  protect  small  shareholders.  All  these  articles  support  the  view  that  efficient  and 
sustainable financial markets depend on some particular legal institutions and information systems. 
This is supportive of Gerschenkron's view that the state may feel obliged to take on responsibility 
for financial intermediation in situations where no decent alternative exits. However, the state is 
also at  least  partially  responsible  for  the legal  framework and most  of  the  institutions  that  are 
fundamental to a well-functioning financial market. Thus, government has a dual role in financial 
development. On the one hand, government controlled banks and financial institutions can alleviate 
some of the problems related to the lack of a decent private sector, and thus remove some of the 
pressure for regulatory and legal reform. On the other hand, the lack of a decent and effective legal 
and  institutional  framework  strengthen  the  call  for  government  to  be  responsible  for  financial 
services. In other words, governments may face a dilemma in its choice of policy for financial 
development. 
1.2.3 Finance and growth
Several authors have indicated a positive empirical relationship between financial development and 
the development of the economy as a whole. In 1911, Joseph A. Scumpeter argued that the services 
provided  by  financial  intermediaries  were  crucial  for  technological  innovation  and  economic 
development.  Some have  argued that  the  causality  goes  in  the  other  direction,  from economic 
development to financial development, while others have discredited the importance of financial 
intermediation as a driver of growth altogether (see for example King and Levine 1993). Several 
recent academic papers on the subject have found evidence supportive of Schumpeter's argument, 
and the debate seems to have shifted it's focal point towards the specific, beneficial constituents of 
financial development and their impact on economic development. 
In a cross-country study of 80 countries for the period 1960-1989, King and Levine (1993) find 
evidence in support of Scumpeter's view that the financial system can promote economic growth. 
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They find that various measures of the level of financial development are strongly associated with 
real per capita GDP growth, the rate of physical capital accumulation, and improvements in the 
efficiency with which economies employ physical capital. In an examination of links between the 
financial and real sectors of five countries that experienced rapid industrialisation in the 1870-1929 
period2, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) find evidence supportive of the view that the intensity of 
financial intermediation has a positive impact on economic output. Rousseau (1999) also find that 
the expansion of the financial  superstructure that began near the Meiji restoration in Japan (ca. 
1879) played a leading role in the rapid expansion of output and investment over the next three 
decades.
For a long time, academics have tried to identify the channels through which financial development 
affects  economic  growth  and  performance.  Levine  and  Zervos  (1998)  find  empirical  evidence 
suggesting that stock market liquidity and banking development are both positively and robustly 
correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity growth. Since their measures of stock market liquidity and banking development both 
are statistically significant in explaining growth, the findings suggest that banks provide a different 
type  of  financial  services  than  stock  markets.  Beck  et  al  (2000)  find  evidence  indicating  that 
financial intermediaries exert a large, positive impact on total factor productivity growth, which 
feeds  through  to  overall  GDP growth.  A potential  link  between  financial  intermediaries  and 
productivity is the quality of lending procedures. One particular study supports this view. Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1996) study the effect of liberalising intrastate branch reform in the U.S. on economic 
growth, and find that such branch reform led to accelerating economic growth, mainly  through 
increases in loan quality. However, the availability of external finance does not always correspond 
to the demand, and under such circumstances the provision of additional external finance may be 
more important than the quality of the intermediation process. Supportive of this view, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) find that industries that are relatively more in need of external finance develop 
disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial systems. It is fair to say that the 
general idea that financial development can foster development of the real economy has gained 
enormous support in the empirical literature. In this paper, however, it is of greater interest to look 
at the role of banks in the financial system and their effect on economic development.
1.2.4 Banking and the economy
Financial markets can be thought of as the "brain" of the entire economic system, the central locus 
2 U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden
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of decision-making: if they fail, not only will the sector's profits be lower than they would otherwise 
have been, but the performance of the entire economic system may be impaired (Stiglitz et  al. 
1993).  Banks  play  a  pivotal  role  in  the  financial  markets,  especially  when  other  parts  of  the 
financial market does not function properly. The principal roles of financial markets in general, and 
banks in particular, consist of transferring capital from savers to borrowers; agglomerating capital; 
selecting projects;  monitoring;  enforcing contracts;  transferring,  sharing,  and pooling risks;  and 
recording  transactions.  In  this  description,  banks  and  capital  markets  deal  not  only  with 
intertemporal  trade  but  also  with  risk  and information.  The  three  are  inexorably  linked.  Since 
intertemporal trade involves dollars today for promises of dollars in the future, there is always the 
risk of default, and information about the borrower's likelihood of repayment is critical. Thus even 
if we would like to separate the exchange, risk, and information roles, we cannot. This complicated 
constellation of tasks is what defines the role of banks and financial markets.
Academics have for a long time tried to pin-point the separate effect of banking development on the 
economy,  and whether  banks provide  services different  from those  provided by other  financial 
intermediaries. Ashcraft (2005) study FDIC-induced failures of healthy banks in the U.S. in 1988 
and 1992, and find that these failures had significant and apparently permanent  effects  on real 
economic activity, mainly through a severe contraction in bank lending. This result tends to confirm 
that banks have an important role as intermediaries which cannot easily, or hastily be replaced. In 
other words, banks are special intermediaries. James (1987) argues that bank loans are unique in the 
sense that banks provide a special service in their lending activity that is not available from other 
lenders.  His empirical  results  indicate  that borrowers bear the costs  of reserve requirements on 
certificates of deposits. Furthermore, he finds a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of 
new  bank  credit  arrangements  that  is  larger  than  the  stock  price  reaction  to  other  credit 
arrangements. These two findings indicate that banks provide a special service which has a value in 
the stock market exceeding the indirect cost of reserve requirements. 
The effect of competition on banking activity seems to be yet another particular trait of the industry. 
Normally, economic theory predicts that increased competition will benefit the consumer or buyers 
of services offered by a firm. However, banking is more complicated because of its intermediary 
role and deposit  insurance. Empirical  evidence point to a potentially negative effect of banking 
competition on newly formed and small firms' ability to attract debt financing3. Some authors stress 
3 In a study of the firm-level impact of the Riegle-Neil Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 in the 
U.S., Zarutskie (2006) finds that increased competition in the banking market resulted in newly formed firms taking on 
less external debt and realising higher returns on assets. The effects are reversed as firms age, and the author contends 
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the  efforts  of  smaller  banks  in  attaining  'soft'  information  on  borrowers,  which  is  particularly 
important for smaller firms with a limited historical and accounting record4. Whatever the reasons, 
the  differential  lending  behaviour  of  large  and  small  banks  is  an  important  and  specific 
characteristic of banking, and should be treated carefully by government as owner and regulator.
1.2.5 Government ownership and economic performance
Given the importance of the banking sector in the economy and the ineffectiveness of the private 
sector in providing necessary banking services under some circumstances, government ownership 
and start-ups of banks could potentially alleviate some of the financing problems faced by firms. On 
the other hand, government ownership may be susceptible to partisan political influence and social 
and developmental objectives could conflict with commercial viability (Andrews 2005).  In trying 
to identify a specific effect of government ownership of banks on economic performance, scholars 
encounter  the problem of  disentangling the effect  of  government  ownership from the effect  of 
associated  insufficiency  of  the  institutional  framework.  As  Andrews  note,  countries  with  poor 
institutional  structure  are  more  likely  to  have  state-owned  banks  and  weak  public  sector 
governance, and thus are more prone to banking crises. Improving the institutional structure,
including reducing the direct intervention of government in economic activities, usually involves 
reducing government  ownership in the banking sector.  Whether or not state-owned banks have 
adverse  effects  on  the  likelihood  of  banking  crises,  a  typical  response  to  such  crises  is 
nationalisation and subsequent divestiture. 
The prevalence of government ownership within banking has triggered a thorough investigation of 
its track record. La Porta et al (2002) document a large and pervasive government ownership of 
banks around the world. Looking at numbers for 1995, these authors find that the world mean of 
government ownership in banking was 41.6 percent. This is a surprisingly high percentage if we 
take into consideration that bank privatisation had been completed in many countries during the 
period stretching from 1970 to 1995. Furthermore, La Porta et al find that government ownership is 
more prevalent in countries characterised by poverty, lack of political rights and democracy, lower 
security of property rights, and where government is less efficient. This evidence does not bode well 
that there is a differential impact of competition on firms depending on their age which has been underscored in earlier 
literature on the subject.
4 Berger, Miller et al (2005) find that small banks tend to lend to more difficult clients while bigger banks lend to larger 
firms with a good accounting record. Adding that larger banks lend at a greater distance, interacts more impersonally 
with their borrowers, and have shorter and less exclusive relationships lead the authors to conclude that small banks 
have an advantage in lending based on soft information. This type of information contrasts with the hard information 
which relates to numbers and accounting figures easily analysed from a distance, potentially in a back-office of a larger 
bank.
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for effective state  administration of banks.  Consequently,  La Porta  et  al  (2002) find significant 
statistical evidence of state ownership leading to reduction in subsequent financial development. 
They also find a negative and significant relationship between government ownership and economic 
and  productivity  growth.  However,  in  dividing  their  sample  into  financially  developed  and 
underdeveloped countries, they find that government ownership has a statistically significant effect 
on income growth only in less financially developed countries. Developed countries appear to  be 
better equipped  to deal with the potentially negative consequences of government ownership. 
Apart from evidence suggesting state ownership is associated with more poorly operated financial 
systems (Barth et al. 1999), a collection of diverse studies paint a more nuanced picture. Verbrugge 
et  al.  (1999)  find  a  limited  effect  of  privatisation  on  bank  profitability,  operating  efficiency, 
leverage,  and  non-interest  revenue.  However,  they argue  that  continued significant  government 
ownership hampers market-oriented governance and decision-making systems. Some evidence of 
the differential impact of government ownership comes from a wide variety of country studies. In a 
study of the German banking market,  Altunbas et  al  (2001) find little evidence to suggest  that 
privately  owned  banks  are  more  efficient  than  their  mutual  and  public-sector  counterparts.  In 
Argentina, Berger et al (2005) observe that state-owned banks have poor long-term performance 
and  that  state-owned  banks  who  underwent  privatisation  improved  dramatically5.  The  poor 
performance  of  some of  the  state-owned banks  could  be related to  an  insufficient  institutional 
structure.  Supportive  of  this  view,  the  authors  find  that  state-owned  banks  that  underwent 
restructuring also experienced positive results. In Italy, Sapienza's (2004) empirical study indicates 
that state-owned banks charge lower interest  rates than do privately owned banks to similar or 
identical firms, even if firms are able to borrow more from privately owned banks. Furthermore, 
state-owned banks mostly favour large firms and firms located in depressed areas, and their lending 
behaviour is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank: the stronger the 
political party in the area where the firm is borrowing, the lower the interest rates charged. 
Studies of particular groups of countries can enlighten our understanding of the subject even more. 
A study by Dinç (2005) suggests that government-owned banks in emerging markets increase their 
lending in election years relative to private banks. Emerging economies thus seem to experience 
difficulties in restraining politically motivated lending. On the other hand, the analysis finds no such 
5 However, one of the problems of the banking sector in Argentina was the provision of easy and cheap credit to 
provincially-owned banks through rediscounting from the central bank. This allowed these banks to finance many 
questionable projects for the provincial governments. This problem was alleviated through regulation, and the 
provincial banks encountered financial distress as their cheap source of funds disappeared.
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election-year increase in the lending policies of government-owned banks in developed economies. 
In a study of transition countries, Bonin et al.  (2005) observe that privatization by itself is not 
sufficient to increase bank efficiency as government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient 
than domestic private banks. The most positive impact of change in ownership occurs when foreign 
owners enter the market. Their empirical results suggest that foreign-owned banks, in particular 
those with a strategic foreign owner6, collect more deposits and make more loans, adjusted for size, 
than domestic private banks indicating that they provide better service as well. The question of 
whether  the government  is  an owner  seems to  be  less  important  than  whether  enough foreign 
investors and owners are present in these transitional markets. In a study which tries to identify the 
necessary factors for a well-developed financial system, Andrianova et al (2008) find cross-country 
evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively more important determinants of the share 
of state banks than political or historical ones. They argue that rather than privatizing or subsidizing 
state  banks,  governments  in  developing  countries  should  build  institutions  that  foster  the 
development of private banking. The performance of government owned banks seem to depend on 
some country specific factors that are more frequent in developed countries. Some have argued that 
institutional structure and legal framework are among these factors, and this is an argument that fits 
quite well with the empirical research on the subject. 
Yeyati et al (2004) separates developing from developed nations in their study of state-owned banks 
and their effect on the national economy. They find that the significance of state-owned banks are 
negatively correlated with GDP per capita in poorer countries, but that this correlation disappears 
when they control for an index of overall government intervention in the economy. Furthermore, 
they find no significant correlation between state-owned banks and GDP per capita in industrial 
countries. As in more general studies, when applying the analysis to all countries, these authors find 
evidence of a negative correlation between state ownership and GDP per capita. This study support 
the hypothesis that state-owned banks have different effects on the economy depending on whether 
we are looking at developing or developed nations, and on the intensity of government intervention 
in general. It also becomes clear that, while institutional factors seem to be unrelated to state-owned 
banks  in  developed  countries,  such  factors  are  correlated  with  state-ownership  in  developing 
countries. In developing countries, the authors find a positive correlation between rule of law and 
state-ownership, and a negative relationship between property rights and state-ownership. Another 
interesting result is that, conditional on a given share of public bank ownership, the positive impact 
6 The participation of an international institutional investor has a considerable additional positive impact on profit 
efficiency
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of financial development on growth is larger in countries with a large share of state-owned banks. 
Yeyati et al argue that it is possible to interpret this result as evidence of a stronger negative impact 
of state-ownership on growth in countries with low financial development. The authors argue that a 
possible explanation for this finding is that countries with well-developed financial  systems are 
better equipped to deal with the distortions that arise from government ownership.  
1.2.6 Main insights from previous studies
Recent academic work provide some lessons as to how governments can intervene in the economy 
while  avoiding  some  of  the  unfortunate  effects  of  such  intervention.  Benevolent  governments 
combined with a strong and reasonable internal government structure may allow states to interact in 
a responsible manner with societal actors and private entrepreneurs. When a state is incapable of 
making civil servants act in the interest of the general will of the people, we are often left with a 
predatory state, mainly interested in extracting rents from society. Keeping in mind these different 
typologies,  it  becomes  clear  that  we  need  to  identifying  the  necessary  components  of  a 
developmental  state,  and not  refuse state  involvement altogether  The question is  not  only how 
much, but what kind of state involvement and ownership we deem preferable. The political agenda 
can supersede the interests of mere private owners and their assumed struggle for higher profits. 
Politicians are in the most basic sense dependent upon the popular vote and election results. Given 
an often complex and intransparent network of governance,  politicians can try to influence the 
decision-making and policies of government owned firms in order to gain the hearts and minds of 
voters. Such policies are often in conflict with strict profit motives, even though they can be in the 
short-term interest of voters. This problem is somewhat different and less disturbing than those of 
the resource-extracting, predatory government. Still,  the issue of political  influence can become 
harmful to the long-term perspectives of an economy and need to be harnessed in order to improve 
government involvement in the economy.
The  banking  sector  is,  and  has  been,  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  a  well-functioning,  modern 
economy, and the state has been much more than just a spectator to its development. It has been at 
the heart of the two largest economic crises during the last one hundred years, triggering calls for 
government intervention. It is less clear what type of role the state should have on this sector. Some 
argue in favour of government ownership, others stick to strict regulation, while hard-nose liberals 
might prefer that government takes on a passive role and lets the banking sector develop according 
to  its  own  business-logic.  The  weights  given  to  each  of  these  points  of  view  have  changed 
considerably, as the post-WWII support for government intervention faded during the 1970's and 
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80's. Intervention has gained some support in recent decades, but pitfalls related to state-influenced 
lending policies remain a topic of utmost importance. In this context, it may be equally important to 
improve  the  institutional  environment  in  which  a  modern  financial  industry  could  evolve. 
Observing a higher frequency of state-owned banks in countries characterised by underdeveloped 
legal systems and an insufficient institutional framework, it seems as if Gerschenkron was right in 
arguing that governments take on responsibility where the private sector is incapable of getting 
involved. However, the state is also responsible for the legal and institutional framework within 
which a banking sector develops, and state-ownership can hardly be seen as a good substitute for 
legal  and  institutional  reform.  Governments  may  still  be  interested  in  jump-starting  financial 
development through ownership of banks, and the case for such involvement could be strengthened 
by the huge amount of academic literature informing us about the apparently strong relationship 
between financial  development and economic performance.  Supposedly, financial intermediaries 
are  crucial  for  technological  innovation  and  economic  development;  banks  provide  a  service 
distinctively  different  from stock  markets;  and  efficient  intermediaries  improve  productivity  by 
increasing  the  quality  of  the  lending  process.  Studies  of  market  responses  to  bank  loans  and 
bankruptcies adds to the impression that banks are indeed special intermediaries, which usually 
incuces a sepcial regulatory regime. Banking is a special sector, and government ownership within 
this  sector  is  pervasive  around  the  world,  particularly  in  poorer  countries  with  less  developed 
institutions.  Government  ownership  has  been  linked  to  poorer  growth  prospects,  but  more 
developed economies seem to avoid some of the the realted problems with such ownership. As 
government involvement in the economy and the financial sector is to some extent unavoidable, it is 
necessary to identify the factors that alleviate the problems associated with government ownership 
and involvement. 
Part 2 Theoretical framework
In order to perform a decent analysis of the Norwegian government's ownership in the country's 
largest financial institution, DnB NOR, we need a broad theoretical framework. This framework has 
been  divided  into  two  parts,  the  first  part  will  discuss  different  rationales  for  government 
intervention and ownership in banks, and the second part will focus on issues pertinent to how 
governments can exercise ownership.
2.1 The rationale for state ownership of banks
There are many possible rationales for government ownership of banks, and some may prove to be 
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less beneficial to a country's economic well-being than others. In analysing the different rationales, 
we can identify associated assumptions and implications for governance which are essential for the 
evaluation of ownership in the case study.
2.1.1 Public choice theory and government intervention
In the academic literature, theories of political economy try to explain the intertwined relationship 
between economics and politics. As an academic branch of political economy mainly emanating 
from economic theory, public choice theory analyse political institutions and decision-making by 
applying the theoretical approach of methodological individualism. Theories developed within this 
academic branch can improve our understanding of the processes that determine the choices made 
by politicians and civil servants, and how these choices are transformed into government action. In 
an academic work which has been called the 'bible' for all scholars in the field of public choice 
theory, Mueller (2003) identifies two main reasons for collective choice; allocative efficiency and 
redistribution. Elaboration on these two rationales will allow us to understand the difference in logic 
associated with each of them. 
2.1.1.1 Allocative efficiency
In situations or markets characterised by public goods or externalities, collective choice can, at least 
in  theory,  improve  allocative  efficiency.  Public  goods  have  two  specific  characteristic,  namely 
jointness of supply and the impossibility or inefficiency of excluding others from its consumption. 
In the most extreme case, provision of a public good implies no marginal costs and no chance of 
excluding individuals from its consumption. Even in less extreme cases, say, where marginal costs 
are very low and exclusion is costly, there is room for collective action, often initiated by larger 
organisations of individuals such as local authorities or the state. Protection is often cited as an 
example of a public good. Taking this example a bit further, protection of property rights could also 
be perceived as a  public good, and consequently the state is  the main agent  for protecting the 
property rights within most countries. As for externalities, the second reason for collective choice, 
they arise when the consumption or production activity of one individual or firm has an unintended 
impact on the utility or production function of a third party. This unintended impact corresponds to 
the non-excludability condition related to public goods in the sense that it is impossible to exclude a 
third party from the side effects related to consumption or production of a good characterised by 
externalities. As with public goods, externalities seem to leave some room for collective choice. 
Where only a few individuals or firms are concerned with the effects of externalities, the Coase 
theorem implies that the mere allocation of property rights will lead to an efficient allocation. When 
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larger  groups  of  people  and/or  firms  are  involved,  the  coordination  necessary  for  an  efficient 
allocation can be very expensive and in some cases almost impossible. Some argue that extending 
financial services to areas where private banks cannot operate profitably may increase financial 
development with positive externalities on growth or poverty reduction (Burgess and Pande, 2003) 
2.1.1.2 Redistribution
"A decent provision for the poor is the true test of civilization." These are the words of Samuel 
Johnson (cited in Mueller 2003), and they refer to our second category of reasons for collective 
choice, namely redistribution. The distinction between allocative efficiency and redistribution is that 
the latter aims to gratify the wants of only a part of the community while the former is meant to 
improve the allocations of resources to satisfy the collective needs of all members of a community. 
There are several reasons for a redistributive policy, and Mueller (2003) identifies five categories.
Redistribution as insurance
Redistribution can serve as a form of insurance against poverty in a society marked by uncertainty 
about individual success. Assuming that individuals are capable of estimating their own probability 
of of being poor, a private insurance company cannot serve this market as more or less accurate 
private information about risks induces adverse selection in insurance markets. This implies that 
forcing everybody to join an insurance program can lead to a Pareto improvement. This type of 
logic is often cited in favour of a welfare state. 
Redistribution as a public good
Redistribution can also be considered as a public good in the sense that wealthier individuals have 
some altruistic motives for supporting the poor. Larger schemes of such support cannot rely solely 
on voluntary association if some of the richer individuals are opportunistic and prefer free-riding on 
the  effort  of  others.  In  such  cases,  redistribution  through  taxation  solves  the  collective  action 
problem, effectively avoiding free-riding. 
Redistribution to satisfy fairness norms
Satisfying some sort of fairness norms in a society is a third reason for redistribution7. People seem 
to adhere to fairness norms which induces them to prefer a more equal distribution. Again, such 
preferences can be transformed into a government policy of money transfers. 
7 Such behaviour can perhaps best be exemplified by the dictator experiments applied in the study of behavioural 
economics. Dictators who are given a certain amount of money to be distributed among one other individual and 
themselves, tend to voluntarily give a certain amount of money to the other participants in the experiments.
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Redistribution to improve allocative efficiency
Productive resources might end up in the hands of people unable to fully exploit their potential. A 
transfer  of  resources  towards  those  capable  of  achieving  a  higher  pay-off  from utilising  these 
resources can potentially improve allocative efficiency and total welfare. Modern welfare states are 
often designed to redistribute in a way that  improves allocative efficiency.  In subsidising food, 
housing, medical treatment, and education, governments try to allocate resources towards sustaining 
and improving the human capital of the society as a whole. 
Redistribution as taking
A final  and less  enticing type  of  redistribution  is  that  of  taking.  In  a  democratic  system,  it  is 
theoretically possible for the majority to lawfully expropriate the wealth of the minority through 
abuse  of  the  electoral  system.  In  less  democratic  states,  the popular  support  required for  such 
extreme redistributive policies is  of course lower.  In general,  the potential  for  redistribution as 
taking can lead to excessive efforts in trying to acquire subsidies or transfers, or in trying to lower 
taxes so as to reduce the potential for such subsidies.
2.1.1.3 Public choice theory and intervention in banking
The strict division into allocative efficiency and redistribution as motives for intervention and, more 
broadly, reasons for organising into states, is not sufficient for categorising all types of government 
intervention.  However,  the categories are  more or less exhaustive,  and it  is  possible to analyse 
government  intervention  as  a  combination  of  the  two.  For  instance,  government  ownership  in 
banking can be seen as a way to solve the problem of asymmetric information between depositors 
and bankers countries where the private banking sector is perceived as opportunistic due to a lack of 
a decent regulatory and legal framework (Andrianova et al 2008). Such issues could also be solved 
by introducing deposit insurance, but in a system where opportunistic behaviour overshadows good 
banking practices, such policies can lead to large losses. In this context, it is of some interest to 
observe  that  in  theory,  deposit  insurance  is  somewhat  similar  to  an  ownership  stake,  although 
without any associated control rights. This issue will be discussed further in following parts of this 
paper. Solving the asymmetric information problem could, however, be seen as a public good in the 
sense that allows an increase in capital  flowing through the intermediation industry,  potentially 
improving allocative efficiency. As mentioned, nationalisation of banks often occur as a response to 
financial crises, and could thus be perceived as a way to alleviate problems of negative externalities 
caused by bankruptcy of financial intermediaries. Abstracting from the potentially dangerous moral 
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hazard created when bailing out unhealthy banks,  removing the externalities  related to banking 
failure can under some circumstances improve allocative efficiency. In this context, government 
ownership is only a temporary approach, and privatisation should follow. Furthermore, banks seem 
to provide some special service to an economy which other intermediaries cannot provide, and in 
situations  where  private  banks  cannot  operate  efficiently,  the  possible  positive  externalities 
associated with banks can make government owned banks socially optimal. 
Redistribution as a rationale for government ownership is more in line with the political view on 
government ownership. Governments can apply redistribution policies in order to gain support from 
constituencies or simply to increase the wealth of incumbents. In owning banks, governments can 
easily politicise lending and financing policies in order to sustain and/or enrich local communities, 
or  increase the wealth  of  political  supporters.  In  some instances,  improving the availability  of 
financial services can improve allocative efficiency, but the potential for political suasion can prove 
harmful in the long run. How to categorise the redistribution incurred depends on the structure and 
policies of the government owned bank. A lending policy aimed at allowing everybody to own a 
home or start a business can function as a form of social insurance policy. Everybody contributes 
through taxation to the losses incurred by government in sustaining an unprofitable banking policy, 
and everybody can potentially profit from such a policy when in need8. Government ownership can 
also lead to redistribution as a public good in the sense that richer individuals subsidise the banking 
services of poorer individuals. As discussed above, such a policy will not work out well if free-
riding is possible. Moreover, government owned banks can act in accordance with certain fairness 
norms.  If  such  ownership  allows the  authorities  to  manipulate  the  interest  rate  policies  of  the 
banking sector, it is theoretically possible to transfer funds from lenders or depositors to borrowers, 
or the other way around. In general, financing policy can adhere to some fairness norms as a logic 
for redistribution.  The operation of a government owned bank can also redistribute in order to 
improve allocative efficiency. Whereas privately owned banks may be less interested in contributing 
to the general welfare and/or education of the population, this is usually in the general interest of the 
people and will more often than not improve allocative efficiency and economic growth.  Finally, 
government ownership can facilitate redistribution as taking. Government ownership of banks leave 
the savings and investments of individuals in the hands of state officials, and these officials could be 
motivated by other factors than social  insurance,  the public good, fairness norms, or allocative 
efficiency.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  some  of  the  representatives  of  the  government  have  private 
8 The policies of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. previous to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007 come to 
mind, although the effects of a 'social' lending policy proved to be disastrous. 
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economic motives, and act according to these. Outright extraction of the societal wealth can be the 
result,  and this  is  the greatest  risk people encounter  in  leaving their  financial  resources  to  the 
discretion of others. 
2.1.2 Perspectives on government ownership
In trying to categorise the different motives for government ownership of banks, academics have 
gathered  around  a  typology  comprising  development,  social  objectives,  political  interests,  and 
agency problems. Sapienza (2004) include all but the developmental objectives in her paper, while 
Yeyati et al. (2004) distinguish between developmental and social objectives. I would argue that this 
distinction is useful, and we will therefore discuss all the four typologies in more detail. 
2.1.2.1 Developmental view
The  developmental  view on  government  ownership  is  normally  associated  with  Gerschenkron 
(1962) who stresses the need for public intervention in economies where the scarcity of capital, 
general distrust of the public, and endemic fraudulent practices among debtors may fail to generate 
the  sizeable  financial  sector  required  to  facilitate  economic  development.  In  this  perspective, 
governments can intervene through ownership in order to directly increase access to finance and 
improve  financial  development  in  general.  Furthermore,  government  ownership  can  facilitate 
lending directed towards sectors of the economy which are essential for future growth prospects. 
However, governments are not always capable of allocating credit efficiently. Improving the legal 
and economic institutions facilitating the growth of private credit could have a more beneficial 
effect on development in the long run. 
2.1.2.2 Social view
The social view emphasizes the role of the public sector to compensate for market imperfections 
that  leave  socially  profitable  investments  underfinanced  (Yeyati  et  al.  2004).  This  view  on 
government  ownership  differs  from  the  developmental  view  as  it  predicts  that  government 
ownership occurs not as a reaction to missing or incomplete markets, but in response to market 
failures caused by public goods, externalities and other factors which lead to discrepancies between 
private  return and social  return9.  In  general,  the social  view considers  government  actions  and 
policies as maximising a welfare function and improving Pareto efficiency. Both the developmental 
and the social view argue that financial markets in general, and the banking sector in particular, are 
9 Stiglitz et al (1993) identify seven potential market failures associated with financial markets: Monitoring as a public 
good; externalities of monitoring, selection, and lending; externalities of financial disruption; missing and incomplete 
markets; imperfect competition; pareto inefficiency of competitive markets; uninformed investors.
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different from other markets, and that government intervention can improve allocative efficiency 
within this sector. 
2.1.2.3 Political view
The political view argues that politicians are interested in owning banks not because it facilitates 
development  or  socially  optimal  policies,  but  because it  allows politicians  to  channel  funds  to 
political supporters and/or incumbents, or addressing short-term political issues. Political suasion 
can harm the functioning of the financial sector, and result in inefficient lending policies and higher 
probability of bank failure. In this view, government ownership leads to inefficient redistribution 
without any attention given to allocative efficiency. Even though market failures may disturb the 
functioning  of  financial  markets,  the  political  view  is  more  concerned  with  the  effects  of 
government failure. Leaving the government in control of banks is associated with less efficient 
outcomes  than  a  privately  controlled  banking  system.  This  view  does  lend  support  to  some 
government regulation, but not direct ownership
2.1.2.4 Agency view
The agency view focuses on the agency problems within government. In this view, governments can 
have  a  wide  range  of  objectives,  both  social,  developmental  and  political.  However,  agency 
problems hamper states'  ability  to intervene effectively.  The main argument  is  that  government 
officials  and  bureaucrats  do  not  have  the  incentives  necessary  for  carrying  out  their  mandate. 
Democratic countries normally adhere to an institutional structure consisting of many principal-
agent relationships. The principal-agent framework can be applied to a long line of relationships 
stretching from voters, through parliament, government, ministry (or ministries), to departments in 
charge of ownership. This complex set of agents and principals, and the resulting lack of incentives 
to perform effective corporate governance is what leads supporters of the agency view to prefer 
private rather than state ownership.
2.1.4 Synthesis of perspectives and public choice theory
Attempting  to  match  the  above  perspectives  on  government  ownership  with  the  public  choice 
theory is a useful exercise. It allows us to identify the main ideas behind each of the perspectives 
and provides a framework for the case analysis in the fourth part of this thesis. The perspectives are 
evaluated on the basis of their focus on allocative efficiency, their motive for redistribution, and 
their political economy stance. Not all of the perspectives fit perfectly into this framework, but it 
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illustrates some distinctive features. In particular, the agency view does not imply any strict focus 
on allocative efficiency or redistribution. It simply states that governments are unable to carry out 
any  ownership  policy  in  an  efficient  manner.  The  political  economy  stance  of  the  different 
perspectives  has  been  included  because  assumptions  about  the  functioning  of  the  market  and 
government  leads  to  very  different  conclusions  pertaining  to  the  effect  of  ownership.  More 
confidence in the market, and a less benevolent government is associated with a pessimistic view on 
government  ownership  and  intervention  in  the  economy,  and  vice  versa.  These  are  theoretical 
assumptions or opinions, sometimes based on empirical research. However, in a case study, such 
assumptions should be investigated further in order to formulate policy implications. In part four, 
we will try to identify the factors which influence government efficiency, opening the black box of 
the internal clockwork of government. 
2.1.5 Efficiency issues
The evaluation of efficiency is highly dependent on the goals of an entity. The orthodox perspective 
within economics and finance focuses on shareholder value and a company's risk-adjusted return. 
As governments often have other objectives than those of private enterprises, we might need to 
apply a broader interpretation of efficiency to the analysis of government owned banks.
2.1.5.1 Government has a bad track record
A considerable amount of academic work has shown that government owned banks tend to be less 
efficient than privately owned banks10. Moreover, their banking activity seems to be very peculiar, 
10 La Porta et al (2002) find that government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent 
financial development in a world-wide sample. However, the effect of privatisation on bank performance seem to be 
less pronounced  than in other sectors  (Verbrugge et al, 1999). In a sample of 60 countries, Barth et al (1999) find that 
the greater the share of bank assets controlled by state-owned banks, on average, the less will be financial development 
as well as the development of the nonbank sector and the stock market. Bonin et al (2005) focus their study on 
transition countries and conclude that, after adjusting for size, government-owned banks make fewer loans, collect 
fewer deposits, and have higher non-interest expenditures than majority foreign owned banks. In a European context, 
private banks appear to be more profitable than both mutual and public sector banks. this probably stems from higher 
net returns on their earning assets rather than from a superior cost efficiency (Ianotta et al, 2007). These authors also 
Table 1: Perspectives on ownership and public choice theory
Perspectives Public choice theory Political economy stanceAllocative efficiency Redistribution motive Market Government
Developmental Improving allocative ef f iciency
Social
Political Taking and political distribution
Agency N/A
Promoting development as a 
public good
Uncapable of initiating 
economic development
Benevolent, but might 
be inef f icient
Correcting for public goods 
and externalities
Fairness norms, insurance 
and public goods
Inef f icient due to market 
failures
Benevolent and 
eff icient
Could be achieved through 
regulation
Eff icient despite some 
failures
Inef f icient and 
opportunistic
Lack of incentives hamper 
ef f iciency
Less af fected by 
agency problems
Ineff icient due to 
agency problems
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with a larger share of their funding coming from the wholesale interbank and capital markets, a 
higher  liquidity  and  lower  investments  in  loans  (Ianotta  et  al.  2007).  This  special   financial 
intermediation  model  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of  conjectural  or  explicit  government 
guarantees, which in turn allow these banks to avoid the indirect costs (in terms of capital markets 
effects) of their poorer asset quality and less profitable intermediation activity. The academic work 
on the subject measures efficiency of banks along a broad set of parameters11,  and state-owned 
banks seem to underperform along all dimensions. The potential difference in operations between 
state-owned and privately owned banks seem to underscore one possible explanation for the poor 
performance of state-owned banks. Government as an owner may have other objectives than the 
private sector, making the standard efficiency measures less relevant. However, one would expect 
the government to be interested in promoting financial development, in contrast with the results 
mentioned above. Academics have a hard time in determining the direction of causality between 
financial and economic development and state-ownership within banking. If the causality runs from 
financial underdevelopment to state-ownership, this would be in line with the development view. 
The  poor  performance  of  state-owned  banks  would  then  be  explained  by  underdeveloped 
institutions and an environment inhospitable to private intermediaries. Even if state-owned banks 
are less efficient than private ones, they could, if no decent alternative exists,  have a positive effect 
on economic and financial development. This type of argument sheds some light on the ambiguity 
that surrounds the interpretation of results found in empirical research on the subject. 
2.1.5.2 Efficiency measures
If  governments  have  different  objectives  than  the  private  sector,  the  traditional  performance 
indicators  applied  in  the  analysis  of  banks  would  be  insufficient  in  determining  whether  state 
ownership is successful. A thorough analysis of the performance of government owned banks need 
achknowledge the government's  objectives,  whether  these  are  identical  to  those applied  by  the 
market, or of a more social or developmental character. This makes it extremely difficult to compare 
the performance of publicly and privately owned banks and could, if the objectives of government 
are difficult to quantify, make it nearly impossible to conclude on the overall performance of state-
owned banks. On the other hand, if the performance of government owned banks is considered 
show that public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks. They argue 
that their results indicate that public sector banks are on average less profitable and riskier than other banks. 
Furthermore, state-owned banks in Argentina tend to have very high nonperforming loan ratios, and poorer long-term 
performance on average than domestically-owned banks or foreign-owned banks (Berger et al, 2005). Finally, Sapienza 
(2004) find that state-owned banks charge systematically lower interest rates to similar or identical firms than do 
privately owned banks.
11 These parameters include contribution to financial development (usually some index of private credit or liquid 
liabilities over GDP), the development of the non-bank sector, amount and quality of loans given and deposits collected, 
insolvency risk, non-interest expenditures, and, last but not least, profitability
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solely  in  relation  to  market-based  measures,  this  could  potentially  pressure  these  banks  into 
mimicking the private sector. This is what De la Torre (2004) calls the 'Sisyphus Syndrome'. In 
Greek mythology, the gods punished Sisyphus into rolling a boulder up a steep hill, but before the 
boulder would reach the top of the hill, it would always roll back down, forcing him to start all over 
again. The analogy to state-owned banks is that these might be pressured into mimicking the private 
sector through market-based systems of performance measurement. Sisyphus is pushing the boulder 
up the hill. This would leave the state-owned banks efficient, but utterly redundant. This situation 
would trigger demands for a reintroduction of a social mandate in order to legitimise the operations 
of  the  state-owned  bank.  The  boulder  rolls  down the  hill,  and  the  bank  would  again  become 
unprofitable according to  the market-based measures.  And the story is  repeated.  Regarding the 
efficiency of state-owned banks, we can extract two important lessons from the analogy to the 
Sisyphus Syndrome. The legitimacy of state-owned banks rest on their ability to act differently than 
privately  owned  banks,  preferably  in  accordance  with  economic  and/or  social  development. 
Secondly,  limiting  the  role  of  owners  to  the  profitability  paradigm  can  make  state-ownership 
redundant.  An  analysis  of  bank  performance  based  on  market  indices  and  results  can  prove 
insufficient, although such an analysis would serve well as a complement to other indicators of 
success.
2.1.5.3 Government objectives diverging from efficiency
In general, state-ownership is legitimised by running a different type of operations than would be 
the case under private ownership. As for banking operations, this could imply alleviating market 
failures through lending policies or collection of deposits. If we continue to assume that we are 
dealing  with  a  benevolent  government,  state-ownership  could  induce  a  long-term  ownership 
strategy  focusing,  for  example,  on  contributing  to  a  national  development  policy.  Government 
objectives could also differ according to the development of the financial sector. In a country with 
underdeveloped economic  and legal  institutions,  state-owned banks might  take  on an orthodox 
business model, effectively stepping in where privately owned banks cannot operate profitably. In 
more financially developed countries, there is less room for state-owned banks running a profit-led 
operation. The main government ownership objectives mentioned in the academic literature on the 
subject are listed below.
National ownership
Preserving long-term national ownership could be one such positive influence. If the wealth of a 
country is highly dispersed, concentrated, national ownership would be difficult to achieve without 
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the involvement of the state. This argumentation presupposes that a national, long-term owner can 
have a positive influence on financial services. The local knowledge of a nationally owned banks 
with headquarters situated within the country's borders, could potentially affect its lending policies. 
A certain bias towards financing local businesses at home and abroad could improve local firms' 
access  to  finance,  facilitating  their  expansion  and  positive  effect  on  the  national  economy12. 
Empirical  evidence  of  a  host-country  bias  in  choosing  financial  services  seem to  confirm  the 
importance of a nationally located financial intermediary (Berger et al., 2002). 
Smoothing external shocks
Governments may also be interested in smoothing the negative effects of external shocks on the 
economy. Yeyati et al. (2004) argue that banks may frustrate expansionary monetary policy because 
they have limited incentives to lend during periods of economic downturns and low interest rates 
and do not internalize the fact that, by increasing lending, they would push the economy out of 
recession. In such situations, state-owned banks could play a role in providing the financial means 
necessary to avoid the negative effects  of a crisis13.  A system of regulation and/or contingency 
contracts could prove less effective than ownership. This is because, while private banks could be 
induced to increase lending by offering government guarantees or subsidies,  the process would 
require some sort of legislative action and would probably be more time consuming than simply 
instructing a manager of a public bank to increase lending.
Extending access to finance
Some are concerned that, with private ownership, excessive concentration in banking can lead to 
limited access to credit by many parts of society (The World Bank and Oxford University Press 
2001).  However,  the World Bank Policy Research  Report  argues  that  state  ownership tends  to 
reduce  competition  and  limit  access  to  finance.  Contending  that  state  ownership  leads  to  less 
competition, it is unlikely that it leads to greater availability of credit14.  Whether state-owned banks 
can extend finance to businesses unable to attain finance from privately owned banks is thus more 
12 This argument serves as the basis for government-ownership of DnB NOR ASA, Norway's largest bank measured by 
total combined assets (About the group, DnB NOR web site, 17.05.2010). The most recent Government's Ownership 
Policy (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2008) states that the state's ownership interest in DnB NOR ASA is 
to ensure that the group has its head office in Norway and that it acts as a partner for Norwegian companies in Norway 
and in the export market. This policy is legitimised by arguing that it provides business and industry with a large and 
highly competent Norway-based financial group.
13 However, Yeyati et al. (2004) find little empirical evidence suggesting that state-owned banks attenuates the 
smoothing effect of financial development, even though they seem to play a role in reducing the elasticity of credit to 
external shocks.
14 Indeed, La Porta et al. (2002) find that the greater the state ownership, the larger is the share of credit going to the 
top 20 firms.
31
of  a  theoretical  debate.  Even though there  there might  be a  theoretical  case for  direct  lending 
towards sectors and industries that generate positive externalities, critics of government intervention 
argue that this eventually leads to a situation in which credit allocation is dictated by political rather 
than economic considerations (Yeyati et al. 2004).
Caretaker during crisis
During crises, governments often feel compelled to recapitalise nationally owned banks in order to 
reduce the risk of bankruptcy and systemic failure. In the midst of the recent financial crisis, several 
governments made attempts at improving the financial balance sheet of the most important financial 
institutions.  Systemic  crises  have  often  led  to  an  increase  in  government  ownership,  or  'care 
taking'15.  Given  the  bad  track  record  of  permanent  government  ownership,  restructuring  policy 
needs to include an exit strategy which allows the private sector to regain control when market 
confidence has been restored. It should be stressed that explicit or implicit government guarantees 
can induce banks to increase their risk exposure, often described as the moral hazard problem of 
state guarantees. In the recent financial crisis, this problem has occurred in the context of American 
banks which were considered "too big to fail", referring to the potentially disastrous effects of large 
scale  bankruptcy  on  the  financial  markets.  The  World  Bank  (2001)  argue  that   government 
intervention following a crisis could be successful as long as it is designed to reduce the likelihood 
of a subsequent crisis and moral hazard by imposing real costs on all involved parties, and get 
resources back in productive use by restructuring and use the private sector to pick winners and 
losers 
2.1.6 Pitfalls
Governments ownership is subject to several potential pitfalls. Since good government ownership 
depends on a recognition of these pitfalls, the most important ones are discussed in some detail.
2.1.6.1 Perverse economic incentives
State ownership of banks face several potential pitfalls, some of which are portrayed by the political 
view of government ownership depicted above. First and foremost, the officials and bureaucrats 
lack the incentives which private owners have in terms of direct economic pay-off related to bank 
performance.  Furthermore,  government  employees  in  charge  of  exercising  ownership  might  be 
15 In financial crises, even governments who under normal circumstances despise taking ownership stakes in banks, 
might feel that bank owners exercise their 'put option' of handing over the bank's deposit liabilities with insufficient 
funds to repay them (The World Bank and Oxford University Press 2001). A 'put option' refers to a contractual option of 
selling an asset at a predetermined price at a predetermined point in time (European put option) or time interval 
(American put option).
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more  interested  in  personal  gains  and  career  opportunities  within  government  than  running  a 
profitable  business.  This  problem is  aggravated by the often stated societal  and developmental 
objectives of government owned banks, which could serve as an explanation or excuse for low 
performance.  Where  discretion  is  called  for,  it  can  be  very  difficult  to  trace  the  rationale  for 
corporate decision-making. Outright corruption could be the motivation for some decisions, and 
such activity can often be hard to reveal. Hart et al. (1997) model the behaviour of government as a 
business owner and find that if political patronage is a severe problem, the case for privatisation 
becomes stronger since spending public resources on wealth transfers to interest groups is easier 
with  in-house  provision  (government  ownership).  On  the  other  hand,  these  authors  proscribe 
government ownership if corruption is the most severe problem. Through privatisation, the corrupt 
government employee could be able to extract considerable profits form the privatisation process, 
and the decision to privatise may be strongly influenced by this potential, private economic gain, 
and  less  coherent  with  social  efficiency.  In  general,  the  economic  incentives  of  politicians, 
government officials and employees are considerably different than those of private owners. If the 
organisation of government allows such perverse economic incentives to influence the government's 
ownership strategy, the results could be devastating. 
2.1.6.2 Soft budget constraints
The term 'soft budget constraint' was originally introduced by Kornai (1979) to describe economic 
behaviour  in  socialist  economies  marked  by  shortage.  The  term  has  been  applied  somewhat 
inconsistently, but refer primarily to situations where a business in financial trouble can count on 
receiving financial support from interrelated organisations. In the context of state-owned banks, the 
soft budget constraint refers to a situation where the bank can count on the government to supply 
funding in times of crisis. If the government agency in charge of ownership policy can appropriate 
funds  from the  treasury  without  bearing  the  full  costs,  the  government  as  a  whole  could  face 
problems of intertemporal inconsistency in policy. It is in the long-term interest of the government 
as owner to enforce a hard budget constraint in order to force profitability and avoid moral hazard 
problems. However, in the short-term the government may want to provide financial aid to state-
owned entities in order to avoid bankruptcy, and the potential financial contraction and job-losses 
associated  with  bank  failure.  This  constitutes  a  inconsistency  of  objectives  which  could  make 
government act schizophrenically and issue conflicting orders (Kornai et al. 2003). The motivation 
for providing soft budget constraints can be stronger for government owners as they are potentially 
more interested in avoiding economic spillover effects related to bankruptcy than private owners16. 
16 Furthermore, if corrupt practices are involved, the motive for soft budget constraints become stronger as government 
officials in charge of the state-owned firm may fear loosing a source of bribes if the bank is allowed to go bankrupt.
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Kornai et al. (2003) argue that the source of soft budget constraints is the inability of the supporting 
organisation (the state in our case) to make dynamic commitments. As the argument goes, it is in the 
interest of the owner ex ante to declare that it will not bail out the business (hard budget constraint) 
in order to provide the correct incentives to management. However, ex post, when the firm is facing 
financial trouble, the potential losses generated by failure and the future prospects for the firm may 
induce  the  owner  into  supporting  the  firm  financially.  The  commitment  problem implies  that 
management in the company correctly predicts that financial  problems will  be accompanied by 
bailout. This is a source of moral hazard, which lowers the incentives of the management, and the 
economic potential of the firm. 
2.1.7.3 Government failure
We have argued above that the state can play a positive role in development through intervention 
and  ownership.  However,  this  theoretical  stance  assumes  a  more  or  less  benevolent,  or 
developmental state. Another important assumption is that the government is able to pick projects 
and businesses that will flourish in the future. A certain consistency in its industrial policy is also 
warranted.  All  of these assumptions are related to the internal structure of government and the 
competency  of  government  officials  as  well  as  their  willingness  to  stick  to  a  long-term 
developmental and/or fiscal policy. As governments change rather frequently, it is very likely that 
industrial  and  economic  policies  change  as  well.  Inconsistency  in  policy  can  lead  to  failed 
development initiatives and loss of time and resources invested therein. State-owned enterprises 
resulting  from  development  or  socially  motivated  policies  can  end  up  in  the  hands  of  less 
benevolent governments, leading to predatory behaviour by state officials and/or corrupt practices, 
lowering the economic prospects  of  the state-owned businesses.  Where states are  successful  in 
furthering economic development,  privatisation of  state-owned banks and other businesses may 
prove socially optimal. There is some evidence, however, that governments are often reluctant to let 
go of banks through privatisation, at least through full privatisation (Verbrugge et al. 1999). Even 
though these state-owned banks may have played an important  role  in  economic development, 
changing circumstances may trigger calls for private owners who appear to be better suited for 
running a profitable intermediation business. 
2.2 How to exercise government ownership
This part  of the paper abstracts  from the rationales for ownership and focuses on the activities 
normally related to the ownership role. However, the motivation for ownership will often affect the 
optimal choice of corporate governance strategy. We will abstract from the primary principal-agent 
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relationship between the people and politicians, and how the ownership mandate is worked out. 
Since  we  are  dealing  specifically  with  state-ownership,  we  will,  first  of  all,  identify  some 
characteristics  of  the  bureaucracy  and  state  administration  as  described  by  Tirole  (1994).  The 
second step is to clarify the relationship between the government and the firm in a contract-based 
theoretical  perspective  (Hendrixe  2003).  Thirdly,  we  will  consult  corporate  governance  theory 
which will allow an insight into the machanisms pertaining to the governance of banks.
2.2.1 Internal organisation of government ownership
It is essential to analyse the internal organisation of states in order to understand how government 
can function as an owner of banks. Some may argue that governments are organised in  manner 
similar to the private sector, and that it can be analysed using the same tools and methods. Tirole 
(1994) argues that there is some scope for a separate theoretical appraisal of the organisation of 
government17.  He  developes  and  elaborates  on  incentive  theory,  and  apply  this  theoretical 
perspective  to  the  analysis  of  the  internal  processes  of  government.  In  turn,  he  discusses 
specificities of the design of incentives in the public, implications of low-powered incentives in 
government,  the  application  of  rules  versus  discretion,  and  the  division  of  labour  within 
government. All of these topics are of interest to us, and will be elaborated upon in the following 
sections.
2.2.1.1 Determinants of incentives in the public sector
Multiplicity of goals
Tirole  (1994)  argue  that  government  agencies  and civil  servants  often face  a  multidimensional 
mandate. This does not necessarily make it more difficult to provide incentives to civil servants and 
agencies  as  performance  related  to  the  different  goals  could  be  given  appropriate  weights  in 
remuneration policies. The problem arises when performance within one or more of the tasks is 
difficult to measure. For example, the mandate of the agency in charge of corporate governance of 
the  state-owned  bank  may  include  social  goals  which  are  difficult  to  measure.  Furthermore, 
difficulties can arise in determining the allocation of weights to the potentially conflicing goals. The 
entity in charge of ownership could face a budget constraint in funding the government-owned bank 
as well as goals related to degree of solvency or lending policy. The contingencies which are meant 
17 It has to be stressed that this section on the internal organisation of government is based on a theoretical perspective 
where economics is applied to a field dominated by political science and sociology. The choice of perspective facilitates 
a comparison with the corporate governance literature which has been applied to private ownership of corporations. It 
increases the theoretical consistency of this part of the paper, and highlights some of the differences between the public 
sector and private corporations. In general, this framework for understanding the organisation of government provides 
us with the tools necessary to analyse the impact of government ownership on the performance and goals of banks. 
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to condition the formal incentive schemes could thus be hard to measure and verify. This could 
leave the incentive scheme incomplete and distortionary.
Lack of comparison
Where possible, comparing the results of an organisation or its management with one in the same 
sector  or  industry  allows a  separation  of  idiosyncratic  risk  from aggregate  risk.  Removing the 
sector-specific risk from the formal incentive scheme increases the accuracy of the performance 
evaluation and creates a stronger link between performance and pay. However, state-agencies are 
often monopolists in their respective area, implying that there is no good source of comparison. The 
theoretical policy advice is to implement low-powered incentive schemes where the agent bears 
only a small fraction of the risk in the performance measure. In our context of state-owned banks, 
the agency in charge of ownership could be evaluated on the basis of bank performance relative to 
other banks. However, the mandate of such an agency often includes goals not directly related to 
profit. The 'equal compensation principle'  implies that if the principal is not able to monitor the 
amount of time allocated to each task, then the marginal rate of return to the employee from time 
and attention spent in each of the activities must be equal (Holmström and Milgrom 1991). If these 
other performance indicators are noisy, this implies that low-powered incentives should be applied 
to all task. If not, the agent encounters an undesirable amount of risk, or allocates time only to the 
accurately measurable task with performance-related payment scheme.
Heterogeneity of owners' tastes
The principals of government agencies are the people. Their tastes as to the goals of a government 
agency  are  heterogeneous  and  potentially  inconsistent  over  time.  Normally,  the  goals  of  an 
enterprise are profitability and shareholder value. However, the mandate of a government agency in 
charge of ownership policy could change depending on the political incumbents or events triggering 
demands for change in ownership policy18. This could potentially explain some of the bailouts of 
banks during the recent financial crisis,  where a supposedly short-term social mandate received 
support  at  the  expense  of  more  long-term  goals  consisting  of  profitability,  competition,  and 
avoiding moral hazard.
Dispersed ownership
If we consider government agencies as the agents, and the people as principals, then the elected 
18 One example of time inconsistency is the Sisyphus Syndrome described in part 2.1.5.2., where the alternation 
between profit-related goals and a social mandate creates a considerable time inconsistency problem. Lack of time 
consistency in the agency's mandate leaves it prone to commitment problems.
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politicians could be seen as filling the role of the board of directors in a corporation where the 
people are the owners. The media monitors the actions of the politicians and informs voters on the 
performance of politicians and the agencies under their control. However, the tasks of governments 
are so complex that political takeovers may be less related to the efficiency and performance of 
single agencies, and even less related to the performance of government-owned entities such as 
banks. In this context, freedom of the press facilitate monitoring activities by the people.
2.2.1.2 Implication: Low-powered incentives
Formal incentives
Monetary incentives do exist in government, but tend to be low-powered due to two main factors. 
One of these factors has been mentioned above and relates to the difficulty of measuring accurately 
the performance of government employees. The second factor is that there often exists a tension 
between measurable and nonmeasurable objectives. For example, keeping costs down is often in 
conflict with qualitative objectives. An agency in charge of an ownership stake in a bank could face 
a budget constraint which limits its ability to perform optimal monitoring of the bank. If quality is 
an important factor in the operations of the agency, low-powered incentives are called for in order 
to avoid that too much attention is given to measurable, quantitative goals, with adverse effects on 
quality. This concern exists in the private sector as well, but Tirole (1994) conjecture that the quality 
concern is stronger in government than in the private sector.
Career concerns and missions
Tirole (1994) argue that career concerns are more important in the public sector. Public servants 
may be  more  interested  in  improving  future  prospects  in  the  public  or  private  sector,  with  an 
associated  focus  on  reputation  and image.  This  induces  public  servants  to  try  to  'mislead'  the 
internal and/or external job market about their ability. Holmström (1982) developed a model of 
career concerns where he identifies a set of conditions for career concerns in government to be 
effective19. Elaborating on the model developed by Holmström, Tirole (1994) includes the aspect of 
multiple  interpretations of  performance in the analysis  of career  concerns.  The outcome of  the 
model reveals information about talent only if  the agent devotes any attention to a task.  Using 
multiplicative  models  of  talent  and  effort  instead  of  additive  ones,  the  possible  range  of  pure 
strategy equilibria is extended20. Different equilibria have separate implications as to the incentives 
19 These conditions are as follows: Performance on the task should be visible by those who grant promotions and wage 
increases, are potential employers, or vote for or against the official; current performance should be informative about 
the official's ability in future tasks; the official should be forward looking and not discount the future too much; 
signalling should not be too costly to the official.
20 Tirole (1994) mentions unfocused and focused equilibria, as well as a 'fuzzy mission' equilibria. The first of these 
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and focus of the agent. The agent may be induced to focus on specific tasks, or exert lower effort on 
task associated with lower expected payoff. In order to maintain focus and incentives to perform 
well on the tasks preferred by the principal, it is essential to reach an understanding considering the 
agent's mission.
Mission setting
Tirole (1994) argue that the setting of a particular mission by constitution, law, or a charismatic boss 
may create a common understanding of the performance signals. Furthermore, if the mission is 
aligned with professional norms, this may facilitate its accomplishment. Another factor that may 
facilitate the success of a mission is whether this is in the self-interest of the official to whom it has 
been given. If the ownership agency is given a social mandate broadly agreed upon among political 
parties  and in parliament,  it  may prove to  be a  rewarding task for the agency itself.  Although 
missions would force officials into revealing their abilities, they could be less averse to mission 
setting if they know their ability before choosing effort. In such situations, high ability officials 
prefer having a mission as this would let them demonstrate this ability. The high ability officials 
would announce such a mission themselves if they were given the right to do so, while the lower 
ability officials would follow suit in order not to reveal their identity. In contrast, when the official 
does not know his ability at performing a certain task, he may refuse engagement altogether.  We 
conjecture  that  mission  setting  seems  to  work  better  in  theory  when  they  are  aligned  with 
professional  norms,  serve  some  self-interest,  and  when  officials  are  confident  as  to  their 
competence within the field of the mission.
2.2.1.3 Rules versus discretion
One potential pitfall of the low-powered incentive schemes applied in government is the capture of 
decision-making  by  interest  groups.  Often  classified  as  corruption,  such  practices  arise  as 
aconsequnece of discretionary power over decision-making. Government officials are assumed to 
have superior information concerning their specific tasks, and are thus given some discretionary 
power in the governmental hierarchy. The official may influence the choice of policy by releasing 
only the information in favour of the cause of a certain interest group. It is, however, possible to 
equilibria refers to a situation where the agent rationally decides to exert no effort on a task that the market does not pay 
attention to, leaving the performance measure uninformative concerning the talent of the agent. In the second 
equilibrium, the market pays attention to the task, the agent rationally decides to focus on the task. The 'fuzzy mission' 
equilibrium refers to a situation where the agent pursues a single mission, although the market does not know which. 
The market makes inferences ex post about which task the agent decided to focus on. It is rational for the agent to focus 
all his efforts on the task where he performs best. The effort exerted by the agent is lower in a 'fuzzy mission' 
equilibrium than in single mission equilibria, even though the agent focuses on a single activity in both equilibria. This 
is because the market does not give full credit for good performance, or full stigma for poor performance in the 'fuzzy 
mission' equilibrium.
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design the civil service in ways that avoid capture of decision-making. 
Reduction of stakes
If the stakes the interest  groups have in the discretionary decision are reduced, the government 
officials' temptation to be captured is also reduced. Enforcing the application of rules to decision-
making reduces the discretionary power of the official and thus reduce the potential pay-off to the 
interest group from lobbying activities. An official in charge of the corporate governance activity 
related  to  a  state-owned  bank  would  be  left  with  less  discretionary  power  if  the  government 
provides a code of conduct and a well developed ownership policy. 
The strength of interest groups
The influence of an interest groups has been linked to the group's organisation. More concentrated 
groups, such as producers and large customers, are usually well organised, whereas taxpayers are 
more dispersed, leaving them prone to free-riding behaviour. The influence of interest groups will, 
of course, also depend on the size of their stake in the decision-making. Tirole (1994) argues that 
asymmetric information between an agency and its political principals will leave interest groups 
more  influential  if  they  have  an  interest  in  suppressing,  rather  than  revealing,  the  information 
available to the agency and itself. In the context of a state-owned bank, potential interest groups 
include  customers  (especially  large ones),  competitors  (present  and prospective),  employees  (if 
well-organised), and other financial stakeholders (such as lenders).
Incentive schemes vs institutions
In  the  theoretical  literature  on  contracts  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  complete  contracts 
approach and the incomplete contracts approach. In the former type of modelling, every possible 
future event  has  been included in  the contract  and has  been assigned a  certain  activity.  In  the 
incomplete  contracts  approach,  control  rights  become important  in  unforeseen situations  where 
some  discretion  is  called  for.  If  control  rights  are  conferred  on  a  single  group  of  officials  in 
government, it may lead to abuse through self-serving actions and capture (Tirole 1994). However, 
the bureaucratic structure of governments is often designed to divide control rights among several 
branches of government. This is an important feature when considering state-owned banks. The 
ownership entity may have to convince the ministry of finance in order to acquire financial support 
for  the bank.  Furthermore,  banks are  normally regulated  by  a  state  agency with  control  rights 
related to the bank's adherence to regulation. Banks are also affected by the policy of agencies in 
charge of enforcing market competition. If all these roles where to be given to a single agency, it 
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could create a severe case of regulatory capture. Fortunately, the norm is that conflicting goals 
should be allocated to different agencies. 
2.2.1.5 Division of labour within government
Intertemporal aspects
Tirole argues that intertemporal commitment by a benevolent government maximises social welfare 
because the government can always duplicate what would obtain under noncommitment and in 
general  do better.  Unfortunately,  governments  are  not always benevolent,  and this  may explain 
some of the many legal restrictions on commitments faced by governments. This is because short-
term commitments coupled with rotation of governments provide a check against  inappropriate 
decisions, including collusion. On the other hand, elections with rational voters who are informed 
about  the  government's  policy can  make the  government  more  accountable,  and may raise  the 
desirability of long-term commitment. 
Multiministry oversight
Governments are often full of dissonant objectives and tight systems of checks and balances. It 
seems as if government is not designed to behave as a coherent entity. As Tirole (1994) contends, 
contractors and public enterprises are often subject to control by several government officials with 
substantially different goals. An example of this duality of government is that public enterprises 
often respond to both a 'spending ministry'  in charge of developing the industry,  and a finance 
ministry in charge of reducing government spending. The time inconsistency problem associated 
with the soft budget constraint in section 2.1.7.2 can be solved by shifting control rights to a cost-
conscious  ministry  when   further  investments  require  substantial  borrowing.  This  restores  the 
government's  credibility  and  strengthens  the  firm's  incentives.  In  practical  terms,  this  could  be 
achieved by  obliging  the  ownership  agency to  get  approval  from for  example  the  ministry  of 
finance in order to go forth with refinancing of state-owned enterprises.
Checks and balances
Tirole (1994) also argue that competition in government among advocates of specific interests or 
causes may give rise to good policy setting. The classical case in support of such a view is to be 
found in courts. Here, a system of conflict and partiality, where none of the parties are expected to 
act in the interest of social welfare, has prevailed for centuries and is deemed to be an integral part 
of a democratic system. In government, we find the same system recurring in the different roles and 
mandates of ministries. They cater to diverging interests, and are competing for parts of the public 
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sector  budget.  Perhaps  most  importantly,  multipartism  could  act  as  a  system  of  advocates 
representing distinct political constituencies. Assuming that the system is made to pick the decision 
which maximises social welfare given the information created and diffused, competition between 
agencies and/or ministries will create a larger amount of information than a single agency (Tirole, 
1994). Even though such competition may have some adverse effects on the agencies' incentives to 
conceal information unfavourable to their cause, it is often seen as more preferable than having a 
single agency with even stronger incentives to conceal information.
2.2.1.6 Main insights concerning government organisation
We have  seen that  incentives  in  the  public  administration  tend  to  differ  significantly  from the 
incentive systems in the private sector. Multiplicity of goals and lack of comparison trigger calls for 
low-powered incentives,  owners'  heterogeneous tastes  make governments prone to  commitment 
problems, while dispersed ownership can hamper monitoring activities by voters. Formal incentives 
are thus less important in the public sector, while career concerns remain influential. Mission setting 
can  help  the  management  in  maintaining  focus  in  models  where  career  concerns  can  lead  to 
multiple equilibria. Capture of decision-making is a phenomenon which is particularly related to 
discriminatory processes within government. It is theoretically possible to reduce the probability of 
such  corrupt  practices  by  reducing the  discretionary power of  government  officials,  effectively 
reducing the stakes of interest groups. Dividing control rights in unforeseen events among several 
agencies can also reduce the likelihood of capture. Finally, we have seen that the division of labour 
within government aims at dealing with the issues mentioned above. Governments are sometimes 
restricted from engaging in long-term commitments because this practice protects the people against 
inappropriate decisions and collusion in times of a less than benevolent government. Multiministry 
oversight strengthens the credibility of government, and reduces the time-inconsistency problem 
associated in particular with the soft budget constraint issue. The many checks and balances which 
exists  in  government  serves  a  purpose in  information gathering and the promotion of  different 
perspectives, even though the administration as such may appear to be somewhat schizophrenic. 
These insights will allow us to understand the framework for government action and its relation to 
the environment, including government owned banks.
2.2.2 Contracting theory
The theory of economics of organisations deals primarily with contracting theory under different 
assumptions concerning the classical principal-agent relationship (Hendrikse 2003). This theoretical 
branch tries to answer questions about the optimal size of organisations, and the pro's and con's of 
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in-house provision through ownership versus external contracting. It is considered as orthodox to 
start off with the assumption of complete contracts, and extend the analysis by considering the 
impact of incomplete contracts. This part will provide the theoretical framework for analysing the 
principal-agent  relationship  and  a  general  description  issues  related  to  the  choice  between 
ownership and external contracting as governance mechanisms.
2.2.2.1 Complete contracts
Under  the  assumption  of  complete  contracts  and  no  asymmetric  information,  the  distinction 
between in-house provision and contracting out becomes irrelevant. Instead of owning the entity in 
charge  of  some  government  policy,  the  government  could  simply  write  a  complete  contract 
prescribing actions to each set of future circumstances, and enforce this contract through the court 
system. If the government is interested in lending to rural areas even though this is an unprofitable 
venture, it can agree on a contract with one or more banks, and pay a fair amount for these services. 
In general, the pursuit of social goals does not, on its own, make the case for government ownership 
(Shleifer, 1998). If, however, we allow for asymmetric information between the principal and the 
agent, we encounter problems of hidden actions and hidden characteristics which increases the costs 
of contracting.
Where asymmetric information makes it impossible for the principal to observe the actions of the 
agent,  the  former  will  have  to  link  economic  incentives  to  some  observed  variable  which  is 
indirectly related to the agent's effort. It becomes optimal for the principal to consider the agent's 
risk aversion, the uncertainty of the environment, profitability of incremental effort and the agents 
discretion regarding the choice of activities when formulating the agent's economic incentives. As 
the agent becomes more risk averse, he will have to be compensated more for the risk inherent in 
the performance measure.  Increased uncertainty regarding the environment  reduces  the optimal 
incentive intensity, as the agent will require a higher risk premium. Where the effort of the agent has 
a strong link to profitability, the optimal contract implies a higher incentive intensity. Finally, if the 
discretion of the agent regarding the choice of activities is substantial, the incentives should be 
stronger  in  order  to  avoid  inefficient  allocation  of  effort.  Hidden  action  problems induces  the 
principal to gather information which can help in perfecting the performance measures used in 
incentive schemes, and perform an increasing amount of monitoring activities as the agent's pay 
becomes more sensitive to performance.  Problems of hidden characteristics arise when there is 
asymmetric information concerning some characteristic of an agent or potential agent. Good agents 
would like to send signals which confirm their identity, and the bad agents would, if not to costly, 
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imitate the actions of good agents in order not to be identified. Under some circumstances it  is 
possible for a principal to create contract options where the two types of agents select different 
contracts  depending  on  their  characteristics.  When  such  self-selection  is  not  easily  obtained, 
external  contracting  can  become  a  costly  affair.  The  principal  may  have  to  choose  between 
expensive measures to reveal the true identity of the potential contracting partner, or accept the 
potential effect of adverse selection. 
2.2.2.2 Incomplete contracts
The analysis becomes more complicated if one assumes that complete contracts are not feasible. 
One would then have to include transaction and influence costs in the analysis of the principal-agent 
relationship.  Transaction  costs  economics  hold  that  in  situations  where  transaction-specific 
investments are made,  it  is not desirable to start  a  market relationship (Hendrikse 2003).  Such 
investments may lead to various types of ex-post opportunistic behaviour due to incompleteness of 
contracts. This problem is usually referred to as the hold-up problem, and can be solved through 
vertical integration. The theory implies that in situations with high level of asset specificity21, long-
term  contracts  and  vertical  integration  are  possible  efficient  forms  of  governance.  Higher 
uncertainty surrounding the transaction, increasing the possibility for ex post renegotiation, is also 
dealt with more effectively with vertical integration. The latter solves these problems because it 
removes the conflict of interest between the two parties in the transaction. More limited uncertainty 
favours long-term contracts,  and if  the level  of  asset  specificity  is  low,  the  efficient  choice of 
governance structure is the market. The choice of governance structure and the determining factors 
are depicted in the table below. The transaction costs theory identifies market failures and prescribes 
vertical integration as a way to avoid costs of market transactions. On the other hand, influence cost 
theory looks at possible organisational fai-
lure, and sees the market as the governance 
structure of last resort. Influence costs are 
defined as the costs of activities aimed at 
changing organisational decisions to allow 
interested parties to capture organisational rents (Hendrikse, 2003). Such actions include lobbying, 
political  activities,  and  distorting  and  manipulating  information.  The  occurrence  of  influence 
activities  requires  that  somebody has  the  power  to  make  decisions  with  an  unclear  impact  on 
various organisational members, and that interested groups within the organisation have access to 
21 High asset specificity refers to a situation where the investment has a much higher value in the transaction than in 
the market.
Table 2: Governance strucures (Hendrixe 2003)
Degree of uncertainty
Low High
Low Market Market
High
Asset 
Specificity Long-term 
contract
Vertical 
integration
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means in order to influence the decision-maker. These requirements seem to be fulfilled in most 
organisations.  Even though larger  organisations,  or  vertical  integration  through ownership  may 
improve coordination and remove hold-up problems, larger organisations increase the potential for 
influence activities.  These two effects  work in opposite  directions as to the optimal size of  an 
organisation or conglomerate. In determining whether ownership is the best solution, we have to 
consider the relative importance of transaction costs and influence costs. This could also have an 
effect on the observed relationship between the state as an owner, and state-owned banks. 
2.2.2.3 Ownership rights
An important part of a governance system is the allocation of ownership rights, also referred to as 
residual  rights.  Ownership  gains  importance  when unforeseen  events  arise,  where  there  are  no 
specific contractual agreements. In such situations, the allocation of property rights with respect to 
assets will determine the allocation of quasi-surplus, the division of  which has not been addressed 
in the specific contractual agreements. The theoretical literature distinguishes between specific and 
residual rights. Specific rights can be determined in contracts as they are verifiable in courts, while 
residual rights determine who has decision-making power in circumstances not described in the 
contract.  Such residual rights are associated with ownership, and can function as a second-best 
solution  in  a  world  with  incomplete  contracts  as  they  protect  against  opportunistic  behaviour 
regarding specific investments. For our purposes, it is possible to argue that ownership is a strategy 
which allows state-owned banks to engage in investments  which are in  the specific interest  of 
government. The vertical integration solves the coordination problem that would reduce transaction-
specific investment if the governance structure was to be based on contracting.
2.2.2.4 Contracting theory applied to public ownership
In an attempt to apply contracting theory to government ownership, Hart et al. (1997) assumes a 
world of contractual incompleteness. The choice a politician faces is whether she will hire public 
employees and provide them with employment contracts, or sign a contract with a private supplier 
who in turn contracts with his or her employees. The fundamental difference between public and 
private ownership is the allocation of residual control rights. The authors use a classical framework 
for  analysis  where  the  provider  of  a  good or  service  can  invest  time and/or  resources  in  cost 
reductions or quality improvements, and where cost reductions has adverse effects on quality. In 
general, a private contractor has stronger incentives both to improve quality and reduce costs than a 
government employee has. This is because the government employee receives only a fraction of the 
returns to quality improvements and cost reductions. However, a private contractor will probably 
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invest too much in cost reduction as he ignores the negative impact on quality. The main policy 
implication is thus to use in-house provision (government control residual rights) when the adverse 
effects of cost reduction on quality are large. On the other hand, public ownership removes the 
excessive tendency to engage in cost reduction and replaces this with a weak incentive to engage in 
both cost reductions and quality improvements. Private ownership may thus be preferred to public 
ownership when the deterioration in quality from cost reductions are small, or when opportunities 
for cost reductions are small and the government employees have relatively weak incentives. In the 
first case, the stronger incentives the private contractor have in both reducing costs and improving 
quality are both desirable. In the second case, there is less scope for potentially damaging cost 
reductions and the private contractor's stronger incentive to improve quality gives him the edge over 
in-house provision22. 
2.2.3 Corporate governance of banks
Corporate governance is  a theoretical  perspective which focuses on the effects of separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations. It applies principal-agent models and game theory 
combined with insights from the theory of corporate finance in order to analyse the relationship 
between owners and managers of corporations. General corporate governance theory in based on 
the work by Tirole (2006) is supplemented by theory on corporate governance of banks in particular 
to provide the basis for this part of the paper. The orthodox view is that corporate governance is 
concerned with the mechanisms which allow insiders or managers to attract external finance by 
credibly committing to return funds to the investors. Some argue that this is a very narrow view of 
corporate governance that does not account for other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, 
customers, and the community surrounding the firm. However, the shareholder value ideology has 
many  supporters  in  the  academic  literature,  and  is  the  most  appropriate  perspective  for  our 
purposes. The role of other stakeholders will be discussed in some detail in section 2.2.3.7.
22 Hart et al. (1997) also argue that competition in the market strengthens the case for private provision if consumers 
are able to assess the quality of the good or service themselves. In such situations, the private contractor would face 
socially optimal incentives, and no government intervention would improve allocative efficiency. Allowing for 
alternative interpretations of the government's agenda, including corruption and patronage, the analysis of Hart et al. 
(1997) becomes even more nuanced. These authors model the behaviour of a corrupt politician, and find that, under 
reasonable assumptions, the politician is able to extract a higher bribe from privatising the public firm than by keeping 
the business in-house. A corrupt politician would thus be biased towards privatisation, even though this may not be the 
most efficient solution. Assuming that in-house provision makes it easier for the politician to spend public resources on 
wealth transfers to interest groups, a politician motivated by patronage would be biased towards in-house provision. 
Corruption and patronage are normally considered to be highly inefficient practices, and the decision concerning public 
or private ownership have to consider whether such practices could influence the outcome.
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2.2.3.1 The separation of ownership and control
As a point of departure, we start off with the description of a corporation where the manager is also 
the sole owner of the corporation. Such a manager is  often referred to as an entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneur will reap all the profit from the effort he exerts in his firm. In other words, she has 
perfect  incentives  to  maximise  the  profitability  of  the  firm.  However,  in  the  real  world,  the 
individuals  with  profitable  projects  are  not  always  able  to  finance  these  projects  themselves. 
Furthermore,  the  entrepreneur  above  may eventually  need  some external  financing  to  reap  the 
benefits of scale economies in production. Finally, assuming that the manager is risk averse, she 
would probably prefer not to put all her eggs in one basket. Holding ownership stakes in more than 
one firm will reduce exposure to firm specific risk, effectively increasing the value of the risk-return 
relationship of her portfolio. All these arguments induce a manager or an entrepreneur into seeking 
external financing, whether it is from the stock market, bond market, or the local bank. Shifting our 
attention to  the perspective of  potential  investors,  we recognise that  investors are  interested in 
investing in projects or businesses with an expected positive return.  However,  even though the 
manager is able to run a profitable business, she might be less than cooperative when deciding on 
the division of the profits among herself and investors. We are now approaching the core of the 
problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control, namely moral hazard. Moral hazard 
occurs when the interests of the principal (owner) and the agent (manager) are not aligned23.
Owners are usually well aware of problems with moral hazard, and try to avoid the negative effects 
of  such  behaviour.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  several  factors  which  complicates  effective 
functioning of corporate governance policies. Tirole (2006) mentions several dysfunctionalities of 
the institutional responses in terms of corporate governance. First of all, lack of transparency may 
allow  the  management  substantial  rewards  while  the  owners  remain  ignorant.  Second,  Tirole 
identifies a significant rise in total value of compensation packages to top executives in the U.S. 
over the years. This has led some authors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) to question whether these 
compensation packages  are  really  in  the interest  of  shareholders,  suggesting that  the  managers 
themselves are in charge of working out their own compensation packages. Third, tenuous links 
23 Tirole (2006) mention four different ways in which the actions of managers can diverge from the interests of owners. 
First, managers may exert an insufficient amount of effort in running a profitable business. As argued by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), when the manager owns less than 100 percent of the firm, he receives less than 100 percent of the 
return on effort exerted in raising profitability. He will have weaker incentives to perform well on the job than an 
owner-manager. Second, the manager may engage in extravagant investments which are in the interest of the manager, 
but will reduce shareholder value. Third, managers may engage in entrenchment strategies in order to secure their jobs, 
even if this is not in the interest of shareholders. Finally, self-dealing can allow managers to extract personal benefits 
from the firm to the detriment of shareholders. Such benefits include everything from harmless perks to illegal insider 
trading. 
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between performance and compensation in  the U.S.  (Tirole,  2006)  indicate  severe  problems of 
alignment  of  managers'  and  owners'  interests.  The  lack  of  such  links  may  result  from poorly 
constructed compensation packages, managers ability to maintain stable compensation despite poor 
results, managers being able to get out on time before losses are incurred, and golden parachutes. 
Fourth, as insiders, managers are often able to manipulate the accounting numbers on which the 
compensation is directly or indirectly based. It seems obvious that all of these issues should be 
considered carefully in formulating executive compensation.
2.2.3.2 Banks as liquidity producers
The liquidity production role of banks has some important implications for corporate governance. 
The capital structure of banks is unique as banks tend to have very little equity relative to other 
firms, and their liabilities are largely in the form of demand deposits while assets often consist of 
long-maturity loans. Macey and O'Hara (2003) argue that it  is this 'liquidity production' role of 
banks that make them 'special'. This role may lead to a collective action problem as banks only keep 
a fraction of deposits on reserve at any one time. The mismatch resulting from the banks' role as 
liquidity producers can leave the bank insolvent if a bank run occurs. Even in banks that appear 
solvent,  the  depositors'  inability  to  coordinate  their  actions  can  cause  bank  runs.  This  is  an 
application of the classical prisoner's dilemma, and constitutes the primary rationale for deposit 
insurance. Furthermore, stakeholders with an interest in the continuing operations of the bank will 
have to pay attention to the possibility of a bank run.  For corporate governance purposes,  any 
policies which ameliorates the reputation of the bank and makes depositors more confident in the 
banks financial position could reduce the likelihood of a bank run.
The high debt-to-equity ratio implied by the liquidity production role of banks has a significant 
influence on the conflict between the interests of debtholders and shareholders. This may induce 
shareholders to engage in risk-shifting behaviour, effectively reducing the value of the creditors' 
claims on the bank24. Two factors tend to mitigate the problem of excessive risk-taking (Macey and 
O'Hara 2003). Firstly, lenders may insist on some form of protection, or covenants, against actions 
by corporate managers that threaten their fixed claims. Secondly, managers tend to be more risk-
averse than shareholders which tend to reduce their risk-taking behaviour. This second argument 
will, to some extent, depend on the structure of the manager's compensation package and other 
incentives. Deposit insurance, which removes depositors' incentives to monitor banks, intensifies 
24 By increasing the risk of the bank, shareholders increase the expected value of their claim as they reap the full 
benefit if company value is high, but are not liable for losses in excess of the invested share capital. Such losses are 
incurred by creditors.
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the conflict of interest between lenders and shareholders. Contending that the operations of banks 
create specific challenges related to corporate governance, Macey and O'Hara (2003) believe that a 
clear case can be made for bank directors being held to a broader, if not a higher, standard of care 
than other directors. Especially, high leverage and the mismatch in term structure and liquidity of 
assets  an  liabilities  in  banking  leads  these  authors  to  propose  that  bank  directors  should  owe 
fiduciary duties to fixed claimants as well as to equity claimants. 
A final issue which links the liquidity production role with corporate governance is divergence of 
privately optimal and socially optimal liquidity provision. This divergence can become large during 
financial crises. Under such circumstances, uncertainty in the financial markets may limit liquidity 
and potentially lead to a credit crunch. During the recent crisis, the focal point of uncertainty was to 
a  large extent counterparty risk.  The opacity of banks and other financial  institutions restricted 
lending between financial institutions and to other sectors. If the lending policies during crises are 
based on irrational behaviour, it could be in the interest of governments to intervene in order to 
improve the liquidity production of banks. Where regulations and fiscal and monetary policies are 
unable  to  reverse  the  tide  of  credit  contraction,  state-owned  banks  can  be  forced  or  strongly 
encouraged to expand lending. It is somewhat unclear whether such policies are warranted, and 
what  the  effects  may  be.  However,  during  the  recent  financial  crisis  we  have  seen  several 
governments initiating policies aimed at overcoming problems of credit contraction.
2.2.3.3 Opaqueness of banks
Banks seem to be particularly affected by information asymmetry and the resulting opaqueness as 
lending  quality  and  risk  composition  can  easily  be  manipulated  and  are  difficult  to  reveal  by 
outsiders.  Consequently,  traditional  corporate  governance  mechanisms  such  as  information 
gathering and monitoring are more difficult to perform in the banking sector. As with the corporate 
governance of other firms, controlling shareholders in banks are interested in increasing the bank's 
risk profile as they gain from the upside in value and can 'put' the firm to the debtholders in case of 
negative returns.  The debtholders,  on the other hand, are not interested in upside potential  and 
would  prefer  the  bank to  stay  solvent  until  all  debt  payments  have  been  made.  However,  the 
extraordinary opacity of banks makes it difficult for debtholders to restrict controlling shareholders 
from risk-shifting. 
Levine  (2004)  argue  that  holders  of  subordinated  debt  and  debentures  can  ease  informational 
asymmetries in banks and boost corporate governance. However, creditors rely on legal systems to 
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support their rights, and where the enforcement of creditor rights is less developed, the corporate 
governance  role  of  creditors  is  weakened.  Furthermore,  large  creditors  can  profit  from  the 
information asymmetries as insiders, possibly at the detriment of other debtholders and the bank's 
financial  health.  The  insider  argument  could  also  be  applied  to  other  insiders  such  as  large 
shareholders. These could benefit from the opaqueness of the bank in using it to exploit outside 
investors and the government. Levine refer to several studies of connected lending practices which 
could be associated with exploitation of outsiders. 
The greater informational asymmetries could also have an influence on incentive contracts. The 
logic  of this  relationship has been depicted in part  2.2.2.1 above.  As outcomes are  difficult  to 
measure  and  easy  to  manipulate,  managers  have  more  control  of  their  own  compensation. 
Compensation packages with strong incentives can thus induce distortive behaviour by managers at 
the expense of long term profitability of the bank. 
2.2.3.4 Managerial incentives in banking
First of all, it's important to acknowledge that managers are motivated by more than just monetary 
incentives. Although stock options and bonuses contribute to the alignment of the incentives of 
managers and owners, other factors such as job security, career goals and capital market monitoring 
may influence the incentives of managers. Furthermore, competition in the product market can limit 
the potential for managerial slack and put pressure on management to run an efficient business. 
Intrinsic  motivation  is  another  category  of  incentives  which  may  influence  the  behaviour  of 
managers. Even though social responsibility, fairness, equity and other intrinsic factors could have 
significant implications for how a manager runs the firm, they are often excluded from analyses of 
corporate governance, and are not discussed in this paper either.
Monetary incentives
Normally, top executives receive a compensation package consisting of a fixed salary, bonus, and 
stock-based  incentives.  The  two  variable  components  of  this  package  are  meant  to  align  the 
incentives of the top executive with those of the owners. Such compensation packages will only 
work as long as the manager is unable to unwind the incentives through trade.  Usually, this is 
avoided by forcing the executive to hold on to stock options or stocks in the company. Bonus plans 
are normally based on accounting data and, as we have seen above, the manager could potentially 
manipulate these accounting data in order to influence the bonus payment. Both of the two incentive 
components of the standard compensation package are thus prone to manipulation. Bonuses and 
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stock-based compensation  have  somewhat  different  effects  on incentives  as  they are  related to 
different measures of performance.  Bonuses are based on accounting data  which depict  current 
profit, while the value of stocks and stock options are based on market data which account for more 
long-term value creation. When the executive is given a combination of bonuses and stocks and/or 
stock options,  he will  have incentives to  balance short  term profit  and long term growth.  The 
weights the two components are given in a compensation package depends on the interests of the 
owners. The main idea is that bonuses and stock-based compensation tend to be complements, and 
therefore both of them tend to be included in compensation packages.
Another  important  issue  to  consider  when  formalising  executive  compensation  is  that  the 
performance measures should be filtered in order to measure the effort exerted by the manager more 
accurately. performance measures should be immunised against external shocks which the manager 
cannot be held responsible for, and be trimmed in order to measure results over which the manager 
has  control.  If  possible,  stock  options  could  be  constructed  to  include  information  about  the 
performance of similar firms in the same sector or line of business. Such 'yardstick competition' or 
relative performance measures can create stronger incentives than straight stock options or stocks25. 
Tirole (2006) observe a lack of such filtering of performance measures in the U.S., which seems to 
confirms that those in charge of compensating managers are either acting in the interest of the latter, 
or ignorant of the potential gains of filtering.
The  opaqueness  of  banks,  heavy  regulation,  banks'  role  as  liquidity  producers,  and  deposit 
insurance schemes are phenomena that affect corporate governance of banks in particular. As these 
factors  tend to  have  a  significant  impact  on the capital  structure  of  banks and the interests  of 
investors and managers, they would presumably also have an impact on the optimal compensation 
packages of bank managers. John and Qian (2003) argue that the heavy regulation of banks and the 
high leverage of these institutions influence the optimal compensation scheme. In particular, as 
regulation  may act  as  a  substitute  for  incentive  features  in  managerial  compensation,  the  pay-
performance sensitivity for bank managers should be lower than for managers in other sectors. 
Depositors  are  the  primary  claimants,  implying  that  the  objective  of  corporate  governance  is 
broader than just aligning the incentives of management and shareholders. Management should also 
be given incentives to act on behalf of debtholders to an adequate degree. John and John (1993) find 
25 It is also of some interest to observe the pro's and con's of stock options versus straight stocks. Stock options are 
cheaper than stocks, implying that for a given compensation budget, options will provide stronger incentives than 
stocks. However, if the manager ends up in a situation where the options are 'out of the money', and he or she finds it 
impossible to produce results which will get the options back 'in the money', the incentive feature of the options 
practically disappears. 
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that,  in  addition  to  aligning  the  incentives  of  top  mangers  and  shareholders,  managerial 
compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimise the agency costs 
of debt. Consequently, in highly leveraged firms, the optimal compensation package has low pay-
performance sensitivity. Furthermore, John and John (1993) argue that deposit insurance premia 
should be tied to the pay-performance sensitivity of the bank management compensation structure. 
Although this is more of a policy advice to regulators, it may also be in the interest of long-term 
owners to link pay-performance sensitivity to the fraction of insured deposits in the capital structure 
of  the bank.  This could alleviate  the risk-shifting behaviour  of  management  caused by deposit 
insurance. This may be in the particular interest of government as bank-owner, assuming that the 
government  has  stronger  incentives  than  other  owners  to  improve  the  stability  of  the  banking 
system as a whole. Moreover, as depositors constitute a large group of voters, the incentives of a 
government  responsive  to  voters'  interests  would  presumably  be  more  aligned  with  those  of 
depositors than other claimants. 
Researchers have also argued that pay-performance should be linked to firm size and risk. Schaefer 
(1998) develops a simple agency model to study the effect of firm size on optimal pay-performance 
sensitivity of the manager's compensation package. His conclusion restates a central lesson from 
agency theory, namely that the optimal incentive contract trades off the provision of incentives with 
the costs of loading risk on the agent at the margin. Shaefer's model predicts that if the marginal 
productivity of effort increases with size more slowly than the amount of risk faced by the manager, 
larger firms will find it optimal to forego powerful incentives in favour of better risk sharing. This 
prediction of the model is supported by results in an empirical study of firm size and management 
compensation  in  large  American  firms  in  the  early  1990's.  Estimations  reveal  that  CEO  pay-
performance sensitivity appears to be approximately inversely related to the square root of firm size 
as measured by either market capitalisation or assets. The size argument applies to large banks in 
particular. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there has been considerable focus on large 
banks  and  the  systemic  importance  of  these  large  financial  institutions26.  Bank  managers  and 
shareholders are usually not inclined to correct for potential externalities related to failure. Again, a 
benevolent government who cares about the health of the financial system may have the incentives 
to account for this externality. Where government has an ownership share, it could induce the bank 
to internalise this externality.
26 Roubini (2008) argues that the securitisation and globalisation leading up to the recent financial crisis implied an 
increase in connectedness between financial institutions nationally and internationally. Failure of large financial 
institutions can thus have very negative impacts on the rest of the financial sector.
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The recent  crisis  also led  to  increased  focus  on  the  compensation  schemes of  bank managers. 
Roubini (2008) argue that the system of compensation of bankers and operators was flawed, leading 
to excessive moral hazard in the form of gambling for redemption. In the U.S., a large fraction of 
such compensation was based on bonuses tied to short term-profits. Combined with the fact that 
such bonuses were only one-sided (managers were only exposed to the upside), this resulted in 
incentives  to  take  larger  risks  than  warranted  by  maximisation  of  shareholder  value.  It  seems 
apparent  that  bank  owners  need  to  be  very  careful  in  designing  compensation  schemes  for 
managers. Moreover, the financial crisis has shed some new light on the opacity of the financial 
industry. Recent financial innovations such as securitisation and the development of new and exotic 
financial instruments have made financial markets and institutions less transparent. Regulators and 
supervisors may have a role to play in promoting fair valuation and risk assessments. Improving 
procedures  for  valuation  and risk-assessment  is  also in  the  interest  of  bank-owners,  and could 
diminish problems of information asymmetry caused by the opacity of banks and other financial 
institutions. 
Until these issues have been sorted out, the informational asymmetries should be accounted for in 
the design of management compensation schemes. Theoretically, less transparency leads to greater 
moral hazard problems. When the manager is in possession of information unavailable to owners 
and creditors, there is greater potential for hidden action. This calls for stronger performance-based 
pay to  align the incentives  of  management  and owners,  and  extended monitoring activities  by 
investors. However, the complexity of financial innovations could, at the same time, increase the 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  banking  business.  This  would  tend  to  reduce  the  optimal  pay-
performance sensitivity of management compensation (Holmström and Milgrom 1987). Both of 
these  effects  need  to  be  taken  into  consideration  when  designing  compensation  schemes  and 
deciding on the amount of effort to expend on monitoring activities.
Other managerial incentives
Managers  face  many  implicit  incentives  which  accompanies  the  explicit  incentives  mentioned 
above.  Poor performance could trigger dismissal or attempts at  takeover or proxy fights which 
could  endanger  the  position  of  the  executive.  Furthermore,  poor  performance  may  induce  the 
owners or the board members to intensify monitoring activities and keep management on a tighter 
leash. It is usually also in the interest of executive managers to avoid bankruptcy as this would also 
endanger  their  position.  These  implicit  factors  provide  incentives  over  and  above  those  of  the 
monetary incentives. The two types of incentives can thus be seen as substitutes. When there are 
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stronger  implicit  incentives,  there  is  less  need  for  explicit,  monetary  incentives.  Normally,  we 
observe a combination of both. 
A factor which has not yet been discussed, but has a considerable influence on the quality of a firm's 
management,  is  competition  in  the  product  market.  Competition  allows for  the construction  of 
relative performance payments through filtered stock options or other types of adjusted performance 
compensation. Furthermore, competition in the product market can filter out exogenous shocks, as 
these will normally hit all competitors more or less equally. Competition will also increase the risk 
of bankruptcy, effectively strengthening this implicit incentive. On the other hand, competition may 
also create perverse effects such as inducing the manager to gamble on 'beating the market'. This 
could have potentially disastrous effects on shareholder value, and lead to excessive risk taking. The 
orthodox view is, however, that competition tend to put some healthy pressure on management. 
Banking market competition appears to be lower than in other sectors as banks tend to form long-
run relationships with their customers. This may be a response to the informational asymmetries 
associated with making loans. 
2.2.3.5 The board of directors
The board of directors represent the shareholders in meetings with management, and is in charge of 
monitoring  the  latter.  It  approves  major  business  decisions  and  take  part  in  formulating  and 
approving corporate strategy. It is normally also responsible for executive compensation, oversight 
of  risk  management,  and  audits  (Tirole,  2006).  It  can  also  have  advisory  functions  vis  à  vis 
management.  Boards  of  directors  are  not  always  able  or  willing  to  perform  these  tasks 
appropriately, and have traditionally been described as ineffective rubber-stampers under the control 
of  management.  This have triggered calls  for more accountable  boards.  As the argument  goes, 
boards often lack independence, as many members have conflicting interests through contractual or 
more informal ties to the firm. The worst case scenario, at least if we consider incentives, is when 
the CEO is  also the chairman of  the board,  resulting in  a severe conflict  of  interests.  Another 
problem is that board members may not pay enough attention to the operations of the firm, leaving 
them unable to challenge the information and policies provided by managers. As with managers, the 
board members may lack sufficient incentives to perform their tasks according to the interests of 
shareholder. Under some circumstances, board members could be put on trial by shareholders, but 
this is option is used mainly when outright fraud has been committed The compensation of board 
members often has no link to company performance, but we should note that some board members 
have proper incentives as they themselves are shareholders in the firm. Finally, board members may 
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be reluctant to confront management and more interested in avoiding conflicts as they have an 
ongoing relationship with management. 
There are remedies for the problems related to boards which we identified above. First of all, we 
should mention that the different roles of board members could create conflicting goals.  Board 
members should extract information from the management, and at the same time interfere with 
management based on this information. Even though independence is seemingly a desirable trait of 
a board member, this often goes hand in hand with less knowledge about the operations of, and the 
challenges  facing  the  firm.  However,  having  independent  board  members  in  compensation 
committees is a policy which could avoid some conflict of interests. Tirole (2006) cites several 
reports  on  corporate  governance  where  some  degree  of  independence  with  reference  to  board 
members is stressed. Some have focused on self-evaluation of board performance, and others have 
made the case for obliging directors to take independent professional advice paid by the firm. In 
evaluating the performance and composition of a board of directors, we need to look at all the above 
factors combined. 
2.2.3.6 Investor activism and monitoring
As mentioned above, active monitors interfere with the decisions of managers in order to increase 
the value of investors'  claims. Such interference apply to strategic decisions,  investments,  asset 
sales,  managerial  compensation,  design  of  takeover  defences,  and  board  size  and  composition 
(Tirole, 2006). Intervention by monitors require that they have some sort of control. Tirole (2006) 
distinguish between formal and real control. Formal control refers to the control enjoyed by owners 
with a majority of voting shares, or other forms of majority control rights. In contrast, minority 
owners who is able to persuade enough other owners to create a majority have real control. Ability 
to  attain  real  control  depends  on  the  ease  of  communication  among  investors,  potential  for 
coalition-building, and congruence of interests among investors. Furthermore, an investor will have 
to be credible in order to gain real control. In this setting, credibility is based on reputation, absence 
of conflicting interests, and the amount of shares held by the investor. When an investor or a group 
of investor has real or formal control, it is possible to launch a proxy fight. When unhappy with the 
performance of the firm, investors with control can seek election to the board of directors with the 
goal of removing management or formalise a resolution on specific corporate policies. Such proxy 
competitions function to discipline the board and management even when the threat of intervention 
is  not  carried  out.  However,  there  are  some  international  differences  in  the  application  and 
frequency of  proxy fights.  International  differences  in  the  structure  of  ownership,  in  particular 
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ownership concentration and stability, influence the choice of governance mechanisms and the use 
of  proxy  fights.  For  example,  Anglo-Saxon  countries  are  known  for  dispersed  ownership  and 
frequent reshuffling of portfolios. 
Monitoring is supposed to alleviate agency problems between investors and management, but the 
principal-agency framework can also be applied to the relationship between the investor community 
and the  monitors.  In  the  words  of  Tirole  (2006);  who monitors  the  monitor?  This  question  is 
particularly  relevant  for  institutional  investors  such  as  mutual  funds  and  governments  holding 
ownership stakes on behalf of others. Another problem is that individual monitors may not act in the 
interest of other owners as they do not internalise the latter's welfare. This can lead to excessive 
free-riding and consequent undermonitoring. Monitors can also decide to collude with management 
or  engage in  self-dealing in  order  to benefit  from their  position.  In observing such tendencies, 
several authors (Coffee 1991, Porter 1992, Bhide 1993) have argued that the long-term investors are 
the only good monitors. High liquidity in the capital markets has a cost. Investors exit instead of 
using  their  voice  in  trying  to  improve  corporate  governance.  A nonnegligable  factor  is  the 
restrictions placed on monitors through regulation, and the possibilities that the legal framework 
offer for activism. 
Several external parties perform monitoring activities. These include boards of directors, auditors, 
large shareholders, large creditors, investment banks and rating agencies. Monitoring can be active 
or speculative, and can be based on prospective or retrospective information. Active monitoring 
implies interference with management  in  order  to increase the value of  investors'  claims.  Such 
monitoring assess the implications of corporate policies and intervene in order to raise firm value. 
Under normal circumstances, large shareholders are the primary actors through general meetings 
and so forth. However, raiders use active monitoring in identifying the prospects of a firm, and 
during  bankruptcy  proceedings  or  financial  distress  the  creditors  can  force  concessions  on 
management based on active monitoring. On the other hand, speculative monitoring is not linked to 
the exercise of control rights. In contrast to active monitoring, which is primarily prospective and 
forward  looking,  speculative  monitoring  is  partly  backward  looking  and  retrospective.  People 
engaged in speculative monitoring activities are not interested in raising value, but in analysing the 
value of the firm. This analysis serves as a basis for adjusting investment positions in the firm, that 
is, whether to sell or buy stocks in the firm. In this way, speculative monitoring contributes to a fair 
valuation  of  the  firm in  the  market.  As  the  market  value  is  often  used  both  in  compensation 
packages  and  in  evaluation  of  the  board  of  directors,  it  has  a  significant  impact  on  corporate 
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governance even though this is not its initial purpose. All in all, monitoring activities are essential to 
corporate  governance  as  they  provide  information  of  utmost  importance  to  those  in  charge  of 
governance, and to those in charge of daily operations.
2.2.3.7 Takeovers and leveraged buyouts
Takeovers and buyouts have an important influence on corporate governance. First, the possibility 
for takeover or buyout will create stronger incentives for managers who risk loosing their job if the 
firm bank is acquired by new owners. However, temporary threat of takeover or buyout could lead 
to  short  term  strategies  aimed  at  fending  off  the  threats  with  adverse  effects  on  long-term 
profitability. In trying to avoid takeovers, managemers often adopt takeover defences. Keeping a 
staggered board which is difficult to replace or enforcing supermajority rules concerning mergers 
and corporate restructuring are potential defensive mechanisms. Handing out shares to employees 
who are assumed to vote with the management is another frequently used strategy. Diluting the 
raider's equity is another group of takeover defence. Furthermore, poison pills in the form of special 
rights  of  target  shareholders to  buy shares at  a  discount  could reduce the value of  equity in a 
takeover at the expense of the raider. Fearing the negative effects of a takeover, management may 
be looking for a white knight, with a friendlier attitude towards management, to take over the firm. 
Finally, management could engage in greenmail, where the management uses company money to 
purchase  the  raider's  block  of  target  stock  at  a  premium.  This  would  reduce  the  value  of  the 
company to other shareholders and can be seen as a form of collusion between the management and 
the raider against  other shareholders. Most of these takeover defences have negative effects on 
shareholder value, and it is a puzzle why shareholders would approve of such measures. If it's not in 
the interest of the incumbent shareholders, it could be a sign of excessive managerial power and 
poor  corporate  governance.  Leverage  buyouts  differ  from takeovers  in  the  use  of  debt  in  the 
takeover process. Supposedly, the new management will have stronger monetary incentives in terms 
of ownership shares, active monitoring will increase as ownership becomes more concentrated, and 
high leverage forces management and the partnership to cut costs and improve efficiency (Tirole, 
2006). Because of the high leverage, the business will have to create large and steady cash flows, 
usually associated with mature industries. High leverage can of course be obtained without buyout 
simply by increasing lending and using the funds to buy back shares. 
The large discrepancies between insider and outsider information in banking discourage takeovers 
and leveraged buyouts (at least by outsiders). Prowse (1997) find that hostile takeovers in banking 
are indeed rare, even in industrialised countries. Takeovers can be even more difficult in countries 
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without efficient securities markets. This is not particularly related to banks, but adds to the other 
factors which reduces competition in the market for governance of banks.
2.2.3.8 Liability structure and corporate governance of banks
High leverage of banks
To analyse the effect of leverage we need lo take a look at the lenders perspective27. The main effect 
of debt is that it disciplines management in several ways. First, by obliging management to make 
regular fixed payments it avoids the 'free cash flow' problem analysed by Jensen (1986), leaving 
less resources to the discretion of managers. Second, debt incentivises management into generating 
cash flows beyond the future debt repayments. Third, creditors are normally given control of the 
firm when it is in financial distress, and may use their right to force bankruptcy, or threaten to use it 
in order to gain some control. If management cares about staying in control, the threat of loosing it 
would  give  him  incentives  to  keep  the  company  afloat  financially.  Fourth,  leverage  provides 
stronger incentives for managers who hold a substantial amount of claims over the firm's cash flow. 
By assuring that any increase in the firm's profit goes to the manager, he becomes by and large a 
residual claimant on his own performance.  
But there are also some negative effects of debt.  First, debt reduces the firm's liquidity, leaving the 
firm less immune to external shocks and potentially making it difficult to find financial resources 
for ongoing projects and new investments. Second, ability of debtholders to force bankruptcy can 
also lead to expensive bankruotcy proceedings, especially if the company has to be liquidated. The 
parties  in  bankruptcy  proceedings  are  often  unable  to  work  out  a  solution  where  the  firm's 
operations can continue. This may be due to transaction costs, bargaining inefficiencies, and legal 
expenses, and have less to do with the expected profitability of the firm. Third, indirect costs may 
appear just in anticipation of bankruptcy. Managers may be induced to gamble with the company's 
resources in order to stay out of bankruptcy. 
Deposits and deposit insurance
Implicit or explicit insurance of deposits is a frequently applied policy in modern financial systems. 
Deposit insurance is supposed to reduce the likelihood of bank runs by removing the incentives 
which  cause  the  coordination  problem  between  depositors.  In  a  simple  prisoner's  dilemma 
framework, we can illustrate the choices facing two depositors where the bank holds twenty percent 
27 In this context, the possible tax advantages of debt are less interesting than its effect on corporate governance 
purposes, it is sufficient to observe that tax advantages may trigger lending in excess of what would otherwise be 
optimal.
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of the value of deposits in liquid assets. The analysis is simple. Without deposit insurance, any of 
the two depositors has an incentive to withdraw their deposit if they fear that the other depositor 
will do so. Strict application of game theory takes the argument even further. If depositor A believes 
that depositor B fears that A will withdraw his deposit, depositor A has incentives to withdraw. In 
the end, it becomes a game of beliefs, where it is very difficult to predict rational behaviour. The 
rationale  for  dealing with the problem seems reasonable.  For  our  purposes,  it  is  perhaps more 
interesting to  look at  the  right  side  of  the table,  where the authorities  have introduced deposit 
insurance covering the full amount of A and B's deposits. For simplicity, we have not included 
transaction costs which are often associated with deposit insurance schemes. We can conclude that 
the risk of a bank run is next to nothing. Depositor A and B are totally ignorant of the financial 
position of the bank. In corporate governance terms, they have no incentives to monitor the actions 
of the bank, as they have nothing to gain by doing so. If we include a dynamic dimension to the 
depositor's dilemma without insurance, it starts to resemble a real bank run. The depositor's who get 
in front of the line outside the branch office (when the bank's internet site has crashed due to 
overload), are able to retrieve their deposits while those who are late end up with nothing. This 
gives the depositors incentives to be informed about the bank's financial health, and act on that 
information, through exit or voice. 
Depositors could potentially contribute to the corporate governance of banks, but when deposits are 
insured, the depositors are unaffected by bank performance and risk, and disincetivised. This has 
three interrelated implications. First, as mentioned, depositor insurance reduces the incentives of 
depositors to monitor banks. Second, deposit  insurance induces banks to rely less on uninsured 
creditors with incentives to monitor and more on insured depositors with no incentives to exert 
corporate governance. Third, insured deposits help produce banks with very low capital-asset ratios 
relative to other firms. Thus, deposit insurance increases both the ability of owners to increase risk 
as  depositors  lack  incentives  to  monitor  the  banks  and and the  incentives  for  bank owners  to 
increase risk because of lower capital-asset ratios (Levine 2004). Furthermore, banks approaching 
insolvency  can  continue  to  attract  liquidity  in  the  form  of  government  insured  deposits.  The 
insurance eliminates the market forces that starve non-financial firms of cash. In such situations a 
bank's operations take the form of a Ponzi scheme where the government indirectly supplies the 
Table 3: Depositors' dilemma
Depositor B Depositor B
Stay Withdraw Stay Withdraw
Depositor A Stay 100, 100 0, 100 Depositor A Stay 100, 100 100, 100Withdraw 100, 0 20, 20 Withdraw 100, 100 100, 100
Depositor's dilemma 
without insurance
Depositor's dilemma 
with insurance
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ever-increasing flow of money needed for the scheme to work. Eventually, the government or the 
deposit insurance corporation ends up with a large loss to cover. Government regulators are not 
ignorant  of  the  moral  hazard  effects  of  deposit  insurance.  Some  argue  that  regulation  and 
supervision can control this moral hazard problem by carefully designing the insurance scheme. 
However,  Barth  et  al.  (2004)  find  a  significant,  and  economically  large,  positive  relationship 
between the generosity of the deposit  insurance scheme and bank fragility.  Official  supervisory 
power and tighter capital regulations do not seem to mitigate this negative relationship. On the other 
hand, greater confidence in the legal system to settle disputes does mitigate, although it does not 
eliminate, the negative association of moral hazard and bank fragility. For corporate governance 
purposes, we thus need to look at the legal environment, and perhaps also regulations, in order to 
determine  the  potential  effects  of  deposit  insurance  on  owners'  incentives.  In  general,  lack  of 
deposit insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs while introduction of deposit insurance can 
prevent bank runs but distort owners' incentives and create moral hazard.
2.2.3.9 Policy environment and regulation
Firms make a lot of contractual concessions to investors in order to increase pledgeable income. 
Such  agreements  take  place  in  an  institutional  environment  that  could  differ  widely  among 
nations28. Tirole (2006) define the term 'contracting institutions' as the laws and regulations that 
govern contracts and contract enforcement as well as other policy variables such as taxes, labour 
laws, and macroeconomic policies that affect pledgeable income and value. He refers to evidence 
which  show that  lower  investor  protection  can  lead  to  higher  shareholder  concentration  as  an 
alternative  mechanism  of  dealing  with  corporate  governance.  We  need  to  acknowledge  that 
shareholder  and  creditor  rights  can  be  very different  between countries,  and that  creditors  and 
shareholders  may  have  different  responsibilities  and  opportunities  depending  on  the  policy 
environment.
For corporate governance purposes it is essential to recognise that banks are heavily regulated. The 
economic importance of banks induces governments to pay specific attention to this sector. All 
types of regulation are not necessary favourable though. Barth et al. (2004) mention the following 
five categories of regulation:
1. Restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce
2. Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry
28 As we saw in section 1.2.2, the legal system can have a considerable influence on financial development.
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3. Regulations on capital adequacy
4. Supervisory power, independence, and resources
5. Regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring
Restrictions on banking activities  and banking-commerce links have several  theoretical  reasons. 
Conflicts of interests could arise, a broader range of possible activities increase the scope for moral 
hazard, complexity makes banks more difficult to monitor, universal banks can more easily become 
'too  big  to  discipline',  and,  finally,  large  financial  conglomerates  may  reduce  competition  and 
efficiency.  We  see  that  several  of  these  factors  could  potentially  affect  corporate  governance. 
Restrictions on banking activity could facilitate monitoring, reduce moral hazard, and potentially 
reduce concentration in the product market, putting more pressure on management. However, these 
regulations do not appear to be substitutes for good governance. They could facilitate corporate 
governance by making the industry less complicated and less prone to moral hazard, and should 
thus be considered more as complements to governance. 
Restrictions on entry by domestic  and foreign banks would reduce  competition in  the banking 
market. As we saw in section 1.2.4, academics seem to disagree on the effect of competition on 
bank  performance.  Lack  of  competition  can  increase  the  franchise  value,  enhancing  prudent 
behaviour of bank managers. On the other hand, competition leads to reduction in prices, or interest 
rates  in  the  case  of  banks,  with  positive  repercussions  on  the  entire  economy.  For  corporate 
governance purposes, we conclude that competition induces more efficient management, and leaves 
less financial resources at the discretion of managers. It also improves the prospects for 'yardstick 
competition'  among  managers,  and  relative  performance  evaluation.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
competition makes the management less risk-prudent, this could imply a trade-off between risk-
taking incentives and efficiency on the one hand, and prudent behaviour, free-cash flow problems, 
and better performance evaluation on the other. 
Regulations on capital adequacy are seen as risk-reducing restrictions in traditional approaches to 
bank regulation (Barth et al. 2004). The logic is that capital serves as a buffer against losses and 
possible failure. Furthermore, greater amounts of capital at risk restrains the proclivity for bank 
owners  to  engage in  high risk  activities.  Capital  requirements  could thus  have  the  function of 
aligning  the  incentives  of  bank  owners  with  depositors  and  other  creditors.  This  could  have 
important  implications  for  corporate  governance,  but  there  are  many  conflicting  theoretical 
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predictions concerning the effect of capital requirements on risk-taking behaviour29. For corporate 
governance  purposes,  the  effects  of  this  regulatory  feature  should  be  treated  carefully  as  the 
associated theory and evidence must be considered as conflicting and inconclusive. 
In a corporate governance perspective, granting supervisory powers to a government agency (or a 
government sponsored one) may contribute to total monitoring efforts. This is especially important 
when we consider the opaqueness of banks and the difficulties private investors face in coping with 
informational asymmetries. Public supervision could also help prevent banks from excessive risk-
taking  behaviour  in  the  context  of  deposit  insurance,  and  act  as  a  substitute  for  insufficient 
monitoring  by  insured  and  disincentivised  depositors.  Whether  or  not  bank  supervision  has  a 
positive effect on corporate governance depends on the competence and professionalism of the 
regulatory  agency30.  If  supervisors  and regulators  are  not  able  to  act  according  to  professional 
standards,  their  actions could hinder  bank operations and have a  negative impact  on corporate 
governance. Barth et al  (2004) do not find evidence of any strong correlation between features 
constituting the 'core' of supervision and nonperforming loans. On the other hand, they find that 
diversification guidelines can have a stabilising effect. Again the inconclusive evidence calls for a 
careful treatment of the implications of supervision for corporate governance. Public supervision is 
not necessarily a substitute for private monitoring activities, and under some circumstances it could 
be a bad complement. 
Regulations on private-sector monitoring of banks include measures such as requirements to obtain 
certified audits and/or ratings, to produce accurate, comprehensive and consolidated information on 
activities and risk-management procedures, and making bank directors liable for misleading and 
erroneous  information.  In  a  corporate  governance  perspective,  these  measures  can  help  in 
alleviating problems of asymmetric information. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004) argue that 
we should not rely exclusively on private-sector monitoring, especially in countries where poorly 
developed capital  markets,  accounting standards,  and  legal  systems distorts  the  private  sector's 
incentives  to  monitor.  They  find  a  negative  correlation  between  private  monitoring  and 
nonperforming loans, but no significant relationship between such monitoring and banking crises. 
29 Barth et al. (2004) find mixed results concerning the effect of capital requirements on bank stability, where the latter 
is measured by non-performing loans and banking crises. Furthermore, capital requirements do not seem to ameliorate 
the risk-taking incentives produced by generous deposit insurance. These authors find a strong positive relationship 
between stringent capital requirements and the likelihood of banking crises after controlling for other features of the 
regulatory and supervisory regime. The evidence seem to support the theories predicting a positive relationship between 
capital adequacy and risk-taking.
30 As we have seen in section 1.1, the effectiveness of government intervention, including regulation and supervision, 
relies on the benevolence of government agencies and their ability to refrain from corruption and patronage.
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Regulations  fostering  information  disclosure  and  private-sector  monitoring  seem  to  have  a 
restrictive effect on risk-taking, and the authors above conclude that their evidence is consistent 
with theories emphasising private-sector control.
Regulation could have a considerable impact on corporate governance. We have to be aware of this 
when analysing corporate governance of banks. Focusing exclusively on corporate governance by 
owners, creditors, and other direct stakeholders could give rise to some misleading conclusions. 
Corporate governance does not happen in an environmental vacuum. In banking, supervisors and 
regulators constitute an important aspect of corporate governance. 
2.2.3.10 Shareholder value or stakeholder society
We have so far considered only one perspective of the corporate governance debate, namely the 
shareholder value perspective. A broader view would ultimately include all stakeholders related to 
the firm, whether it is employees, customers, suppliers, or third parties affected by some external 
effects  of the corporate venture.  Corporate  social  responsibility has gained influence as part  of 
corporate  strategy  in  recent  years.  Such responsibilities  can  include  duties  towards  employees, 
communities, creditors, or more ethical considerations related to the operations of a firm. Even 
though some corporate social responsibility strategies include policies which are unrelated to the 
operations  of  the  firm,  the  main  idea  is  to  internalise  potential  externalities.  When  trying  to 
distinguish between shareholder value and stakeholder society as different paradigms of corporate 
policy, it can be helpful to exclude from stakeholder society those policies which in fact serve the 
goal of shareholder value. Treating employees fairly and decently may appear to be motivated by 
altruism at first sight, but could also be part of a plan to build a good reputation as employer in 
order  to  attract  the  best  people.  The  distinction  becomes  clear  if  we accept  that  truly  socially 
responsible organisations are those that consciously make decisions that reduce overall profits. In 
order to guarantee that the corporation serve the interests of stakeholders, the latter need to be given 
some control rights, either through the legal system or through bargaining. 
Objections  to  the  stakeholder  society  governance  structure  are  mainly  based  on  efficiency 
arguments. If managers pay less attention to shareholders and creditors, this will eventually make 
financing  more  expensive.  When  financing  is  obtained,  a  governance  structure  where  many 
stakeholders have a say could reduce efficiency in decision-making. Furthermore, if the different 
stakeholders come to an agreement, it would probably involve a longer list of objectives than that of 
the shareholders alone. As discussed in section 2.2.1.1, when agents face a multitude of objectives, 
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incentives are known to be (and should be) poor. Proponents of the shareholder value paradigm 
would  not  disagree  on  the  need  to  look  after  stakeholders.  However,  they  would  argue  that 
managers should be the servants of shareholders, and that other stakeholders should be covered 
through the contractual and legal apparatus. 
Part 3 The Norwegian government's ownership in DnB NOR
This comparative case study will allow us to apply the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments 
to concrete observations. It does not, however, allow us to challenge the empirical results related to 
government ownership of banks. Studying separate cases of government ownership may give an 
insight into mechanisms which empirical research cannot identify. We are primarily interested in 
analysing the circumstances of government ownership and how they could be linked to different 
rationales  for  ownership  and  how ownership  is  exercised  by  the  Norwegian  government.  The 
comparative study will focus on the case of government ownership of banks in Norway, where the 
state has a considerable minority stake in the country's largest bank, DnB NOR. Focusing on one 
country  allows  us  to  consider  the  framework  of  government  ownership,  its  efficacy,  and  its 
economic effects in more detail. This part is mainly based on easily accessible information related 
to government ownership and information attained through interviews with Knut J Utvik, deputy 
director at the Ownership Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, and  Kjell 
Arne Aasgaarden and Anders Hole,  respectively head of section and senior advisor at the Section 
for Licencing, Laws, and Regulation under the Department of Finance and Insurance Supervision at 
the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN)31.
3.1 Introduction
Any  observer  of  government  ownership  in  Norway  should  be  aware  of  the  long  tradition  of 
government intervention and ownership within the economy. Gleinsvik et al. (2001) document an 
evolution of state ownership in Norway where policies have responded to events and external and 
internal motivation. The authors illustrate the development in a table which has been reproduced 
below. We can see that ownership policies have evolved to become more based on professionalism 
and separation of roles within government. These changes have been based on the government's 
experience  with  ownership  and  external  forces  such  as  the  EEA agreement,  globalisation,  and 
transparency and coverage. It could seem as if government ownership has become more in touch 
with private sector governance policies. However, Gleinsvik et al. (2001) argue that there are some 
important  differences  between  state  and  private  ownership,  especially  regarding  governance 
31 The transcribed versions of these interviews can be delivered on demand (Norwegian)
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mechanisms.  Wholly-owned  government  companies  are  not  listed  or  traded,  removing  market 
pricing as a signal to management. The government often aims at retaining its ownership stake, 
removing  pressure  on  management  from  potential  takeovers.  Furthermore,  some  state-owned 
companies  are  more  or  less  protected  from  bankruptcy,  removing  yet  another  management 
incentive.  Finally,  government  tends  to  be  reluctant  to  adhere  to  private  sector  management 
compensation schemes because they are considered as unfair. These are some of the factors that we 
need to keep in mind when studying state-ownership of the bank DnB NOR.
State involvement in the banking sector has been an important characteristic of public policy in 
Norway  for  long  periods  of  time.  During  the  1960's  and  70's,  government  officials  became 
increasingly aware of the inability of the private banks to account for social  welfare effects of 
banking.  This  sparked  a  considerable  debate  on  the  role  of  banks,  and  the  potential  for  a 
democratisation of banking (Knutsen et al. 1998). Banks appeared to be financial institutions with a 
social  mandate,  and  were  supposed  to  act  in  accordance  with  government  policies.  When  the 
circumstances and/or regulatory regime hindered the application of a social mandate, the banks 
received the blame. However, it was not the democratisation movement of the 60's and 70's which 
led to state-ownership of DnB NOR. Ownership occurred as a response to the financial crisis which 
struck Norway around 1990. Following deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets in the 
1980's,  Norway  experienced  extraordinary  growth  in  credit,  and  changes  in  the  allocation  and 
access to credit for different sectors of the economy. The commercial property sector experienced 
high  growth  due  to  increased  availability  of  credit  during  this  period.  Norway  had  become 
increasingly  dependent  upon  income  from  the  petroleum  sector,  and  when  oil  prices  fell 
considerably during the 1980's, this triggered a contraction in fiscal policy. However, up until the 
late 1980's, politicians encouraged banks to increase lending and engage in more risky projects and 
businesses.  Increased  lending  was  funded  through  openings  in  the  currency  markets  due  to 
liberalisation.  As  the  Norwegian  Krone  fell  in  value  towards  the  end  of  the  1980's,  the  new 
financing policy of the banks appeared to be an expensive affair. The responsibility for the banking 
crisis  cannot  be  assigned  to  either  the  political  authorities  or  the  financial  system in  itself.  It 
Table 4: Evolution of government ownership in Norway (Gleinsvik et al. 2001)
Period Motivation Policies
1970's State ownership essential policy
1980's
1990's
After 2000
New governance ambitions & construction of 
Norwegian oil companies
More catastrophicly bad results & discredited 
state-ownership (right-wing progress)
Deregulation and competition & restructuring of 
unprofitable state enterprises
Separating sectoral regulation and commercial 
goals & EEA-agreement
Division of roles, autonomy and marketisation & 
focus on efficiency and operations
Globalisation & rich state – ownership more 
transparent
Professionalism and autonomy in ownership 
administration & participation in restructuring
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occurred due to a combination of many factors which created the general financial crisis taking 
place in Norway between 1987 and 1992. 
The banking crisis resulted in full state ownership of Norway's three largest commercial banks, 
namely  Den norske Bank  (DnB),  Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK), and  Fokus Bank. The 
State  Bank  Insurance  Fund  (Statens  Banksikringsfond)  and  the  State  Bank  Investment  Fund 
(Statens Bankinvesteringsfond) were created in 1991 with the purpose of governing these banks. 
The former had a more short-term, caretaker role during crisis, while the latter was to have a more 
long-term perspective. The insurance fund was given the authority to acquire shares in the banking 
sector. As a result, the fund provided the three banks with equity in exchange for complete write-
offs of shareholder capital, leaving the fund as the sole owner (Bjerkan 2009). The investment fund 
was  established  to  ensure  helathy  refinancing  of  the  banks,  and  acted  as  a  supplement  to  the 
insurance fund. The paths of the three banks led to somewhat different destinations. Under state 
governance, Fokus Bank became a regional bank until the government sold its shares in 1995. It 
became a subsidiary of the Danish bank, Danske Bank, in 1999 (Kort om banken: Fokus Bank web 
pages, 31.05.2010). CBK experienced a gradual privatisation as the Norwegian government decided 
to reduce its ownership stake to 51 percent in 1995, down to 35 percent in 1999, and finally full 
privatisation in 2000 as a response to an offer by the Swedish bank MeritaNordbanken to buy all 
shares  in  CBK  (Om  Nordea:  Nordea  web  pages,  31.05.2010).  In  DnB,  the  state  reduced  its 
ownership stake through the two funds gradually, ending up with a 42,9 percent share in the bank in 
1999. As a result of a merger between DnB and Postbanken the same year, the government's share 
rose to 60,6 percent. Further privatisation in 2001 left the government with a 47,8 percent share, 
which was then fully administered by the State Bank Investment Fund. In 2003, a merger between 
DnB and Gjensidige NOR which resulted in the company DnB NOR led to a reduction in the 
government  ownership  stake  to  below  30  percent.  This  triggered  a  policy  to  increase  the 
government's ownership stake to 34 percent, based on consent from the Storting. Following these 
acquisitions of other financial firms such as Vital Forsikring in 1996, Skandia Asset Management in 
2002, Nordlandsbanken in 2003, and mergers with Postbanken in 1999, and Gjensidige NOR ASA, 
DnB NOR ASA has become Norway's largest financial services group with a total combined assets 
of NOK 2076 billion (About the group, DnB NOR web pages, 31.05.2010). This case study of 
government ownership in banking in Norway will thus focus on the state's 34 percent ownership 
share in DnB NOR ASA. 
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3.2 Policy environment and institutional framework
The  government's  policies  related  to  ownership,  organisation  of  ownership  activities,  and 
institutions provide a framework within which the actual practice of ownership can take place. 
Moreover, regulation has been framed as an important ingredient in the theoretical and impirical 
literature. This part focuses exclusively on these issues.
3.2.1 Ownership policies
The Norwegian state has a considerable direct ownership in Norwegian businesses. The ownership 
varies from ownership shares in large publicly listed companies to small businesses with sectoral 
mandates. Government has a long-term perspective on its ownership policy, and strive to become a 
predictable  owner,  applying  generally  accepted  principles  of  corporate  governance  (Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008). Companies are categorised according to the rationale and 
motivations for ownership, and different policies apply to the different categories. The categories 
are as follows:
1. Companies with commercial objectives 
2. Companies with commercial objectives and ensuring head office functions in Norway 
3. Companies with commercial objectives and other specific, defined objectives 
4. Companies with sectoral policy objectives 
The objectives assigned to the ownership of a company determines the allocation of control rights 
between ministries. For example, Gassco AS, a fully state-owned company in charge of operating 
the  transport  of  gas  from the  Norwegian  continental  shelf  is  administered  by  the  Ministry  of 
Petroleum and Energy,  as  it  has  clearly  defined  sectoral  policy  objectives.  The  Department  of 
Ownership within the Ministry of Trade and Industry administers state ownership in 22 companies 
which makes it the government entity with the largest number of companies under administration.
The government defines some general ownership policies which are applied more or less regardless 
of the objectives of ownership The present government stresses the need for an active ownership 
policy. This should not, however, be confused with the term 'investor activism' used in the corporate 
governance literature. In general, the government does not aim at interfering with the decisions of 
managers. The government stress that an active ownership policy requires clearly defined goals of 
the company, a board composition which addresses the interests of all shareholders and the need for 
competence, capacity and diversity, and good systems for monitoring of the company's finances in 
66
the broadest  sense.  Moreover,  companies  with commercial  objectives  have to  acknowledge the 
fundamental requirement of profitability. This is not synonymous with the objective of short-term 
maximisation  of  profits,  and  the  government  stress  that  long-run  competitiveness  depends  on 
factors  such  as  sufficient  investments  in  research  and  development  (R&D)  and  human  capital 
(Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008). Moreover, the government encourages diversity 
of  boards and management,  and insists  that  companies  under  administration adopt  high ethical 
standards.The companies are also expected to follow norms of social responsibility, which could 
have  somewhat  different  interpretations  according  to  the  characteristics  of  the  company  under 
consideration. 
The government  itself  has defined the rationale and goals  of state ownership for all  the above 
mentioned categories. Furthemore, in  The Government Ownership Policy (Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 2008), all government owned companies have been assigned firm-specific goals. 
For companies with commercial objectives, government sets a target rate of return based on the 
capital asset pricing model, with some room for discretion due to the incompleteness of this model. 
The  government  also  communicates  long-term  expectations  regarding  dividends,  normally 
formulated as a percentage of accounting results. Regardless of objective, the government expects 
that state-owned companies act in accordance with the policies listed below.
1. Long-term  perspective  on  restructuring,  especially  in  communities  with  few  other 
opportunities for employment
2. High ambitions regarding R&D activities
3. Efficient use of resources and minimisation of the company's impact on the environment
4. Follow up work on health, safety and the working environment
5. Adoption of ethical guidelines
6. Combating corruption through transparency and public disclosure
7. Promotion of gender equality and recruitment of people with a minority background
8. Protection of operations, employees and the local community against accidents
The government insists that these general objectives support long-term profitability and sustainable 
industrial development. Most of these objectives are not very controversial, and belong to a trend of 
increased social awareness among companies in recent years. However, some of these objectives 
can be interpreted as part of a social mandate which businesses would not adhere to unless told to 
do so. This applies, in particular, to the first and seventh objective above which seem to be the most 
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politisised  objectives.  However,  it  seems likely  that  business  can  fulfill  the  objectives  without 
endangering their long-term competitive position. Moreover, corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
policies based on these objectives should not be seen as distinct elements unrelated to corporate 
strategy and business development. Relating social responsibility to corporate strategy and business 
development is one possible way to avoid 'window dressing' of CSR policies, and making them 
effective and not only promotional. 
To ensure that companies adhere to these objectives, government encourage the ministries in charge 
of ownership to perform follow-ups of the companies' work regarding the objectives. The Ministry 
of  Trade  and Industry,  in  charge  of  DnB NOR,  has  been  the  most  active  in  following up the 
implementation  of  the  objectives.  In  2008,  this  ministry  started  working  on  an  overview  of 
implementation of objectives, and during the first half of this year, separate meetings on the subject 
were held with the all the companies under the ministry's administration. The current government 
aims at making such meetings on CSR an annual routine, ensuring that companies pay sufficient 
attention to these considerations. 
A distinctive feature of the government's ownership policy is transparency. We can observe this 
from the extensive documentation on ownership policy, and its public availability. For the purposes 
of this paper, we have not encountered any problems whatsoever in attaining information on these 
policies. Most of the information is available on-line, giving civil society as a whole, and corporate 
stakeholders  in  particular,  easy access to  this  information.  This allows considerable scrutiny of 
government policies in this field, facilitating the work of media and the civil sector in critisising 
government policies. This tightens the link between the people as principals and government as an 
agent in the public choice perspective of public governance. 
3.2.2 Internal organisation of governance
The  government  defines  three  main  governmental  tasks  which  are  more  or  less  related  to 
government  ownership.  First,  government  formulates  legislation.  Second,  it  act  as  a  public 
supervisory authority. Third, it manages the state's shares and other state property. The government 
insists  on distinguishing between these three roles.  A clear  separation of  these roles  is  seen as 
important in order to safeguard the legitimacy of each role. This is part of the reasoning behind the 
allocation of administrative control of most of the commercially oriented companies to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry. Efforts to increase the organisational distance between roles, and consentrate 
ownership  within  one  ministry  aims  at  strengthening  confidence  in  state  administration  of 
ownership and reduce role conflicts (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008).
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Our focus here is on the ownership of DnB NOR, which is under the administration of the Ministry 
of  Trade  and Industry.  We will  thus  abstract  from the  organisation  of  ownership  within  other 
ministries,  where sectoral  objectives tend to  have a larger influence on the ownership policies. 
Within the  Ministry  of  Trade and Industry,  the  Department of  Ownership,  established in 2002, 
administers the state ownership of 22 companies. This department has been organised in order to 
combine capacity for corporate governance with requirements pertaining to ministerial decision-
making processes. A rather small, full-time staff at the department is organised into different firm-
specific  teams  consisting  of  economists  and  lawyers  in  charge  of  exercising  ownership  and 
following up each company. There are three professional areas, with a deputy director general in 
charge of each of these areas, including finance, analysis, and legal matters. The deputy director 
generals  are  also  responsible  for  following  up  a  certain  number  of  firm-specific  teams.  The 
administrative tasks of the  Ownership Department include proposing candidates for the board of 
directors  and  nomination  committees,  monitoring  and  following  up  the  company's  financial 
performance,  and  formulating  an  opinion  on  other  prospective  ownership  issues  (Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008).
The Ownership Department is supposed to be rather independent from the rest of the bureaucratic 
structure. When asked about the factors that ensure this independence, Knut J. Utvik states that the 
Ownership  Department  has  restricted  its  attention  towards  dealing  exclusively  with  ownership. 
They will not take part in the formulation of policies, and if anything touches upon subjects related 
to  the  companies  where  the  government  has  an  ownership  stake,  it  will  be  dealt  with  by  the 
Economic Policy Department.
3.2.3 Institutional factors
When government is involved as owner of separate legal entities, this implies that it has to exercise 
ownership in  accordance with a  certain institutional  framwork (Ministry of  Trade and Industry 
2008). This framework consists of the constitution and administrative law, company legislation, 
competition law, and legislation related to the stock exchange and securities. Policies must also be 
in accordnace with EEA regulations, including rules considering subsidies.
First,  the constitutional  framework prescribes  that  the administration is  organised such that  the 
government and ministries have powers of instruction and control over other state bodies.  This 
allows the government to act  on decisions made in the Storting (Parliament),  or  directives and 
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wishes of the Storting. The constitution further stipulates that government is to administer state's 
ownership,  and  that  the  Storting  has  explicit  authority  to  instruct  the  government  in  matters 
concerning state-owned businesses. Government also depends on the consent of the Storting for 
decisions regarding changes in ownership interests, including capital increases as well as the buying 
and  selling  of  shares.  Finally,  the  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  of  Norway  is  in  charge  of 
controlling each ministry's  administration of government ownership,  and reports  to the Storting 
concerning these matters.
Second, company law has considerable influence on how the government may exercise ownership. 
It prescribes a clear division of roles between shareholders and the company's management. The 
legal  framework  holds  that  the  board  of  directors  and  management  is  in  charge  of  company 
administration. Management is responsible for, and in charge of the management of the company's 
operations. The state is to promote its interests as owner through the general meeting. If the minister 
does not act through the general meeting, legislation leaves the minister without any authority in the 
company. In companies where the government is only part owner, the law requires that government 
cannot favour itself at the expense of other shareholders. Equal treatment of all shareholders is an 
essential  legal  principle  which  limits  the  exchange  of  information  and  dialogue  between  the 
company  and  separate  owners.  Limited  companies  legislation  puts  restrictions  on  the  dialogue 
between the state as owner and the company, although it does allow the state to communicate its 
opinion on issues of interest to society as a whole. In general, the authority of the state vis à vis 
companies where it has ownership interests depend on the state's ownership share. In wholly-owned 
companies,  the  state  is  granted  more  freedom  to  act  through  the  general  meeting,  there  are 
restrictions on gender equality of boards, the Office of the Auditor General benefits from increased 
control of administrative activities, and the owner can impose obligation on the company that will 
reduce its  financial  results.  In partly owned companies,  company law states that even majority 
owners need to respect the interests of minority owners, and cannot make decisions which are in 
conflict with the interests of minority owners or the comapany as a whole. This is a legislative 
imperative  with  important  implications  for  the  government  as  owner  since  the  rationale  for 
government ownership is often based on considerations which are not purely commercial.  This 
implies that government and other owners may have diverging interests. Whether the realisation of 
government objectives are in conflict with the interests of other owners will depend on an overall 
assessment of the advantages, the position of the company, and other circumstances (Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 2008). Moreover, the government can realise different goals depending on the 
ownership share as illustrated below. It is obvious that the government's influence on a company 
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depends on its ownership share. The rationale for government ownership can thus often be tied to 
the size of the government's ownership share. 
The requirement pertaining to equal treatment of all shareholders imply that the company cannot 
discriminate among shareholders unless this is based on the common interests of the company and 
the shareholders. Normally, large shareholders will  not receive more information than the other 
shareholders,  but  under  some  circumstances  there  might  be  a  legitimate  call  for  giving  large 
shareholders more informations than others.  This could occur in relation to decisions regarding 
capital changes, merger negotiations, or other decisions which require a majority. The company and 
its investors are required by law to handle insider information in a proper manner. The government 
agency or ministry in charge of ownership may at some times receive inside information because of 
the many roles of government. However, in transactions which affect publicly listed companies, it 
must  be  clarified  whether  the  government  is  in  possession  of  insider  information.  When  in 
possession of insider information, government (as with everybody else) has an obligation of non-
disclosure, and the inside information must be restricted to people with a particular need for the 
information. 
In considering public subsidies, the government is restricted by the EEA agreement which forbids 
public subsidies. This also applies to public enterprises. The so-called market economy investor 
priciple should be applied when deciding whether public funds injected in companies constitute 
subsidies.  This implies that  the government  cannot  inject  funds into companies  based on other 
considerations than those applied by private investors in funding decisions. The state is thus obliged 
to demand market return on capital injected into state-owned enterprises. However, when the state 
imposes obligations on a company that the board considers not to be commercially justified, the 
company should be compensated through separate allocations. Such allocations are restricted by the 
EEA agreement, and this agreement generally forbids operating subsidies for companies exposed to 
Table 5: Ownership share and associated rights and responsibility
Rights and responsibility
More control through general meeting. Can impose value reducing obligations.
Equal treatment of shareholders.
9/10 Majority owner can squeeze out other shareholders.
2/3
 1/2
1/3
Owner-
ship 
share
Wholly-
owned
Partially 
owned
Control over decisions to amend company articles of association: regarding mergers, 
demergers, capital changes, convertible loans, conversion, and dissolution.
Control over decisions regarding approval of annual accounts, dividend payments, election 
of members of the board (if no corporate assembly) and corporate assembly.
Negative control of decisions where 2/3 majority is required: Block movement of head 
office, capital changes, amendments of articles of association.
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competition. In Norway, the principle of freedom of information applies to public administration. 
The government insists that transparency increases confidence in government ownership. In relation 
to the administration of ownership, situations could occur where it is necessary to withhold some 
documents from the public. This will normally apply to price-sensitive information and documents 
with a confidential  commercial  content.  Delayed publication of documents also apply to issues 
under the investigation of the Office of the Auditor General.
3.2.4 The government's corporate governance policies
Corporate  governance  policies  can  be  identified  within  several  parts  of  public  policy.  The 
Regulations for financial management in the state prescribes that entities responsible for companies 
that are government owned, fully or partially, shall produce written guidelines concerning how the 
management and control authority shall be exercised in relation to the company (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 2008). The state is obliged to administer its ownership interests with special emphasis 
on..:
● Expediency  of  chosen  form  of  incorporation,  the  company's  articles  of  association, 
financing,  and  the  composition  of  the  board  in  relation  to  the  company's  objective and 
ownership.
● Equal treatment of all owners and a clear division of authority and responsibility between 
the owning entity and the board of directors.
● Achievement of the objectives set by the company's management.
● Satisfactory performance of the board of directors
The Regulations for financial mangement in the state also prescribes that governance, monitoring, 
and control should be adapted to the state's ownership share as well as particular traits and risk 
related to the company. It is also imperative that target rates of return should be set and followed up 
by the appropriate ministry.
The government has also formulated a set of ten principles for good corporate governance (see 
appendix). These principles are supposed to be applied by all state-owned companies. According to 
the  government  (Ministry  of  Trade  and  Industry  2008),  the  principles  are  in  accordance  with 
broadly accepted principles of corporate governance. Moreover, these principles are supposed to 
reduce risk related to the companies and ease outside financing as the application of reasonable 
guidelines increase market confidence. Publication of corporate governance principles is also part 
of public policy on disclosure of information related to public administration. 
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The principles are more or less in accordance with The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance (2009), a set of guidelines for good corporate governance published by the Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Board (NCGB). NCGB is an organisation consisting of representatives of 
different interest groups of owners and issuers of shares on the stock exchange. To the extent that 
the government's corporate governance principles adhere to the guidelines given by NCGB, they are 
also in accordance with the principles of the private financial sector on this matter. It should be 
mentioned that the government's principles address some issues which NCGB has not paid much 
attention to, including 'resonable' remuneration and incentive arrangements and consciousness of 
social responsibilities. Remuneration of top executives has been an important part of the continual 
public  debate  on corporate  governance,  and it  seems as if  the relatively egalitarian Norwegian 
society is reluctant to accept hugh remuneration of executives, especially when this occurs within a 
a company where the government has an ownership stake. This observation supports the view of 
Gleinsvik  et  al.  (2001)  who  argue  that  government  is  reluctant  to  adhere  to  private  sector 
compensation schemes. Consciousness of social responsibilities can be interpreted very differently 
depending on the context. As we saw in section 3.1.1.1, the government's expectations concerning 
social  responsibilities  of state-owned companies are not very controversial,  and can be seen as 
promiting long-term sustainable operations. It seems as if there is a convergence of the interests of 
companies  and  the  government  when  the  temporal  perspective  is  extended.  In  the  long  term, 
companies may profit form a good reputation and having legitimised their operations. This is what 
most private companies use as an argument in favour of CSR policies. For the government, CSR 
policies  reduces  negative  attention  towards  state-owned  companies,  and  consequent  fall  in  the 
opnion polls. Concering these two divergences between government corporate governance policy 
and that of the private sector, we might expect an impact of government ownership on company 
policy. 
3.2.5 Regulation and public supervision of banks
3.2.5.1 The role of The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway
In order to provide an in-depth coverage of the role and function of the FSAN and regulations of 
banks, the publicly available information from the authority has been supplemented by information 
gathered during an interview with Kjell Arne Aasgaarden and Anders Hole,  respectively head of 
section and senior advisor at the Section for Licencing, Laws, and Regulation under the Department 
of Finance and Insurance Supervision at the FSAN. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
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(FSAN) is the agency in charge of financial supervision in Norway. The authority supervises banks, 
finance companies, mortgage companies, insurance companies, pension funds, investment firms, 
securities  fund management  and market  conduct  in  the  securities  market,  stock  exchanges  and 
authorised market places, settlement centres and securities registers, estate agencies, debt collection 
agencies,  external  accountants  and  auditors  (About  Finanstilsynet:  The  Financial  Supervisory 
Authority of Norway web pages 3.06.2010). This independent government agency built on laws and 
decisions emanating from the parliament, where its main goal is to promote financial stability and 
well functioning markets. Furthermore, the supervisory authority lists 6 intermediate goals tied to 
its role in the financial markets:
1. Sound financial institutions and firms with a fit and proper management, and good internal 
control and risk management 
2. A robust infrastructure ensuring satisfactory settlements and payments 
3. Good  monitoring  of  risk  in  the  household  and  corporate  sector  and  in  real  estate  and 
securities markets 
4. Adequate  information  to  investors  and  users  in  the  financial  market,  and  good  quality 
financial reporting by listed companies 
5. To promote financial market actors’ compliance with the rules of conduct and to seek to 
prevent conduct which may undermine confidence in the financial market 
6. To ensure that critical situations are handled with minimal harmful effects
The Financial Supervisory Act (Lov om tilsynet med finansinstitusjoner mv: Lovdata web pages 
3.06.2010) lays the foundation of the agency's operations. This act explicitly defines the agency's 
area  of  responsibility,  main  goals,  and  formal  ties,  responsibilities  and  powers  with  respect  to 
entities under supervision, auditors, and government. Moreover, the act describe formal duties and 
restrictions applying to the agency's employees, and provides for legally imposed financing of the 
agency's  operations.  As  mentioned  above,  the  FSAN is  an  independent  agency.  The  Financial 
Supervisory  Act  prescribes  that  the  FSAN  board  members  should  be  appointed  by  the  King. 
Moreover, the King appoints the director general, which is head of management, for a period of six 
years. Currently, the director general is serving his third consecutive term and has been director of 
the agency since 1993. The process of appointing the leadership of the FSAN secures the agency's 
independence vis à vis the government and other parts of the public service. Kjell Arne Aasgaarden 
stress that there is no direct link between the state agencies in charge of administration of ownership 
and the FSAN. The organisation of the state aparatus, where the  Ownership Department and the 
FSAN are under two different ministries, implies that these two entities should not be in direct 
contact  with  eachother.  Moreover,  Aasgaarden  states  that  the  FSAN  communicates  with  the 
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management and controlling bodies in their work, and not with single owners or groups of owners. 
In other words, the agency is relatively indifferent to the fact that the government has an ownership 
stake in DnB NOR. 
Entities under supervision are obliged to provide the agency with any information that the agency 
requires at all times. This is to allow the FSAN to ascertain that the financial companies function 
optimally and in accordance with legislation and the purpose, conventions and the rationale for 
establishment of each institution. Auditors are obliged to report to the FSAN on any circumstances 
which could imply a breach of legislation, potentially harm the operations of the institution, or 
disapproval of the institution's accounts. Moreover, the FSAN has the power to force institutions to 
follow the applied legislation,  have a higher responsible  capital  than the minimum restrictions, 
restrict  total  credit  to a customer to a lower level  than that prescribed by law, and change the 
composition of the control committee (in charge of supervising the company’s activities and ensure, 
inter alia, that the company complies with statutory enactments, its Articles of Association and rules 
laid down by the Supervisory Board and approved by the General Meeting). The FSAN also has the 
power to summon the board of directors, the control committee, and the supervisory board to an 
extraordinary general meeting. Regarding the employees and board members of the FSAN, they are 
obliged to respect the confidentiality of operations, cannot be involved in any of the companies 
under supervision including ownership of shares etc., and cannot receive loans from the institutions 
under supervision unless consent has been granted by the appropriate ministry. The costs of running 
the FSAN are covered by the institutions which are under supervision each year, where the division 
of  costs  is  made on the basis  of  the capital  under  management  at  the different  institutions.  In 
general,  these legislations empower the FSAN to perform its  tasks and provide it  with  a  large 
degree of independence from both the government, other government agencies, and the financial 
sector. 
On the other hand, the FSAN is not averse to contact with the financial industry. Tirole (1994) argue 
that it is preferable to avoid the influence of interest groups on the operations of the regulating 
authority. However, Kjell Arne Aasgaarden reveal that several interest groups influence and try to 
influence the FSAN. Financial industry groups are particularly important in this matter. Considering 
the banking sector, Finance Norway (FNO), the trade organisation for banks, insurance companies 
and other financial institutions in Norway,  is the most important interest group. Aasgarden believe 
that there has been a move towards and ideology where the industry is seen as providing important 
input to the FSAN. The FSAN is obliged by law to consult the affected parties when considering 
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new legislation. The authority has regular meetings with the industry representatives two times a 
year, and sometimes the FSAN and the industry establish project groups. The communication and 
cooperation  between  the  FSAN  and  the  industry  is  supposedly  constructive  and  a  source  of 
improved knowledge on the effects of regulations. This relationship between the FSAN and the 
industry has developed considerably from the more conflictual relationship which existed between 
the supervisory authority and the industry organisations before. 
3.2.5.2 Banking regulations
Regulation  can  potentially  work  to  defend  and  improve  conditions  for  established  commercial 
actors, and change the power-structure in the market (Stigler 1971). Considering the Norwegian 
case, Kjell Arne Aasgaarden argue that this is not an issue since Norwegian regulation is basically 
the same as European regulation. The regulative framework which applies to the banking sector is 
more  or  less  the  common  European  legislation  that  Norway  has  adopted  through  the  EEA 
agreement. According to Aasgaarden, there is not much additional legislation concering Norwegian 
banks. Moreover, as Anders Hole states, one of the main building blocks of the European legislation 
is freedom of establishment. This ensures that all banks within the jurisdiction of this legislation has 
the same right to establish a business wherever they want. Aasgaarden argue that harmonisation of 
European legislation has had a positive effect on the Norwegian financial system as such. It has 
allowed for  foreign entry into several  parts  of  the  Norwegian banking market,  and consequent 
increase in competition.
Some authors argue that strong regulation can reduce the need for corporate governance through 
concentrated ownership (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). However, Kjell Arne Aasgarden argue that the 
function of the FSAN cannot be seen as a substitute for the government exercising ownership in 
DnB NOR.  On  the  other  hand,  he  admits  that  the  supervisory  activity  of  the  FSAN is  often 
appreciated by the banks as an input in the daily management, particularly in smaller banks. In 
general  Aasgaarden  argues  that  the  supervisory  functions  are  qualitatively  different  from 
governance functions,  although circulars  published by the FSAN can be perceived by some as 
contributions to corrective behaviour.
The Norwegian regulations oblige financial institutions to consolidate into their financial statements 
all ownership shares in other companies. Aasgaarden says that the FSAN considers itself as among 
the best in class at complying banks and other financial institutions to consolidate their statements. 
Anders Hole adds that commercial  bank legislation implies a limit  of 4 percent  for shares and 
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ownership in other companaies. Furthermore, there are some legal requirements concerning what 
type of companies that can be included in a corporation.
Kjell Arne Aasgaarden state that the FSAN has an ideology that implies a positive attitude towards 
active ownership and active exercising of ownership rights. In general, the rights and the potential 
influence  of  shareholders  are  protected through the Limited Liability  Act,  but,  as  Anders  Hole 
states, regulations imply that listed companies must provide continuous reports on their operations 
and  finances.  Aasgaarden  adds  that  transparency  of  bank  is  an  important  issue  in  regulation, 
allowing whoever interested access to information in the form of annual reports and so on. 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there has been a considerable focus on systemic risk 
related to  large financial  institutions.  Kjell  Arne Aasgaarden can confirm that  DnB NOR is  an 
institution which could be a potential source of systemic risk in the Norwegian context. He argues 
that there has been a gradual development towards focusing on systemic risk, where risk-based 
supervision implies that more weight is given to systemically important institutions. Moreover, he 
contends that most countries in Europe have moved away from quantitative restrictions on liquidity 
reserves before the crisis,  while we now observe that they are returning rather quickly to their 
former policies. The supervisory authority in Norway has, according to Aasgaarden, been paying 
attention to the liquidity reserves and ability to support external shocks of all banks the whole time. 
Now they register that other countries are following suit. 
3.2.5.3 Deposit insurance
A particular characteristic of banking in modern economies is the presence of deposit insurance. 
The  deposit  insurance  in  Norway  is  relatively  high,  covering  deposits  up  to  NOK 2.000.000. 
(Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund: Bankenes Sikringsfond web pages 11.06.2010). This makes 
the Norwegian deposit insurance scheme among the most generous in the world. Several academics 
have argued that deposit insurance strengthens the the banks' incentives to increase exposure to risk 
(Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez 2008, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002, Barth, Caprio 
Jr and Levine 2004, Levine 2004). In other words, generous deposit insurance schemes can lead to 
serious problems of risk-shifting, reducing the expected value of debtors' and depositors' claims. 
Some of  these  authors  (Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Detragiache  2002)  claim that   strong institutional 
environment can allevite some of these problems, but this is a rather controversial issue (see for 
example  Barth,  Caprio  Jr  and  Levine  2004).  Kjell  Arne  Aasgaarden  in  the  FSAN admits  that 
Norway has a high level of deposit insurance. Observing actions by other European countries to 
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increase their formal level of deposit insurance during the recent financial crisis, he argues that we 
should consider the fact that Norway has never experienced the need to change the insurance policy. 
Moreover, he argues that the scheme is convenient in the sense that consumers can be confident in 
leaving leaving large amounts, perhaps due to sale of assets, in their bank accounts without any 
worries. Aasgaarden states that Norway, through the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund, has no 
plans to change the level of insured deposits. However, the European Union has definitive plans to 
regulate depostits as a standard across Europe, with a maximum level of deposit insurance at EUR 
100.000. For Norway, this will eventually imply a considerable reduction in the level of deposit 
insurance (from today's NOK 2.000.000 to ca. NOK 800.000). Considering the current system of 
deposit insurance, Aasgaarden agrees that, at least in theory, it would have an impact on risk and 
risk-related behaviour. However, he claims that he is not in a position to evaluate the significance 
and empirical effects. On the other hand, he argues that some of the motivation for the Norwegian 
deposit insurance scheme is that it has appeared to work well over time. 
3.2 Rationale for ownership in DnB NOR
In the State Ownership Report (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008), it is explicitly stated that the 
rationale for ownership in DnB NOR is to ensure that the company is headquartered in Norway, and 
that the bank acts as a partner for Norwegian companies in Norway and in the export market. The 
company thus belongs to the second category of objectives for state-owned companies mentioned in 
section 3.1.1.1. According to the government, this will provide business and industry with access to 
a large and highly competent Norway-based financial group. The ownership report also states that 
the current government intends to hold on to its 34 percent stake in DnB NOR. As we can see from 
table 6 above, an ownership share of one third gives the government negative control of decisions 
where 2/3 majority is required. This gives the government the power to block movement of head 
office, capital changes, and amendments of articles of association. 
In considering the rationale for government ownership in DnB NOR, several questions arise. First, 
why  is  it  in  the  interest  of  the  government  that  this  financial  institutions  is  headquartered  in 
Norway? Second, why does the government feel obliged to have negative control over DnB NOR in 
order to guaranteee nationally located headquarters? Third, does the government use its potential 
control for other purposes as well? Fourth, does the government ownership have any unforeseen or 
understated effects on the operations and strategies of DnB NOR?
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3.2.1 Government's interest in nationally located headquarters
In the interview with Knut J. Utvik, deputy director general in the Ownership Department, these 
questions  were  answered  in  some  detail.  When  asked  why  it  is  important  to  ensure  national 
ownership in DnB NOR, the deputy director refers to two factors. First, DnB NOR is one of the 
largest  Norwegian  Companies  and  it  is  seen  as  important  to  ensure  Norwegian  ownership  and 
headquarters in some companies because they are considered to be important arenas of learning for 
Norwegian businesses. It becomes a place where Norwegian competence and talents can develop. 
Knut J. Utvik stress that this line of thought is based on a more pragmatic perspective than the 
purely theoretical where everybody are fully mobile. Second, based on observations the director 
argues that distance and localisation has a certain significance for willingness to take on risks, and 
that being close to information about the situation in a society can influence decision-making during 
crises  or  downturns.  A bank  located  close  to  the  market  is  expected  to  be  more  confident  in 
handling local phenomena than a bank with headquarters located far away, and where decisions are 
pulled towards the centre. the ownership report also states that government ownership ensures that 
the bank acts as a partner for Norwegian businesses in Norway and in the export market. But does 
ownership allow the state to induce the bank into lending to Norwegian businesses, or does the bank 
find it commercially preferable to lend to Norwegian businesses as a function of the localisation of 
headquarters?  Knut  J.  Utvik  argue  that  DnB  NOR,  as  a  Norwegian  bank,  has  the  necessary 
knowledge of Norwegian businesses, and thus the proximity and prerequisites necessary to follow 
these businesses in their  foreign ventures  as well.  He stresses  that  DnB NOR mentiones  some 
sectors where they aim at being big on an international scale as well, and that there is no restrictions 
on involvement in international companies as far as the bank has the capacity to do so. Rephrasing 
the the question, I asked Knut J. Utvik what the government is afraid would happen if DnB NOR 
were to be fully privatised. He refers to the potential for a foreign owner who will relocate the 
headquarters abroad. This would leave the Norwegian public and businesses without an equally 
committed local bank. Utvik argues that this would probably harm businesses more than individual 
customers, as there are several banks present in the retail market. In particular, the absence of a 
Norwegian bank could lead to reduced financial activity vis à vis Norwegian businesses during 
crises. In the foreword of the State Ownership Report (2008) the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Sylvia Brustad, argued that a large state owner shall ensure additional predictability and stability, 
and provides assurance that the companies can continue to focus on long-term creation of value 
even in times of crisis. When asked about the government's contribution to focus on the long-term 
perspective, Knut J. Utvik refered to the government's acceptance of no pay-outs during the crisis 
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year 2008, leaving the money wihtin the the company. Furthermore, the government supported an 
emission of new shares which allowed refinancing of the bank. Finally, government portrayed itself 
as a stable owner in choosing not to offer its shares for sale during the crisis, which could have 
worsened the banks financial position.
These seem to be well formulated arguments for national ownership. But why should the state be 
the national owner? The director adds that the distribution of capital in the Norwegian society is 
such that there are no good alternatives to government ownership. As DnB NOR is a very large 
company, there is simply no organised capital capable of taking over the state's position. The fact 
that the two other banks which were nationalised after the crisis in the early 90's eventually became 
foreign owned when the government sold its shares (Fokus Bank under Danske Bank, and CBK 
under MeritaNordbanken to form Nordea) seems to support this view of the investor environment in 
Norway.
3.2.2 Secondary reasons for ownership
The government's general expectations and principles apply to its ownership of DnB NOR, and 
could potentially be linked to the rationale for ownership. In particular, the government expects the 
companies in its portfolio to be cnscious of their social responsibilities. State ownership of DnB 
NOR thus implies an increased awareness and focus on CSR. When asked about how the social 
responsibilities of DnB NOR could be defined, Knut J. Utvik refers to a presence in society and 
attempts at playing a role in society and not being too passive. Moreover, the social responsibility 
includes  consideration  of  the  products  the  bank  sells  and  promotes,  and  the  localisation  of 
operations with respect to countries where the bank should not be present. Utvik interprets ethical 
business  to  imply  that  the  bank  should  pay  attention  to  gender  equality,  working  conditions, 
environmental  impact,  and  avoid  corruption.  Examples  include  consideration  of  ethical  and 
environmenttal aspects of the businesses which aplly for financing, and the provision of sufficient 
information about risk etc. to individuals in selling the bank's products. When asked whether the 
government has been a main driving force in pushing social responsibility, the director posits that 
the government has been active in focusing on these topics and putting them on the agenda. The 
Ownership Department is careful not to impose a strict framework for CSR policies, as this would 
require  more  competence  in  this  field.  However,  the  department  may  insist  that  DnB  NOR's 
operations have to be in accordance with general requirements developed in the society. 
The government is not alone in focusing on CSR policies. More and more private businesses adopt 
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CSR policies, which may indicate that such policies are not in conflict with profit motives. Knut J. 
Utvik argues that, in general, lack of focus on social responsibility could have dire consequences for 
a company. He points to reputational factors, and that these could have real economic value. As for 
the government as owner, Utvik argues that the expectations regarding social responsibility is in 
accordance with the  objective of  long-term profitability.  Based on observations,  he argues  that 
several other long-term owners shares the government's perspective on social responsibility. On the 
other hand, the Ownership Report (2008) states that the government as owner wants the companies 
where it has an ownership stake to define measures and/or guidelines which contribute to reducing 
the likelihood of negative individual events which are more likely to gain public attention. To the 
question of whether such measures and guidelines are more in the interest of the government than 
other owners, Utvik responds that the government is subject to significant monitoring by the media 
and the public, and that if government companies break many rules and so on, this could have a 
negative effect on public opinion regarding government ownership.  Government ownership can 
thus create another dimension, as it provides the public with a distinct owner it can critisise and 
evaluate. Utvik argues that the potential for negative attention from the media could be a driving 
force in the area of social responsibility.
3.2.3 Unforeseen or understated effects of ownership
One possible understated effect of government ownership arise because of the government's policy 
to remain an owner with a long-term perspective. Knut J Utvik argues that it becomes more and 
more obvious that having a long-term owner is in the company's development interests, and that it 
therefore is also mainly in the interests of the shareholders. On the other hand, Gleinsvik et al. 
(2001)  argue  that  a  policy  to  keep  a  certain  ownership  share  could  reduce  pressure  on  the 
management from possible takeover attempts.
Another potential understated effect is that keeping the headquarters of DnB NOR in Norway puts it 
under the jurisdiction of Norwegian supervisory authority.  In Utvik's  opnion,  this has not  been 
given much weight by the  Ownership Department. He admits, however, that it could be of some 
importance that the largest active financial institution in Norway is under the country's supervisory 
authority  instead  of  being  just  a  branch  of  a  foreign  bank  following  special  rules  for  capital 
adequacy and coverage of deposits and so on. 
A third, but less obvious, implication of locating headquarters in Norway is that the investment arm 
of DnB NOR is located in Norway. DnB NOR markets, a subdivision of the bank, is the largest 
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single actor on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Knut J. Utvik rejects the idea that the location of this 
division of DnB NOR is part of the government's ownership policy. However, it is fair to assume 
that such a large actor bring considerable liquidity to the stock exchange, which is in the interest of 
listed companies. 
3.3 Corporate governance of DnB NOR
In section 3.1.1.4 we adressed the general corporate governance principles of the government. The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry has also taken part in the formulation of the OECD guidelines on 
Corporate  Governance  of  State-owned Enterprises  (OECD 2005).  The  administration  of  state-
owned enterprises is mainly in accordance with these guidelines. The essence of these guidelines 
are  reproduced  in  the  appendix.  In  the  Government  Ownership  Policy (2008)  the  government 
elaborates on some topics related to corporate governance. This information has been supplemented 
with information from the interview with the deputy director general of the Ownership Department 
in order to get an insight into the state's corporate governance of DnB NOR. 
3.3.1 Contact with the company
The ownership ministries are in charge of monitoring the companies' economic results. For DnB 
NOR the  Ownership department  is  responsible  for  the contact  with the company.  This  contact 
includes  regular  meetings  with  the  management  of  the  company  where  any part  of  the  state's 
ownership policy can be discussed. These meetings between investor and management is in line 
with  expectations  related  to  communication  between  management  and  larger  investors.  The 
opinions  expressed by government  during these  meetings  should be considered as  input  to  the 
company's management and board of directors (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2008). 
As such opnions are considered as inputs, the government stress that it is the board of directors who 
is  responsible  for  making  the  right  compromises  and  decisions  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
shareholders. Under some circumstances, it  might be in the interest of the company to pass on 
inside information to large shareholders, such as the state. In such situations, the government is 
subject to normal legislation for handling confidential information. Knut J. Utvik in the Ownership 
Department argue that since they are not active on the stock market, it will normally create few 
problems to be in an inside position for a limited period. The Ministry has established routines to 
handle such information confidentially. 
The last government ownership report to the Storting was given the title An Active and Long-Term 
Ownership (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2006-2007). The title is supposed to emphasise the 
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main ambition of government ownership. Knut J. Utvik argues that Ownership Department does 
practice an active ownership, given the limitations implied by the decision not to sit on boards, and 
respecting  the  general  roles  in  the  governance  structure.  It  is,  first  of  all,  through the  general 
meeting that the ownership department exercise its ownership rights. The department participates 
actively in the general meeting through considerable preparation for voting on any subject on the 
agenda. In companies with election committees, such as DnB NOR, the department enters into the 
committees and participates actively in getting a board with the composition regarding diversity and 
competence that is appropriate for the company. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry is a member of the nomination committee of DnB NOR. He is a former director 
general of the Ownership Department. Moreover, Utvik states that the department exercise an active 
ownership by communicating their  expectations to  return on investments.  As mentioned in  the 
general policy framework above, the government has set an expected long-term rate of return based 
on  the  capital  asset  pricing  model  (CAPM).  In  addition,  the  Ownership  Department  airs  its 
grievances or concerns during quarterly meetings, where the focus could be on everything from 
risk-profile and market share, to performance on the retail market. 
In the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005) it is stressed 
that it is in the interest of the state that other owners do not perceive of the state as an intransparent 
and  unpredictable  owner,  and  that  they  feel  that  they  are  treated  fairly.  As  the  Norwegian 
government has adopted these guidelines, it is interesting to see how this works out. Knut J. Utvik 
states  that  the  Ownership  Department  avoid  interfering  with  management  decisions  using  it's 
majority.  It  is  essential  that  they  respect  the  role  of  the  board  and  the  normal  division  of 
responsibility. In general, holding on to a well-defined policy, including the government's principles 
for corporate governance, and respecting the implications of the Limited Liability Act and the The 
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (2009) will according to Utvik strengthen 
the transparency and predictability of government ownership.
3.3.2 The responsibilities of the board
According to the Government's Ownership Policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2008), the state 
emphasise compliance with company legislation (Limited Liability Companies Act) pertaining to 
the relationship and distribution of competence between the shareholder, the board, the corporate 
assembly,  and  the  company's  management.  The  board  of  directors  is  responsible  for  the 
management  of  the  company.  This  implies  that  it  is  not  the  responsibility  of  the  minister  as 
administrator of government ownership to make decisions regarding the operations of the company. 
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Development and restructuring of the company's operations, evaluation of larger projects, and long-
term strategy are also responsibilities of the board. Moreover, the board is in charge of hiring and 
firing the top executive manager. The board and the manager is responsible for the administration of 
the company, and that the company is administered in the interest of all the owners. They are also 
subject to personal liability for damages and may be subject to criminal persecution with regards to 
their management of the company. Shareholders exercise supreme authority through the general 
meeting although it is a precondition that the board and management have considerable freedom of 
action with respect to the management of the company. The shareholders should not, under normal 
circumstances,  intervene  in  affairs  which  constitute  the  responsibilities  of  the  board  and 
management.  The  main  principle  for  the  government's  exercise  of  ownership  is  that  it  should 
exercise its ownership through preparations for, and decisions made during the general meeting. 
Key to the exercise of ownership is an obligation to take part in election committees to ensure 
professional,  independent,  and  competent  governing  bodies  which  work  on  behalf  of  all 
shareholders and in the best interest of the company as a whole. 
If the board does not appear to act in the interest of all shareholders, as expected by the government, 
the  Ownership Department will  consider attempts at  changing the composition of the board or 
communicate an opinion about its composition. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-owned Enterprises also contend that all shareholder should be recognised, treated equally, and 
have equal access to information on the company. The government's policy is in accordance with 
these guidelines, and Knut J. Utvik says that the Ownership Department does pay attention to equal 
treatment of shareholders in the case of DnB NOR. They monitor whether the company follows 
rules and recommendations for good governance and distribute information equally. Furthermore, 
the  department  is  reluctant  to  require  information  from  the  company  that  is  not  yet  publicly 
available. 
The government also has ambitions regarding the social responsibility of the companies where they 
have an ownership share. But how does the government induce DnB NOR into considering their 
social  responsibility  when they have  no  representatives  on the  board?  According to  Utvik,  the 
Ownership Department has sent the board of DnB NOR their main views on the importance of 
questions related to social responsibility. Moreover, the department has separate meetings with the 
company where they deal with this type of issues. In the end, it is the board which will evaluate the 
company policy and make decisions on these matters. The department has communicated very few 
absolute requirements, but has tried to put these issues on the agenda.
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In section 2.2.5, we have seen that the administration of banks may require a particular type of 
corporate  governance.  The  Ownership  Department  follows  the  same  guidelines  for  exercising 
ownership in all its companies, but Knut J. Utvik argues that firm-specific challenges may differ. In 
addition to arguments about the demand for special governance mechanisms in the banking industry 
(Macey and O'Hara 2003), academics have also argued that creditors may perceive of government 
ownership  as  a  form of  guarantee,  effectively  reducing  their  incentives  to  monitor  the  bank's 
activity (Levine 2004). When asked how the state deal with such potential problems, Utvik points to 
the department's work in attaining a competent board that puts such issues on the agenda. The 
Ownership Department stress, as often as possible, that it cannot subsidise its companies, and by 
this protect the interests of the creditors. Any state participation in capital expansions has to be in 
accordance with the  Market Economy Investor Principles (see Slocock 2002). Utvik argues that 
some of these issues are more regulatory in nature, and should thus be dealt with by the Financial  
Supervisory  Authority.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  more  complex  issues  may  require  a  certain 
continuity of the board, facilitating a deeper insight into these issues. 
3.3.3 Election of board members
In considering the division of roles between owner and the company, the company's board and 
corporate assebly have considerable responsibilities. Nomination of board members in DnB NOR 
takes  place  in  the  election  committee.  The  government  wishes  to  take  part  in  the  election 
committee,  and  has  one  representative  present  in  the  election  committee  of  DnB  NOR.  In 
cooperation with representatives of the other shareholders,  government  aims at  having the best 
possible  composition  of  the  company's  governing  bodies.  The  state  stress  the  need  for  good 
procedures for the appointment of board members. 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry has worked out instructions for the preparations for elections in 
the  companies  under  the  administration  of  the  Ministry.  These  instructions  state  that  elections 
should be organised within an internal election committee which prepares a recommendation for the 
election  of  members  and  remuneration  proposals  in  accordance  with  more  detailed  rules.  The 
purpose of these instructions is to establish good procedures for the internal election preparations as 
well. Through its representative in the external election committee, the government will ensure that 
the board represents a diversity of competence and has sufficient capacity to perform their duties. 
Moreover,  for  larger  companies,  the  government  would  like  to  ensure  that  the  board  has 
representatives which have an understanding of social matters. As an owner, the government sees it 
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as very important that the company has industrially and financially competent boards, capable of 
performing efficient monitoring of the company. In this context, the independence of the board vis à 
vis  the  management,  and  its  provision  of  broad  and  open  information  about  the  company  to 
shareholders are important requirements. The government also requires that the board and corporate 
assembly have a balanced gender distribution. 
Active politicians, including members of parliament (Storting), ministers, state secretaries, and civil 
servants whose area of responsibility is somehow affected by or related to the company's operations 
are excluded from becoming representatives in the company's governing bodies. This is meant to 
avoid conflicting interests, espescially where the interests of the state does not fully converge with 
those  of  the  shareholders.  The  state  has  also  decided  not  to  have  its  own board  members  in 
company's which are partially owned, including DnB NOR. Moreover, the state expects that the 
board of directors will evaluate their own performance. This should include an evaluation of the 
composition of the board and how the group of directors perform, both individually and as a group, 
in relation to the objectives that apply to their work. If the board fails at attaining the predetermined 
results or lack the necessary competence, the government will participate actively in changing the 
composition of the board. 
As the government has decided not to have its own members on the board of directors, I asked Knut 
J.  Utvik  how  the  Ownership  Department is  able  to  exercise  an  active  ownership  policy.  He 
responded that the government is not involved on the operative level, but communicates opinions 
on  the  higher  strategic  level.  The  Ownership  Department can  challenge  the  company  through 
discussion and by giving their opinion as an owner and a competent group who follows up on its 
input. However, they are not directly involved in decisions, but are active in giving their opinion on 
what they consider to be in the long-term interest of the owners. Furthermore, they influence the 
board through the election process.
3.3.4 The government's opinion on management compensation
Normally,  it  is  the  election  committee  who  propose  a  board  remuneration  plan  to  the  general 
meeting.  The  governmet  insists  that  the  remuneration  should  reflect  the  board's  responsibility, 
competence, time spent, and the complexity of the company. The remuneration should be moderate, 
in accordance with that of other similar companies. To ensure the independence of the board, its 
members should not have performance related or variable remuneration. Considering management 
compensation,  the  government  has  drawn  up  a  set  of  guidelines  for  the  remuneration  of  top 
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executives in state-owned companies. The purpose of these guidelines is to communicate the factors 
which the state wish to emphasise in voting on management compensation at the general meeting. 
The main priciples of these guidelines are reproduces in the appendix.
These principles are  in line with the prescriptions of  the contracting and corporate  governance 
theory described above. However, there are some differences if we look at the specificities of the 
government's  opnion  on  management  pay.  First,  the  government  states  that  options  and  other 
option-like  compensation  should  not  be  applied  in  companies  where  the  government  has  an 
ownership  share.  Second,  share-based  compensation  should  only  be  used  if  they  are  deemed 
appropriate in reaching long-term goals, and should have a lock-in period of at least two years. In 
general, any variable remuneration should be based on easily observed and measurable objectives 
which the management is able to influence. Furthermore, the total variable compensation should not 
be higher than the six month fixed salary. There are also some rather restrictive guidelines regarding 
pension benefits and compensation on termination of employment. 
With regards to DnB NOR, Knut J. Utvik states that the Ownership Department has followed up on 
the  guidelines  for  compensation  during  general  meetings.  There  has  been  introduced  a  legal 
requirement in 2008 that boards of listed companies publicise and explain their own guidelines for 
executive compensation. The General Meeting is to cast an advisory vote concerning the guidelines 
,but  for  options  and  other  share-related  compensation,  the  vote  is  binding.  The  Ownership 
Department has voted against some proposition regarding management compensation, which has 
led to an increase in the general retirement age from 62 to 65 years. Furthermore, DnB NOR has 
abolished pension benefits in excess of 12 G (ca. NOK 900.000) in new agreements, confirming 
that the state has had a significant influence on compensation. When asked whether moderation of 
compensation can be in conflict with creation of value within the company, Utvik refers to a general 
policy of the government consisting of controlling inequalities, which seems to have been a good 
economic model. He argues that more variable compensation, for example based on market value, 
has not had a good track record as many of these compensation schemes seem to have paid off more 
or less independent of results.
3.4  Theoretical  predictions  and  observed  effects  of  government 
ownership
In trying to fit the observed government policies with the theory from part two of this paper, we can 
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identify some potential effects of government ownership on how the business operates. It will also 
help us in analysing whether the ownership policy of the government reaches its goals. 
3.4.1 The Rationale for ownership - comparing theory with reality
As noted above, the Norwegian government has an ownership stake in DnB NOR in order to ensure 
that the bank keeps its headquarters situated in Norway. As the argument goes, there are no other 
Norwegian capitalists that are able and willing to take on the role as main owner of this national 
financial giant. It thus remains a responsibility of the government. This seems somewhat similar to 
Gerschenkron's (1962) description of Russia during industrialisation, where the government took on 
the role of financial intermediator when the private sector was unable to step in. On the other hand, 
there  are  some very important  differences.  It's  not  the inability  of  the private  sector  to  absorb 
deposits or perform other financial services which is the issue in Norway today. It's merely the lack 
of a private-sector, nationally located bank. The government sees it as important to hold on to a 
nationally  located  bank because this  may have some positive  repercussions  for  the  rest  of  the 
economy. In this sense, the government acts as a national 'owner of last resort'. If we abstract from 
all the potential pitfalls related to government ownership for a second, the government's rationale 
for  ownership seems to  based on recognition of the important  role  banks play in  the financial 
system, and how a well-functioning financial  system can have a  positive influence on the real 
economy. These relationships were discussed in part 1.2. 
3.4.1.1 Perspectives on government intervention and public choice theory
We can  also  try  to  place  the  stated  rationale  for  government  ownership  in  DnB NOR  in  the 
framework of the perspectives on state ownership and public choice theory described in section 2.1. 
Ensuring that the Norwegian market has access to a nationally located bank could be perceived as a 
public good. This would put government ownership of DnB NOR in the social or developmental 
perspective. However, we have also seen that government as owner may not impose the correct 
incentives on the firm (Gleinsvik et al. 2001). This would indicate that the agency perspective is 
applicable. Government do seem to be somewhat restrictive on remuneration of top executives, 
which, in the agency perspective, could imply inefficiencies. Furthermore, the government appears 
to be motivated by allocative efficiency in ensuring provision of nationally based financial services. 
It  could be argued, however, that ensuring national headquarters can have the indirect effect  of 
increasing  employment  in  the  financial  sector  in  Norway.  Knut  J.  Utvik  in  the  Ownership 
Department achknowledge  that  the  headquarters  do  provide  very  good  opportunities  for 
development of human resources. There are two possible interpretations of this. If we contend that 
88
the government ensures employment of headquarter staff at the bank by holding on to a 34 percent 
share  of  the  bank,  the ownership rationale  is  more  in  accordance with  political  distribution as 
described in the political view. If, on the other hand, training people in the profession of banking 
and finance has positive externalities for the rest  of the economy, as argued by the Ownership 
Department, it is more in accordance with internalising externalities and the social perspective. As 
for the political economy stance, the government seems rather pragmatic, observing that the market 
is not able to run the bank on a national basis, and arguing that inefficiencies lead to positive effects 
of  holding on to a  nationally owned bank.  On the other  hand,  the organisation of  government 
ownership  activity  seems to  be  based  on  recognition  of  potential  inefficiencies  in  government 
intervention and problems related to direct political interference in ownership. 
3.4.1.2 Efficiency issues and pitfalls
The government's ownership role in DnB NOR has gone from being a caretaker in the crisis around 
1990 to becoming an owner ensuring a nationally located financial services provider. DnB NOR is 
supposed to be operating on a commercial basis, with expectations regarding return on investments. 
It is clearly not a development bank, and the Norwegian financial sector is not in need of one either. 
The government avoids too much intervention in strategic and operational matters by rejecting to 
take  part  in  the  board  of  directors.  This  policy  makes  patronage  close  to  impossible,  and  the 
transparency  of  the  government's  ownership  hinders  corrupt  practices.  As  the  Ownership 
Department is obliged to get approval from the parliament (Storting) in order to take part in capital 
expansions, this may alleviate some of the problems of the 'soft budget constraint' mentioned in part 
2.1.7.2.  Leaving  the  financing  decision  to  another  governmental  entity  may  help  solve  the 
commitment problem, but at the same time, the Storting is politically responsible to the people and 
may suffer from its own commitment problems. 
According to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises, state-
owned firms should have access to finance on the same terms as their competitors. This is related to 
Table 1: Perspectives on ownership and public choice theory
Perspectives Public choice theory Political economy stanceAllocative efficiency Redistribution motive Market Government
Developmental Improving allocative ef f iciency
Social
Political Taking and political distribution
Agency N/A
Promoting development as a 
public good
Uncapable of initiating 
economic development
Benevolent, but might 
be inef f icient
Correcting for public goods 
and externalities
Fairness norms, insurance 
and public goods
Inef f icient due to market 
failures
Benevolent and 
eff icient
Could be achieved through 
regulation
Eff icient despite some 
failures
Inef f icient and 
opportunistic
Lack of incentives hamper 
ef f iciency
Less af fected by 
agency problems
Ineff icient due to 
agency problems
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the mentioned problems of the soft budget constraint, and has been under discussion in Norway 
during the recent financial crisis. In an online news article, two professionals within the financial 
industry (Bjørnestad 17.03.08) argued that the state ownership in DnB NOR could give the bank an 
advantage in the funding market. This case is different from the soft budget constraint setting, as the 
government is not directly supplying credit to the bank. It is the market which may perceive of 
government ownership as a form of insurance. Some have argued that such an explicit guarantee 
can have an effect on the banks behaviour (Ianotta et al.  2007), leading to funding through the 
interbanks and capital  markets,  higher liquidity,  and lower degree of investment in the lending 
market. Knut J.  Utvik does not find this issue to be very relevant for DnB NOR however. The 
Ownership Department is frequently in touch with rating agencies, and the latter seem not to give 
much thought to government ownership in their evaluations. Utvik argues that DnB NOR probably 
deserves its rating primarily based on its own merits. 
3.4.2 The government's administration of ownership compared with theory
The observations  concerning  the  Norwegian  government's  administration  of  ownership  will  be 
analysed in light of the theoretical framework in order to formulate theoretical predictions as to the 
functioning of state ownership in DnB NOR.
3.4.2.1 Internal organisation
The structure of the state apparatus provides an organisational separation of roles related to DnB 
NOR.  The  FSAN,  which  is  in  charge  of  enforcing  regulation  and  public  supervision,  is  an 
independent  subdivision  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  Furthermore,  the  Norwegian  Competition 
Authority, in charge of enforcing market competition, is under the administration of the Ministry of  
Government  Administration,  Reform,  and  Church  Affairs.  Most  importantly,  the  Ownership 
Department which administrates government ownership in most of the companies with commercial 
objectives is under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This organisational separation should ensure 
that government officials envolved in affairs that affect DnB NOR and other state-owned companies 
do not have conflicting interests. The Ownership department has the sole purpose of administrating 
the ownership shares of the state. This reduces the multiplicity of roles, reducing even further the 
potential for a conflict of interests and facilitating measurement of the departments performance. 
However,  the  Ownership  department  is  effectively  the  only  government  body  in  charge  of 
administrating ownership shares in companies with commercial objectives. There is thus not much 
room for direct comparison with other ownership entities within government. It could, however, be 
possible to compare the performance of the Ownership Department with that of investment funds 
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with a similar portfolio. Considering the theory in the subject, it seems to have been a good idea to 
separate the administration of companies with commercial objectives from the administration of 
companies with broader and sectoral objectives. This allows the Ownership Department to focus on 
a simple set of objectives, leaving the sectoral ministries the right to govern companies with more 
complex objectives, and where sectoral knowledge and competence are needed. 
Tirole (1994) argue that multiplicity of objectives, lack of comparison, and heterogenous tastes of 
owners (the people) tend to favour low-powered incentives in government. Furthermore, as there is 
often a conflict  between measurable and non-measurable goals, it  may not be in the interest of 
political principals to enforce performance payment to government officials. However, as we have 
seen above,  the administration of government  ownership shares  in companies with commercial 
objectives is not very complex. It does not include many different objectives, it could be possible to 
compare with similar financial investors or portfolios, and the tastes of the owners do not seem to 
be very heterogenous in the case of commercial companies. There is a potential conflict between 
measurable and non-measurable goals, such as profitability vis à vis social responsibility, but this 
could hardly be enough to imply that low-powered incentives are called for. There seems to be a 
theoretical rationale for giving the ownership entity stronger incentives than what we observe today. 
This could be achieved by giving the administration of government ownership to a fund or another 
external entity where the state compensation scheme does not hinder performance payment. We 
should  not  forget  the  importance  of  career  incentives  in  government,  but,  at  least  in  theory, 
monetary incentives can increase the performance of an ownership entity over and above what 
career concerns can do. 
As mentioned in section 2.2.1.3,  low-powered incentives and discretionary powers may lead to 
capture of government agencies by interest groups. The Norwegian government states explicitly 
that it  wishes to work against  corruptive practices in the companies where it  has an ownership 
share.  Leaving  the  Ownership  Department without  much  discretionary  power  could  work  to 
alleviate problems of capture. As we have seen, the government has formulated a clear policy for 
the companies where it has an ownership stake and a list of rules and procedures for the corporate 
governance of these companies. This reduces the stakes for interest groups willing to engage in 
corruption. Furthermore, rules regarding the transparency of ownership policies and governance and 
public  access  to  documentation  and  so  forth,  reduces  the  likelihood  of  corrupt  practices.  The 
institutional  framework,  with  an  independent  supervisory  authority  which  is  also  in  charge  of 
monitoring the activity of DnB NOR makes it even more difficult to get away with corruption.
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Considering the  division  of  labour  within  the government,  the  role  of  the  Storting in  granting 
financial  resources  has  been  mentioned  as  a  potential  mechanism  for  avoiding  intertemporal 
commitment problems. This is a form of multiministry oversight which we can also identify in the 
relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which is the 
ministry in charge of the Ownership Department. Such a system of checks and balances can lead to 
a competition in government among advocates of specific interests that gives rise to a favourable 
policy setting (Tirole 1994). One advantage of such competition is its potential for incentivising 
several ministries and agencies to produce information related to a policy issue. Considering the 
case of DnB NOR, the  Norwegian Competition Authority gathers information on the competitive 
environment, the  FSAN gathers information on systemic and individual risk, and the  Ownership 
Department gathers information related to investor monitoring. As these government entities are 
supposed to be independent of eachother, the information flow between them is supposedly limited. 
However, government may be able to use the information provided by all the agencies in its work 
on updating and reforming ownership policies. 
3.4.2.2 Contracting theory 
The  contracting  theory  described  in  section  2.2.2  can  be  applied  to  the  choice  of  governance 
mechanism, whether contracts or ownership is called for, and possible results implied by the choice 
of governance mechanism. In our case, the Norwegian government has chosen an ownership stake 
in order to induce DnB NOR to appreciate the government's objective. We have seen that the main 
reason for government ownership is to ensure that the largest banking group in the country locates 
its headquarters within the country's boarders. Could this be achieved through contracting? Could 
the government  sign  a  contract  implying  some sort  of  financial  compensation  in  exchange for 
national headquarters? Such a contract would be easy to enforce as there is no real opportunity for 
hidden action or other principal-agent problems. The contract could even stipulate that the bank has 
to employ a certain amount of people from Norway as top executives.  On the other hand, the 
construction and organisation of a national headquarter is an investment with high asset specificity. 
It is in the particular interest of the government, and would probably have less value in the hands of 
other investors. As we can see from the table 
to the right, high asset  specificity implies 
that  a  long-term  contract  or  vertical 
integration  would be  the  best  governance 
structure.  Considering  the  potential Table 2: Governance structures (Hendrikse 2003)
Degree of uncertainty
Low High
Low Market Market
High
Asset 
Specificity Long-term 
contract
Vertical 
integration
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committment problem of governments, it is not unlikely that the bank would attach a high degree of 
uncertainty to a  relationship where the government pays for national headquarters.  This setting 
favours vertical integration, or ownership, as a governance mechanism. In other words, the optimal 
choice of governance mechanism depends on the ability of the contracting parties to reduce the 
uncertainty in the relationship. As mentioned above, a clearly defined contract would alleviate some 
of  the principal-agent  problems,  and could also reduce  the uncertainty of  the  relationship.  The 
government could seek broad support in the parliament for a long-term contract, effectively making 
ex-post renegotiation less likely. 
A long-term contract  would probably be much cheaper  than holding a  34 percent  stake  in  the 
company. However, it would also be in direct conflict with EEA restrictions on public subsidies. 
The European Commission define public  subsidies  according to  the so-called 'market economy 
investor principle' (MEIP). The essence of the MEIP is that when a public authority invests in an 
enterprise on terms and in conditions which would be acceptable to a private investor operating 
under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not a state aid (Slocock 2002). There is 
no reason to believe that any other investors would pay DnB NOR to locate its headquarters in 
Norway,  implying  that  a  contract  like the  one  above would  be  considered  as  an  illegal  public 
subsidy.  In  other  words,  the  Norwegian  goverment  has  no  real  choice  between  governance 
mechanisms. If the goal is to ensure national headquarters, the government is forced into ownership. 
This perspective reveals an important facet of the ownership issue. The government ownership has 
the same function as a subsidy would have. In theoretical terms, the government pays the bank for 
this service through lower dividends caused by non-optimal location of headquarters. As long as the 
government does not compensate other investors in any way, the government incur only 34 percent 
of these costs, proportional to its ownership share. 
Government ownership can also have some other implications in the contracting theory.  In the 
model of Hart et al. (1997), a private contractor might have too strong incentives to invest in cost 
reduction at the expense of quality. Assuming that the private contractor has stronger incentives that 
public  employees  to  invest  in  both  cost  reductions  and  quality,  there  is  still  some  room  for 
government ownership. The stronger the negative effect of cost reductions on quality, and as quality 
becomes more important,  the case becomes stronger for government ownership.  In our case,  if 
qualitative factors of the bank's operations are more important than reducing costs, and reduction of 
costs  has  a  very  negative  impact  on  quality,  the  model  of  Hart  et  al.  (1997)  would  support 
government ownership. In banking, it is possible to argue that cost reduction could reduce stability, 
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and  that  stability  is  a  qualitative  factor  which  is  highly  appreciated  by  the  government.  This 
relationship has not been mentioned in government reports, although the government insists that 
ithas  a  long  term  perspective.This  may  reduce  the  call  for  short  term  profit  incentives  and 
consequent reduction in stability. 
3.4.2.3 Corporate governance theory
The corporate governance literature identifies several factors which are relevant in the relationship 
between an owner and the management of a firm. The topics discussed in section 2.2.3 will here be 
applied to the Norwegian government's corporate governance of DnB NOR. 
Managerial incentives
Concerining the managerial incentives, we have seen that the government has formulated a set of 
opinions  on  management  compensation.  These  opinions  are  restrictive  in  the  sense  that  they 
prescribe  low-powered  incentives  in  the  management  compensation.  Restrictions  apply  to  the 
amount  of  variable  compensation,  the  application  of  options,  the  design  of  share-based 
remuneration, and the value of pension benefits and compensation on termination of employment. 
Some of these restrictions may be reasonable in a general corporate governance framework. This is 
particularly true for restrictions on compensation on termination of employment and restrictions 
that prescribe a high degree of correlation between varable remuneration and factors which the 
management is able to control. On the other hand, the government seems rather averse to the use of 
variable remuneration, especially option-based compensation which the state refrains from using. 
This  aversion  can  be  related  to  fairness  ideals,  and  a  general  government  policy  on  keeping 
economic inequality to a minimum. In a general corporate governance perspective, such poolicies 
would induce the board of directors to move away form the optimal compensation scheme which is 
best suited to align the interests of managment with those of the owners. We would thus expect that 
the management, ceteris paribus, has less incentives to act in accordance with the interests of the 
owners. 
But we also need to consider managerial incentives in light of our special case of banking. As we 
have observed in the theoretical part on corporate governance of banks, there are several factors in 
banking that could imply a need for low-powered incentives. Heavy regulation and high leverage of 
banks have been associated with lower pay-performance sensitivity of the optimal compensation 
scheme (John and Qian 2003). Moreover, the role of depositors as claimants calls for a broader 
objective  of  corporate  governance  than just  aligning  managerial  and shareholders'  interests.  As 
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mentioned above,  it  could  be  in  the  interest  of  long-term owners  to  link  compensation  to  the 
fraction of deposits in the liability structure in order to increase stability. DnB NOR is the largest 
financial  institution  in  Norway.  Theoretical  arguments  seem  to  favor  lower  pay-performance 
sensitivity for large firms, and especially for systemically important financial institutions such as 
DnB NOR. All these issues point towards a need for lower pay-performance sensitivity. These may 
not have been the main concerns of the government when it formulated its opinion on managerial 
compensation. However, the government's preference for low variable compensation and focus on 
fixed compensation seem to be in accordance with the corporate governance literature related to 
banks. As the government policy on compensation applies to all companies where the state has an 
ownership stake, it seems as if the relatively good fit between policy and theory is more or less 
accidental  or random. The government's opinion that variable compensation has to be linked to 
more long-term performance is also in accordance with arguments made in the aftermath of the 
recent financial crisis (see Roubini 2008). 
The corporate governance literature predicts that management can be motivated by other factors 
than pure monetary incentives. Implicit incentives related to the managent's performance, such as 
the fear of takeover or bankruptcy and consequent potential for losing the position as manager, 
could work to incentivise the management. These factors will be discussed in more detail below. 
Another  factor  which creates  incentives  for  management  is  the  monitoring activity  by external 
parties. The government as owner has a unique opportunity and obligation to engage in monitoring 
activities. As the government stress the need for more low-powered incentives, it is probably even 
more important to monitor the activities of the management. The government is involved in active 
monitoring and sets target rates of long-term return to their investment. It is also actively involved 
in challenging the management on other performance indicators such as market share, and activity 
on the retail market. The Ownership Department has its own subdivision of lawyers and economist 
who should be able to provide the necessary competence for active monitoring. Furthermore, the 
department hires external consultants on a regular basis, which compensates for a small full-time 
staff.  Speculative monitoring can also contribute to management incentives.  Such monitoring is 
mostly backward looking and retrospective, but contributes to a fair valuation of the company. The 
government's focus on transparency could facilitate such speculative monitoring by supplying the 
market with more information than other investors would.
Product market competition can also facilitate corporate governance. In the Nordic coutries, the 
banking industry is rather concentrated, and although Norway has a lower concentration in the retail 
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market than the other Nordic countries, it may still hamper competition (Report from the Nordic 
competition authorities 2006). As the lack of competition may reduce the risk of bankruptcy, it will 
also reduce the incentives of management related to fear of bankruptcy. On the other hand, the 
existence of other banks in the Norwegian market that are similar to DnB NOR facilitates relative 
performance measures by allowing owners to separate between external shocks and management 
performance in their compensation schemes. 
The board of directors
The board of directors is the link between the Ownership Department and the management of DnB 
NOR. The government has a strict policy to act through the general meeting and by influencing the 
board of directors without having any members on the board. The government and the Ownership 
Department both stress the need for a competent board with a composition that allows it to perform 
its task optimally. The current board of directors of DnB NOR ASA consists of nine members and 
three  deputies.  They  are  highly  competent,  with  degrees  from  some  of  the  best  educational 
institutions  in  Scandinavia.  The  board  also  includes  three  employee  representatives.  The 
competence and skills of the board are essential features which are also stressed in the corporate 
governance literature. In accordance with this literature, the government also insists that the board 
of directors should be independent vis à vis the management, effectively excluding top executives 
from  sitting  on  the  board.  Moreover,  the  government  excludes  government  officials  who  are 
affiliated with the company in any way from sitting on the board. This ensures that the duties of 
board memebers are not in conflict with other administrative tasks related to the operations of the 
bank. Finally, the government stress that the board of directors should perform regular evaluations 
of their own work. This has also been adressed in the corporate governance theory as a mechanism 
for  improving  corporate  governance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  government  has  no  preferences 
regarding  the  ownership  stakes  of  board  members.  When  owners  sit  on  the  board,  they  have 
stronger incentives to monitor the company's management, but this could also lead to collusion 
between the owner-board memeber and the management at the expense of other shareholders. The 
government may need to adress this question as it can have a significant influence on the role and 
incentives of the board. 
Investor activism
With  a  34  percent  ownership  stake  in  DnB  NOR  ASA,  the  Norwegian  government  has  the 
possibility to exercise what Tirole (2006) refers to as real control. In focusing on long-term issues, 
the government can build a coalition among investors who have the same temporal perspective. The 
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Ownership Department does express an interest in evaluation and possible changes of the board if it 
does not perform as intended. The willingness and ability of government as a large investor to alter 
the composition of the board can discipline the board, and is an important tool for exercising active 
ownership. The board of directors is supposed to monitor the activities of the management, but it 
can be equally important that large owners actively monitor the activities of the board. The role of 
board monitor filled by the Ownership Department is in line with what theory predicts for large, 
long-term investors. 
Takeovers and leveraged buyouts
The potential for takeovers or leveraged buyouts is close to non-existent in the case of DnB NOR 
ASA. The government  sticks to  its  policy of  holding 34 percent  of  the shares  in  the financial 
institution, making it impossible for an outsider to gain full control of the company. There is only 
one other  really large shareholder in the company, namely The Savings Bank Foudation DnB NOR 
which holds about 10 percent of the shares. This foundation is also a long-term investor, which 
makes it even less likely that someone would engage in a takeover or buyout (Facts and history: 
The Savings Bank Foundation DnB NOR web pages, 08.06.2010). Gleinsvik et al. (2001) argue that 
the tendency of the government to hold on to their shares reduce the potential managerial incentives 
created by the management's fear of being overtrown during takeovers or buyouts. On the other 
hand, the explicit long-term ownership policy may avoid instances where the management adopt 
takeover defences such as poison pills, staggered boards, supermajority rules, or handing out shares 
to loyal employees. The list could go on, but the main idea is that takeover defences are not in the 
shareholders' interest, and the benfit of avoiding such activity could balance the negative effects on 
performance incentives induced by lack of threats from outside investors. 
Liability structure of DnB NOR and corporate governance
Banks are normally highly levered, which some have also linked to their instability. In the corporate 
governance literature, leverage disciplines management by imposing an obligation to pay out some 
of the profits in interest payments. In 2009, the total liabilities of DnB NOR as a percentage of total 
assets amounted to 94 percent (DnB NOR Annual Report 2009). This may appear to indicate a high 
degree of leverage,  but it  is actually lower than the liabilities/assets ration for its Scandinavian 
competitors. For Nordea, the  ration is 96 percent while for Danske Bank the ratio is 97 percent 
(Nordea  and  Danske  Bank  Annual  Reports  2009).  The  high  degree  of  leverage  increases  the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, something the management would like to avoid as it ususally implies that 
management is replaced or looses its job. Moreover, the high leverage can strengthen the incentives 
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of  management  if  the  latter  holds  substantial  claims  over  the  firm's  cash  flow.  However,  the 
Norwegian  government  insists  that  variable  compensation,  including  shares  and  other  claims, 
should  not  be  a  main  factor  in  management  remuneration.  On the  other  hand,  as  a  long-term 
investor in the bank, the government would probably try to avoid bankruptcy as an outcome. This 
may reduce the managerial incentives created by high leverage. In avoiding bankruptcy, the bank 
will avoid the many costs related to bankruptcy procedures. 
Another issue particular to the liability structure of banks is deposits and the often related deposit 
insurance. As we have seen, Norway has one of the most generous deposit insurance schemes in the 
world, at least if we cosider formal deposit insurance policies. This leaves the depositors in banks 
affected by the insurance scheme with very few, if any, incentives to monitor the banks' behaviour. 
The public's deposits at DnB NOR accounts for about 34 percent of the bank's liabilities in 2009 
(DnB NOR Annual Report 2009) which is not far from the fraction of deposits in liabilities of  some 
of its main Scandinavian competitiors. Nordea administers deposits accounting for about 32 percent 
of liabilities, while Danske Bank has deposits which constitute 29 percent of its liabilities (Nordea 
and Danske  Bank Annual  Reports  2009).  As  deposits  constitute  about  one  third  of  the  bank's 
liabilities, and have very few incentives to take part in monitoring or other corporate governance 
activities,  it  becomes  interesting  to  find  out  if  anybody  else  engage  in  corporate  governance 
activities related to the deposits. Potential suspects are the the agency in charge of administrating 
the deposit insurance, the supervisory authority, and/or the government as owner. In Norway, the 
Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund is in charge of securing the deposit liabilities of its member 
banks. Its main tasks consist of handling crises, preventive work, and management of the fund's 
assets. The Guarantee Fund has a separate department in charge of this preventive work, including 
analysis  of  member  institutions,  advisory  services  to  smaller  banks,  organising  courses,  and 
calculating and collecting the levy and guarantees (About us: The Norwegian Banks' Gurantee Fund 
web  pages  12.06.2010).  The  preventive  work  can  potentially  alleviate  some  of  the  problems 
associated with the generous deposit insurance scheme, although it is far from fully correcting for 
these problems. 
The  FSAN is  in  charge  of  supervising  the  banks,  but  they  do  not  consider  their  activity  as  a 
substitute for exercising ownership. On the other hand, their function as supervisors provide the 
agency with certain powers enabling it to enforce regulation and compliance with the main and 
intermediate  goals  of  the FSAN listed in  section 3.2.5.1.  These  goals  are  somewhat  related to 
downside risk of banks as they refer to soundness of financial institutions, monitoring of market 
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risks,  good  risk  management,  and  retaining  confidence  in  the  financial  market.  The  indirect 
attention  given  to  downside  risk seems to  support  the  view that  reasonable  financial  authority 
supervision can counteract some of the negative consequence of deposit insurance. Furthermore, the 
Guarantee Schemes Act (Kredittilsynet 2004) gives the FSAN certain powers to interfere with the 
governance  of  financial  institutions  under  circumstances  such  as  payment  or  capital  adequacy 
difficulties. This act also states that if a financial institutions cannot meet its liabilities and cannot be 
secured a sufficient financial basis for continued satisfactory operation, the King may order the 
institution to be placed under public administration. Such action has serious repercussions for the 
corporate  governance  of  the  financial,  making  former  governing  bodies  inoperative,  freezing 
payments to creditors, and forbidding new deposits, debts and extension of old debt. It is obviously 
a situation that the governing bodies of a bank would try their best to avoid. These legal provisions 
strengthen the position of the FSAN and the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund vis à vis the banks, 
and incetivises management and shareholders to pay more attention to the solvency of the bank. The 
government as an owner has not formulated a governance policy specifically adapted to DnB NOR. 
In general, the Ownership Department does not differentiate between banks and other firms in its 
administration of  ownership. Perhaps this is not an optimal policy given the role of deposits in the 
bank's liability structure and the generous deposit insurance scheme. Even if the government were 
to  be  more  inclined  than  other  investors  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  depositors, 
legislation requiring that all shareholders be treated equally might hinder any governance policies 
that are in the interest of depositors at the expense of shareholders. 
3.4.3 Predictions and DnB NOR operations
3.4.3.1 National ownership and geographical focus of operations
Considering  the  government's  rationale  for  ownership,  we  would  expect  that  DnB  NOR  has 
concentrated its  operations within the country's borders.  This is exactly what we observe when 
studying  the  financial  institution's 
commitments  by  geographical  location,  as 
shown in the diagram below (Based on DnB 
NOR  Annual  Report  2009).  Geographical 
location has been determined by observing 
the address of the institution's customers. 72 
percent  of  the  bank's  commitments  are 
based in Norway. It is thus fair to say that 
Diagram 1: DnB NOR's commitments according to 
geographical location
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DnB  NOR  has  focused  on  the  Norwegian  market,  fulfilling  the  government's  main  rationale. 
Moreover, DnB NOR appears to have a considerable focus on development of the competence of its 
employees, diversity and equal opportunities, and the health, safety and working environment of its 
employees (Promoting work-life balance and diversity: DnB NOR web pages 16.06.2010). This is 
in  accordance  with  the  government's  motivation  for  keeping  headquarters  in  Norway,  namely 
development of Norwegian competence and human resources.
3.4.3.2 Efficiency
Apart from insistence on nationally located headquarters, the government's ownership in DnB NOR 
has been defined as commercial.  A simple test  of the commercial  viability of DnB NOR is  to 
compare its financial results with those of similar financial institutions. Danske Bank and Nordea 
are reasonably good candidates as they also have their main operations in Scandinavia. We should 
keep in mind that the Swedish state is the second largest owner in Nordea, holding 19,9 percent of 
the share capital. On the other hand, the 
largest  owner  in  Danske  Bank  is  the 
Møller Mærsk Group with 22,27 percent 
of  the  shares  (The  A.P.  Møller  Mærsk 
Group  and  A.P.  Møller  og  Hustru 
Chastine  Mc-Kinney  Møllers  Fond  til 
almene Formaal).  Using the companies' 
return  on  equity  (ROE)  allows  us  to 
observe differences in how much profit 
each company generates with the money 
shareholders have invested. The diagram 
above  illustrates  that  the  ROE  of  the 
different institutions have experienced similar developments the last eight years. On average DnB 
NOR had a ROE of 13 percent while Nordea had  a ROE of 15 percent, and Danske Bank had a 
ROE of 11 percent for the perdiod running form 2002 until 2009. Keeping in mind that 
this is a very simple test, there is not much evidence of DnB NOR being less profitable than the two 
other Scandinavian institutions.
3.4.3.3 Low-powered incentives and risk
As  we  have  seen  above,  the  government  adheres  to  a 
compensation policy where the main constituent is supposed 
Table 6: Standard & Poor's ratings 
for DnB NOR
Period Credit rating
May 2005 A/Positive/A-1
May 2005 A+/Stable/A-1
June 2005 A+/Stable/A-1
October 2005 A+/Stable/A-1
April 2006 A+/Stable/A-1
March 2007 A+/Positive/A-1
April 2007 A+/Positive/A-1
April 2008 AA-/Stable/A-1+
January 2009 AA-/Negative/A-1+
April 2009 AA-/Negative/A-1+
December 2009 A+/Stable/A-1
March 2010 A+/Stable/A-1
Diagram 2: Based on the companies' annual reports  
for 2002-2009
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to be fixed payments. The result is a rather low pay-performance sensitivity which would normally 
induce the management to take less risks. In order to assess the risk profile of DnB NOR, we can 
take  a  look at  the  company's  credit  ratings.  The  Counterparty  Credit  Rating  is  supposedly  an 
opinion  of  a  company’s  overall  creditworthiness.  DnB  NOR  Bank  ASA,  which  is  the  largest 
banking subsidiary of the DnB NOR group has a long history of credit ratings from rating agencies 
such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and DBRS. DnB NOR Bank ASA has received very stable and 
high credit ratings from Standard & Poor's, as can be observed in the bank's history of credit ratings 
above (Standard & Poor's 2005-2010. See appendix for explanation of ratings). The other rating 
agencies also give DnB NOR a rather stable and high ratings (Moody's and DBRS 2005-2010). The 
main objection of the credit rating agencies is the substantial exposure of the bank to the shipping 
market. DnB NOR is one of the world's leading shipping banks, which is related to the importance 
of this sector in the Norwegian economy. Furthermore, Moody's latest rating report (2010) refers to 
a lack of geographical diversification, in accordance with our observations above. The bank's focus 
on the Norwegian market and a international business sector where Norwegian companies have a 
considerable market share, is in accordance with the government's interests of owning a financial 
institution servicing the needs of Norwegian businesses. The obvious disadvantage is the impact of 
the  bank's  business  model  on  its  credit  rating.  We would  contend,  however,  that  DnB NOR's 
banking operations have a rather low risk profile, as supported by statements in Standard and Poor's 
rating report for 2007. 
3.4.3.4 Corporate social responsibility
The Norwegian government encourage DnB NOR, as well as other state-owned companies, to pay 
attention to the impact of its operations on society as a whole. It is somewhat difficult to determine 
the real effect of CSR policies, but there are several standards for corporate responsibility that banks 
may adhere to. Below, we can see the standards which the different Scandinavian banks comply 
with. These principles cover a diverse set of responsibilities, including human rights, environmental 
impact, corruption and responsible investment. As we see from the table above, DnB NOR complies 
with a larger set of principles than the two other Scandinavian banks. Bearing in mind that many of 
these principles are overlapping, this serves as evidence of a strong commitment by DnB NOR to 
Table 7: Application of CSR policies (from corporate web pages)
CSR Principles DnB NOR Nordea Danske bank
UN Global Compact X X X
OECD's guidelines for multinational companies X X
UNEP FI principles X X X
UN Principles for Responsible Investments X X X
Equator Principles X X
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uphold a high standard of corporate reponsibility. Moreover, DnB NOR is listed on the Dow Jones 
Sustainabilty Indexes which  tracks the financial performance of the leading sustainability-driven 
companies worldwide. Oekom Research has given DnB NOR 'prime status', a rating awarded to 
companies that are among the leaders in their industry and which meet industry-specific minimum 
requirements regarding environmental and social issues (Emphasis on transparency: DnB NOR web 
pages  14.06.2010).  DnB  NOR's  adoption  of  these  principles  are  in  accordance  with  the 
government's ownership policy as portrayed in section 3.2.2. It is difficult to say whether it is the 
government  as  owner  which  has  been  the  driving  force  behind  the  implementation  of  these 
principles, but it is evident that DnB NOR complies with the government's wishes in this area. 
3.4.2.5 The recent financial crisis and government involvement
DnB NOR was not exempted from the negative effects of the recent financial crisis. On January 22. 
2009, a Norwegian internet-based newspaper could document that shareholders in DnB NOR had 
lost close to eighty percent of their capital in less than one year (Krekling 22..01.2009). The topic of 
the article was whether the Norwegian government would have to protect DnB NOR from failure. 
The government announced that it would stick to its policy of holding a 34 percent ownership share, 
and the management of DnB NOR rejected the need for a government initiated rescue operation. 
The  deterioration  of  DnB  NOR's  financial  position  during  the  crisis  was  partially  due  to  its 
engagements in the Baltics through its subsidiary DnB NORD (Ministry of Trade and Industry 
2009-2010). The bank had the opportunity to acquire necessary capital from the Norwegian State 
Finance Fund, but preferred to go ahead with an emission of shares in order to strengthen its core 
capital.  The government could have rejected the emission by using its negative power resulting 
from its  34 percent share,  but  eventually agreed.  The emission provided DnB NOR with gross 
proceeds  of  NOK 14 billion.  The  government  took part  in  the  emission  proportional  to  its  34 
percent ownership share. 
The government  also launched some general  measures  to  help the  suffering financial  sector  in 
Norway. The first initiative was a scheme where the banks were offered the possibility to borrow 
government  bonds  in  exchange  for  preferred  bonds.  The  government  bonds  would  serve  as  a 
guarantee for banks seeking new loans, or could be sold to improve financing prospects. The first 
auction of these government bonds was conductes on November 24., and DnB NOR was the only 
participant, receiving all the value of the auction of NOK 10 billion (Bjerkan 2009). Bjerkan argues 
that the scheme should be considered as government subsidy although ESA found came to the 
opposite conclusion in its evaluation. Initially the scheme received substantial criticism form being 
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specifically  designed for  DnB NOR. Eventually  the  government  altered the scheme to  include 
several savings banks which were effectively left out of the as a consequence of the initial design 
(Nordbø and Krekling 08.02.2009). In the interview with Knut J. Utvik, he confirmed that there had 
been some criticism of the rescue operation. He argued that the intention was to help the Norwegian 
financial sector and that DnB NOR was a large actor in this market. 
As discussed in section 3.4.1.2, some market participants argued that DnB NOR benefitted from 
having the Norwegian government as a large owner during the financial crisis. In the newspaper 
article mentiond above (Bjørnestad 17.03.2008), Terje Fatnes, an analyst in SEB Enskilda Securities 
stated that DnB NOR was the Norwegian bank who borrowed the most from abroad. It's short-term 
foreign debt constituted about 20 percent of the bank's gross lending. However, DnB NOR did not 
suffer significantly from the counterparty risk and the lack of funds which characterised the market 
in the first quarter of 2008. The analyst argued that the international lenders considered it as highly 
unlikeley that the Norwegian government would let DnB NOR experience liquidity problems. It is 
very difficult to measure whether the government as owner had any real impact on DnB NOR's 
ability  to  attract  funds,  although Ottar  Ertzeid,  Group Executive  Vice  President  of  DnB NOR 
Markets, stated in the same article that the bank benefitted from having stable owners. In its rating 
report of DnB NOR from April 2008, Standard & Poor's does not comment on the role of the state 
as owner at all. In the previous report, it does not factor any support to government ownership in its 
stand-alone ratings on DnB NOR, as the government is not involved in any way whatsoever in the 
daily management of DnB NOR (Standard & Poor's 13.04.2007). On the other hand, an incident 
which gained enormous media coverage during the crisis, was an alledged text message from the 
Prime  Minister,  Jens  Stoltenberg,  to  the  DnB  NOR  group  chief  executive,  Rune  Bjerke.  The 
message supposedly contained inside information on the government's forthcoming rescue package, 
enabling DnB NOR to adjust its financial position in government bonds accordingly (Mathisen and 
Mæland  20.10.08).  In  the  end,  an  investigation  led  by  the  Norwegian  National  Authority  for 
Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime found the contact between 
the two as natural, but stated that the bank should not have traded on the information (Stenseng and 
Brockfield 18.02.10). Exept for this incident, which is not necessarily related to the government's 
ownership, it seems as if the impact of government ownership on DnB NOR performance has more 
to do with stability than type of ownership.
Considering the huge impact of the financial crisis, it seems as if the Norwegian government was 
capable of dealing with the consequences and providing relief to the financial sector more or less 
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without favouring 'their own' bank. I would argue that this is a result of the distinct separation 
between the financial authorities and the Ownership Department, as described in section 3.4.2.1. 
Furthermore, as the Ownership Department is not directly involved in the board of directors, it has 
less scope for discriminatory intervention during crisis. The latter was also mentioned in Standard 
& Poor's rating report of 2007 as essential for its factoring out of government ownership in the 
rating procedure. 
3.4.2.6 Does the government reach its objectives
It is obvious that DnB NOR focuses on the Norwegian market. The majority of its commitments are 
located  in  Norway,  and  its  foreign  endavours  are  mainly  within  shipping,  an  industry  where 
Norwegian  businesses  are  very  active.  Seemingly,  this  goal  is  reached  without  compromising 
profitability, but does imply higher level of risk than if DnB NOR were to run a more diversified 
business.  Moreover,  the financial  institution appears  to  respect  the government's  call  for  social 
responsibility. There has been some alleged incidents during the recent financial crisis which may 
be in conflict with what the theory describes as good government ownership. However, it is difficult 
to say whether interactions between the government and DnB NOR during the crisis is mainly due 
to the size,  and consequent  systemic importance,  of  DnB NOR, or  whether it  is  related to  the 
govenment's role as owner. Overall, it is air to say that the government has been rather successful in 
exercising its ownership of DnB NOR as the rationale for ownership has support in observations.
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Summary and concluding remarks
This thesis has aimed at understanding the issues pertinent to government ownership of banks and 
applying the theory on the subject to the case of the Norwegian government's ownership in DnB 
NOR.  The  debate  on  governemnt  ownership  in  general  has  changed  from  a  high  degree  of 
confidence in state intervention post WWII, to low legitimacy of state intervention and focus on 
privatisation in  1970's  and 1980's,  ending up with a  more nuanced perspective  in  more recent 
literature focusing on the effect of regulation on both private and public ownership. We have seen 
that type of ownership tends to rely on the distribution of wealth in a society, and that the room for 
state intervention could be greater in more modern economies where comparative advantage is less 
dependent on natural resources and the relative amounts of labour and capital within a country. 
State  intervention will  not  work out  very well  unless government is  able to  make autonomous 
decisions  which  are  embedded  in  society.  Appropriate  internal  structure  of  government  which 
avoids  short-term  politicising  of  intervention  is  essential  for  these  mechanisms  to  function  as 
intended. 
In banking, there is a relatively high degree of government interference and ownership around the 
world.  We have  seen that  the  quality  of  legal  systems and institutions  are  inversely  related to 
government ownership in banking, but at the same time, these factors appear to be positively related 
to  the  efficiency  of  government  ownership  in  banking.  The  main  motivation  for  government 
intervention  in  the  banking  market  is  the  considerable  effect  of  this  sector  on  the  rest  of  the 
economy.  However,  government  owned banks seem to  underperform relative  to  private  banks, 
although this is not true if we look exclusively at observations from developed countries, which are 
characterised  by  a  better  organised  government,  stronger  institutions,  and  more  elaborate 
legislation.  The  effect  of  government  ownership can  be  tied  to  its  rationale.  The  objectives  of 
government intervention depends on the benevolence of the state, and its ability to recognise, and 
control for, certain pitfalls. We have seen that the internal organisation of government has some 
implications regarding the incentives of government officials and entities, and that the division of 
labour within government and the application of rules may alleviate some of the problems which 
are predicted to arise in situations with low-powered incentives and multiple tasks. Moreover, in 
exercising  ownership,  the  government  need  to  recognise  the  importance  of  good  corporate 
governance, and apply such standards to its own administration of ownership. 
As for the Norwegian case, the government has defined an elaborate ownership policy, leaving less 
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room for discretion, but at the same time reducing the probability of corruption and capture of the 
ownership entity by stakeholders and other interest groups. The organisation of ownership activities 
ensures independence, both from other government entities tied to the operations of DnB NOR, and 
short-term political pressure. Considerable experience with government ownership in Norway has 
been characterised by continuous revisions and improvements of policies related to ownership. The 
current  ownership  policy  related  to  DnB  NOR  is  based  on  a  moderate  rationale  of  keeping 
headquarters in Norway. However, there are some unforeseen effects, the majority of which have 
positive effects on DnB NOR's operations. Government ownership also implies pressure to adapt to 
govenment interests concerning social responsibility and management compensation. These issues 
may prove to be more in the interest of government than other owners. 
The final verdict is that the Norwegian government's ownership in DnB NOR is rather successful. 
DnB NOR has located its headquarters in Norway, and focuses on th Norwegian market, both at 
home and abroad. Moreover, the financial institution produces quite good results compared with 
other large Scandinavian banks. Almost by a fluke, the low-powered managerial incentives implied 
by a general policy on compensation seems to fit weel with theoretical prescriptions for optimal 
executive compensation in the banking industry. This could be the reason for the relatively low and 
stable risk profile of DnB NOR. Furthermore, the company appears to respect the governments 
insistence on social responsibility. In light of the recent financial crisis, some minor incidents seem 
to confirm that there are still some issues to be resolved. Considering the magnitude of the financial 
crisis however, the government seems to have done a good job as DnB NOR has benfitted mainly 
from having a large institutional investor, and not because it is the government that takes on this 
role. 
Currently,  the  government  has  started  working  on  a  new  proposition  regarding  government 
ownership (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2010). I would therefore like to finish off 
with some policy advice. The Norwegian government has a considerable ownership in DnB NOR. 
Large  ownership  shares  come  with  great  responsibility.  It  is  of  utmost  importance  that  the 
government  continues  to  behave  as  an  active  owner,  perhaps  even  intensifying  its  monitoring 
activities vis à vis DnB NOR. The other owners are smaller, and probably less motivated to follow 
up the company's performance. Moreover, banks are special institutions, implying that corporate 
governance policies should be adapted to the specific characteristics of banks. In particular, it is 
essential that the liability structure and the role and incentives of insured deposits are recognised 
and accounted for  in  the administration of  ownership.  If  the government  adjusts  its  ownership 
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policy  accordingly,  this  author  would  predict  that  the  government's  ownership  in  DnB  NOR 
continues to be succesful, perhaps even more so.
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Appendix
1. The Norwegian government's principles for corporate governance
1. Shareholders shall be treated equally. 
2. There shall be transparency in relation to the state’s ownership of the companies. 
3. Decisions and resolutions by the owner shall be made/passed at the general meeting. 
4. The state will, if applicable together with other owners, set performance objectives for
the companies. The board of directors is responsible for the objectives being attained. 
5. The capital structure in the companies shall be adapted to the objective of the ownership
and the company’s situation. 
6. The composition of boards of directors shall be characterised by competence, capacity
and diversity based on the distinctive nature of each company. 
7. Remuneration and incentive arrangements should be designed so that they promote
value creation in the companies and are perceived as being reasonable. 
8. On behalf of the owners, the board of directors shall have an independent control
function vis-à-vis the company’s management. 
9. The board should have a plan for its work and should work actively on building its own
competence. The board’s work shall be evaluated. 
10. The company shall be conscious of its social responsibilities. 
(The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008)
2. Main principles of The Norwegian government's guidelines for the remuneration of 
top executives in state-owned companies
1. The remuneration of leading personnel in companies under full or partial state ownership 
shall be competitive, but the companies shall not be wage leaders compared with other 
corresponding companies.
2. The chief element in compensation arrangements should be the fixed salary. 
3. Compensation arrangements must be designed to ensure that unreasonable remuneration is 
not paid as a result of external factors that the company’s management is not in a position to 
influence.
4. The individual elements in a pay package must be considered together, so that the fixed 
salary, any variable pay and other benefits, such as pensions and compensation on 
termination of employment, are seen as constituting a whole. The board of directors must 
have an overview of the overall value of the compensation stipulated for each individual 
executive.
5. It is the responsibility of the whole board to adopt the guidelines for the remuneration of 
leading personnel. The remuneration of the general manager shall be adopted by the board 
of directors.
6. The board must ensure that the remuneration of leading personnel does not have unfortunate 
effects for the company or undermine its reputation.
7. The remuneration for the work of the board of directors must not be performance based or 
variable.
8. Members of the company’s management shall not receive special remuneration for holding 
office as board members in other companies in the same group.
9. Agreements made before these guidelines entered into force may continue to apply.
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(The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008)
3. OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises
I. Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for State-Owned Enterprises
The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-playing field 
in markets where state-owned enterprises and private sector companies compete in order to avoid 
market distortions. The framework should build on, and be fully compatible with, the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance.
II. The State Acting as an Owner
The state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent ownership 
policy, ensuring that the governance of state-owned enterprises is carried out in a transparent and 
accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness.
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
The state and state-owned enterprises should recognise the rights of all shareholders and in 
accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ensure their equitable treatment 
and equal access to corporate information.
IV. Relations with Stakeholders
The state ownership policy should fully recognise the state-owned enterprises’ responsibilities 
towards stakeholders and request that they report on their relations with stakeholders.
V. Transparency and Disclosure
State-owned enterprises should observe high standards of transparency in accordance with the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
VI. The Responsibilities of the Boards of State-Owned Enterprises
The boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary authority, competencies and 
objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of management. They 
should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions.
(OECD publishing, 2005)
4. Explanation of Standard & Poor's credit ratings
Long-term issuer credit ratings
AAA: An obligor rated 'AAA' has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
'AAA' is the highest issuer credit rating assigned by Standard & Poor's.
AA: An obligor rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It differs 
from the highest-rated obligors only to a small degree.
A: An obligor rated 'A' has strong capacity to meet its financial commitments but is somewhat more 
susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than 
obligors in higher-rated categories.
109
BBB: An obligor rated 'BBB' has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, 
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened 
capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitments.
BB, B, CCC, and CC: Obligors rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', and 'CC' are regarded as having significant 
speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'CC' the highest. While 
such obligors will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed 
by large uncertainties or major exposures to adverse conditions.
BB: An obligor rated 'BB' is less vulnerable in the near term than other lower-rated obligors. 
However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or 
economic conditions, which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial 
commitments.
B: An obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than the obligors rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has 
the capacity to meet its financial commitments. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions 
will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments.
CCC: An obligor rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favorable business, 
financial, and economic conditions to meet its financial commitments.
CC: An obligor rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable.
R: An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its financial condition. During the 
pendency of the regulatory supervision, the regulators may have the power to favor one class of 
obligations over others or pay some obligations and not others. Please see Standard & Poor's issue 
credit ratings for a more detailed description of the effects of regulatory supervision on specific 
issues or classes of obligations.
SD and D: An obligor rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' has failed to pay one or more of its 
financial obligations (rated or unrated) when it came due. A 'D' rating is assigned when Standard & 
Poor's believes that the default will be a general default and that the obligor will fail to pay all or 
substantially all of its obligations as they come due.
(Standard and Poor's 2009)
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